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Economics is often described as the social science dealing with the allocation of goods and
services and the efficiency of this allocation. The market mechanism has been the most
prominent allocation mechanism in this framework. In terms of modern economics, this
prominence is rooted in general equilibrium theory. The main insight is the first welfare
theorem which states that the market mechanism leads to efficient allocations under
certain assumptions.
One crucial assumption of the welfare theorem is price taking behavior, i.e. no player
is big enough to influence the market price with his behavior. This means, for example,
that a firm cannot strategically restrict its output to increase the market price. However,
as Coase (1960) points out, efficient allocations should even be expected in bargaining
markets with few players. The idea is that it would always be efficient to switch from an
inefficient to an efficient allocation while sharing the additional rents from this switch.
The Coase argument, however, hinges on the assumption of symmetric information,
i.e. every player knows not only his own valuation of any possible allocation but also
the valuation of all other involved parties.1 Akerlof (1970) shows that even markets with
a large number of buyers and sellers are no longer efficient if this assumption fails. He
gives the example of the used car market and argues that sellers of used cars are better
informed about the quality of the car than buyers. As a buyer cannot distinguish good
from bad cars, he is only willing to pay an average price. It might very well be that the
owners of high quality cars find this average price too low to sell their car. Consequently,
high quality cars are not sold even if a sale was efficient, i.e. buyers value a high quality
used car more than sellers. This is an illustration of the adverse selection principle: At
any given market price the sellers of the low quality cars will be more eager to sell their
1The argument of Coase depends, of course, on other assumptions as well, e.g. clearly defined




cars than the sellers of the high quality cars.
The idea that asymmetric information leads to inefficient allocations was also shown
in settings with few players. Mirrlees (1971) analyzes a model where a government sets
an income tax schedule to maximize its redistributive objectives. The assumption here is
that a government can only observe the income someone has but not the effort this person
had to exert to achieve this income. If people differ in their productivity, it is impossible
to achieve full equality: A productive worker could always claim to be unproductive.
Because of his high productivity he has to exert less effort than an unproductive worker
to reach the same income. Mirrlees (1971) shows how the government optimally distorts
the labor supply decision of the workers. The main results are that marginal tax rates
vary between 0 and 1 where only the most productive worker faces a marginal tax rate of
0. This implies that all but the most productive worker work less than socially efficient
as taxation distorts their labor supply decision.
The work of Mirrlees is especially important because it presents the technical machin-
ery that has been used in many applications of similar models later on. Examples are
models of non-linear pricing (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), regulation (Baron and Myerson,
1982) or insurance (Stiglitz, 1977). All these models look at a principal (monopolist,
regulator, monopolist insurance) who chooses a mechanism according to his preferences.
He offers a menu from which the agent (consumer, regulated firm, insured) can choose his
preferred action (quality, quantity, insurance coverage). By his choice, the agent reveals
his private information (willingness to pay, efficiency level, risk). The common assump-
tions are that the principal can commit to the offered menu, i.e. he cannot retract his
offer and substitute it with a different one after the agent has chosen from the menu. By
allowing the principal to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the principal has full bargaining
power and only the presence of asymmetric information allows the agent to earn rents.
All these models share the properties of the Mirrlees (1971) model: The allocation for
all but the best type is distorted below first best.
The main technical machinery used in these models is the following. The private
information of an agent is denoted by a one dimensional parameter called “type”. The
first step is using the revelation principle. This principle says that any equilibrium of any
mechanism can be implemented through a direct revelation mechanism. It is therefore
sufficient to concentrate attention on direct revelation mechanisms. A direct revelation
2
Introduction
mechanism consists of an allocation rule which assigns an allocation to each possible type.
Then the agent is asked for his type and the allocation corresponding to his announced
type is implemented. One has to make sure that each type has an incentive to truthfully
reveal his type. This last requirement is known as incentive compatibility constraint or
incentive constraint for short.
Technically, it would be very difficult to consider the incentive constraints between
all types. However, Mirrlees (1971) introduced assumptions that greatly simplify this
task and have–for this reason–been part of the literature ever since. It is assumed that
higher types are “better” in the following sense: A higher type has (i) a higher utility
from any possible contract and (ii) a higher marginal rate of substitution between the
decision and money at any possible contract (“single crossing”). Let me give an example
to illustrate this: In a regulation setting, a higher type firm would have lower costs and
lower marginal costs at any output level. Hence, type denotes an efficiency level and the
private information of the agent basically conveys information concerning “how good”he
is. This simplifies the problem as it can be shown that non-local incentive constraints
can be neglected under the assumptions above. Put differently, if each type prefers his
contract to the contracts of very close by types, he will also prefer his contract to the
contracts of far away types.
Three chapters of this thesis relax the assumption above. In chapter 2, a procurement
auction is analyzed in which firms are specialized. Specialization directly violates part(i)
of the assumption above: We assume that low types are relatively efficient for low quality
production but high types are relatively efficient for high quality production. Hence, a
firm’s private information is no longer its efficiency but its production technology. At
the quality level a firm is specialized in, it produces at lower costs than any other firm.
While such setups have already been analyzed in settings with one principal and one
agent, the extension to an auction setting is new and creates technical challenges as well
as new insights. For example, non-local incentive constraints have to be checked and
normal scoring rule auctions can no longer implement the optimal mechanism.
Chapter 3 analyzes a health insurance setting where the risk of falling ill is private
information of the agent. In such a setting, part (ii) of the assumption above would mean
that someone with a higher probability of falling ill is willing to pay more for an increase
in insurance coverage. While this seems reasonable on first sight, it is not obvious in the
3
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health context: It is well documented that high health risk is strongly correlated with
low income. It is also documented that, at partial coverage, people with low income often
forego treatment when falling ill in order to save copayments. But then it is not clear
that someone with a higher risk but lower income will be more eager to buy insurance
coverage.2 At full coverage, however, income does not play a role for utilization and
the standard intuition that higher risk agents are more eager to buy insurance coverage
prevails. It is shown that this setup–with a violation of part (ii) of the assumption above-
–can help to explain the empirical puzzle that people with low health risks tend to have
high insurance coverage.
Chapter 4 deals with a violation of part (ii) of the assumption above in a general
principal agent setting with quasilinear utility functions. The focus is here how to deal
with binding non-local incentive constraints. It is shown that binding non-local incentive
constraints reduce the usual distortion in those models and can even lead to upward
instead of downward distortion. The latter distortion can even happen at the top type.
A rough intuition is that the normal downward distortion enables the principal to extract
more rents from high types. If this leads to a violation of a non-local incentive constraint,
the principal has extracted too much from high types: High types wants to claim that
they are (very) low types. In short, the principal cannot extract that much from high
types and therefore the motive for the downward distortion is counteracted.
The last chapter of this thesis turns to a different kind of setting in the theory of
asymmetric information. Following Crawford and Sobel (1982), a cheap talk framework
is used to analyze communication between doctor and patient. The question asked
is whether welfare is maximized if a doctor takes the costs of the health insurance into
account when deciding about a prescription. The alternative considered is that the doctor
maximizes the patient’s utility without taking costs to the insurance into account. At
first glance, internalizing costs seems to increase welfare. However, there is a problem. If
the doctor takes these costs into account his objective differs from the patient’s objective,
i.e. the patient would favor more expensive treatment because his insurance pays for it.
To get the more expensive treatment, the patient will try to convince the doctor that he
2Note that from the insurance point of view it does not matter whether someone is unable or unwilling




is an especially suffering case by exaggerate his symptoms. The doctor will anticipate
this behavior but communication in equilibrium will be noisy. Worse communication
makes it more difficult for the doctor to get the right diagnosis and therefore welfare is
decreased by this communication effect. Whether the communication effect or the cost







The literature on procurement and optimal incentive regulation, see for example Laffont
and Tirole (1987), Laffont and Tirole (1993) or Che (1993), assumes that firms have
private information with regard to its cost function. As usual in screening models, this
private information is represented by a “type”which is assumed to be a scalar. It is then
assumed that higher types are better in the sense that higher types have lower costs. If
costs, for example, depend on the quality produced, this means that a higher type has
lower costs for any quality level.
On the other hand, the private information of a firm is often interpreted as the pro-
duction technology it uses. This technology was determined in the past and can therefore
be treated as given in the context of one specific procurement contract. Following this
interpretation, one should expect that firms chose production technologies that are not
obviously inferior to alternative technologies, i.e. there should be some level of quality
for which the technology of a firm is efficient. Put differently, firms are specialized in
the production of a certain quality level. As we argue below, this specialization is not
covered by standard procurement models which assume that higher types are better in
order to obtain a single crossing property.
Put differently, the procurement literature so far focusses on private information
concerning absolute efficiency of a firm. We will think of private information in terms of
production technology and specialization.
To illustrate what we mean by that, we describe the market for home care in the
Netherlands which was recently liberalized. Local governments now procure home care
3This chapter is based on Boone and Schottmüller (2011b).
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for their citizens and money saved on the procurement can be used now by local govern-
ments for other things, like sports facilities (that is, the money received from the central
government to pay for home care is not earmarked). However, the local government
does have a duty to provide care of some minimum standard. It used to be the case
that regional care offices procured without much incentive to save money. Due to this
liberalization, new players have entered the market. For example, cleaning companies
considered moving into home care. As these new players have no experience with care
(to illustrate, they did not use to hire nurses or other professionals with a medical back-
ground), they are seen as low quality players. At this low quality level, however, they
are cheaper than traditional firms. That is, they can provide simple services like house
cleaning and shopping more cheaply than incumbent home care companies. In this sense,
incumbents are specialized in high quality production while entrants are specialized in
low quality/low costs production.4
This pattern –where incumbents are specialized in high quality service while entrants
specialize in a low quality (low price) service– is typical after liberalization. Many Eu-
ropean countries have liberalized sectors like post, taxis, air transport, railway or local
transport. This has led to entry by players who offer lower quality in, for instance, the
following sense: only make deliveries twice a week (instead of 6 days a week), drive
cars substantially cheaper than a Mercedes (see http://www.tuktukcompany.nl/ for an
example), operate planes with reduced seat pitch and limited on board service as well
as offering less connections, use old trains and buses to transport people. A reaction
often heard by customers and/or incumbents is that the liberalization is bad for welfare
because of the lower quality.5
4To a certain extent this can be resolved through market separation in care and support. People
who do not need medical attention but only someone to clean their home, can be served by cleaning
companies. While patients who stay at home and need a nurse can be served by the incumbents. Hence
at the extremes of the home care spectrum, market separation can alleviate the issue. However, many
cases in home care are not so clear cut. To illustrate, a nurse helping an elderly woman putting on her
clothes in the morning and cleaning the house may recognize the first signs of dementia that would be
overlooked by an employee of a cleaning company. In such a separated market, what we write above
applies to the support segment of the market.
5One could even take a broader point of view and also consider the case of foreign workers entering
a domestic labor market. In the EU there was a heated debate about Polish workers coming to the west
in case Poland would join the EU. Again some people argued that this is bad since Polish workers are
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In each of these cases, one could argue either that quality did not decrease at all or
that before liberalization quality was inefficiently high. In the former case, incumbents
spread rumors to reduce the probability that entrants win contracts. In the latter case,
after liberalization quality goes down but total surplus rises. Presumably, in some of
the examples mentioned either of these two cases arise. However, we are interested in
the case where indeed entrants offer both lower quality and lower total surplus than
incumbents.6 The question we ask is: How should a planner (in the home care example:
the municipality) who wants to maximize welfare optimally organize the procurement in
the face of such low quality entrants?
We show the following results. Think of low (high) type firms as firms specialized in
low (high) quality production. First, if low types (e.g. entrants in the examples above)
are indeed worse high types (incumbents in the examples) with respect to first best
welfare, the incumbents (under the optimal procurement rules) do not lose from entry.
Second, only if first best welfare first decreases and then increases in type, types special-
ized in high quality can lose in the following way: A low quality provider (entrant) can
win the procurement even though the high quality provider (incumbent) would provide
higher welfare under the optimal procurement rules. Third, in this latter case, quality
is distorted above first best for some types and below first best for others. Fourth, in
both cases an interval of types has zero profits (“profit bunching”). Although all types
in this interval have zero profits, they produce different qualities when winning the con-
tract. Put differently, a mass of types will have no economic rents under the optimal
contract although types are perfectly separated in equilibrium. Fifth, if first best welfare
is monotone in type, relatively simple auctions can implement the optimal mechanism.
Technically speaking, a contribution of the paper is to solve a two-dimensional mech-
anism design problem. A technical challenge is that local incentive compatibility is not
straightforwardly sufficient for non-local incentive compatibility, i.e. non-local incentive
constraints have to be checked explicitly. To illustrate the problem, view profits as a
function of the probability of getting the contract. The assumption that firms are spe-
supposedly less qualified than domestic workers.
6There are two reasons for this focus. First, as argued below, in the home care example mentioned
above there is evidence suggesting that the entrants offer lower surplus. Second, if the entrants offer
higher surplus than the incumbents, it is clear that they should be used by a value maximizing planner.
Further, if the cheaper entrants offer higher surplus, no service should be procured from the incumbents.
9
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cialized implies then that “marginal profits” (where marginal refers to a slightly higher
probability of getting the contract) are not monotone in type. This is equivalent to a
violation of single crossing in one dimensional models. As is well known, non-local in-
centive compatibility does not follow from local incentive compatibility if single crossing
is not satisfied.
Our paper is related to the literature on procurement, especially to those papers
in which more than price matters, e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1987), Che (1993), Branco
(1997), Asker and Cantillon (2008) or Asker and Cantillon (2010). This literature shows
how quality (or quantity) is distorted away from first best for rent extraction purposes. It
also analyzes how simple auctions can implement the optimal mechanism. These papers
assume that firms are not specialized, i.e. higher types have lower costs for all quality
levels. This assumption seems to be too strong in many settings, e.g. newly liberalized
industries. We show that relaxing it leads to zero economic rents for a mass of types
which is, to our knowledge, a new result in the literature on procurement auctions. We
also show that implementation of the optimal mechanism by standard auctions, e.g.
scoring rule actions, is no longer straightforward when firms are specialized.
Our paper connects the literature on competitive procurement with the literature
on countervailing incentives, see Lewis and Sappington (1989) for the seminal contri-
bution and Jullien (2000) for the most general treatment. By assuming that firms are
specialized, our paper uses a cost function that resembles the utility functions of the
countervailing incentives literature. Our result that the participation constraint is bind-
ing for a mass of types is also typical for this literature. We contribute by allowing
for several agents bidding for the contract while the countervailing incentive literature
focuses on settings with one principal and one agent. As a consequence of this one agent
setting, the probability of being contracted is one for the agent. Consequently, local in-
centive compatibility constraints are sufficient for non-local incentive compatibility and
many of the technical challenges encountered in our paper do not occur. From an applied
point of view, having more than one firm leads to the result that optimal procurement
auctions can be second best inefficient.
An exception from the focus on one agent in the countervailing incentives litera-
ture are papers on auctions with valuation dependent externalities, see Carrillo (1998),
Figueroa and Skreta (2009) or Brocas (2011). The outside option is type dependent
10
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since the agent suffers the externality even if he does not participate. The main dif-
ference between our paper and this literature is the existence of another variable, i.e.
quality in our paper, while the auction literature focuses on the problem of allocating
one exogenously given good. Hence, the only variable is the probability of getting the
good. Since the used preferences satisfy single crossing, non-local incentive constraints
play again no role.
As we solve a mechanism design problem with two variables, i.e. quality and the
probability of winning, our paper is also related to the literature on multidimensional
screening as surveyed in Rochet and Stole (2003). We contribute here by analyzing a two-
dimensional screening model with countervailing incentives. Other screening models with
one-dimensional type and multidimensional decisions include, for example, Matthews
and Moore (1987) or Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). In these papers, single crossing is
assumed in each dimension which rules out the specialization we have in mind.
The set up of the paper is as follows. In section 2.2, we present the model. Section 2.3
analyzes the case where first best welfare is monotonically increasing in type while section
2.4 deals with U-shaped first best welfare. In the latter case we find a discrimination
result, i.e. some types with lower second best welfare are preferred to types with higher
second best welfare. Section 2.5 shows how the model extends to situations in which the
assumptions of section 2.2 are not met and section 2.6 concludes. Proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2.2. Model
We consider the case where a social planner procures a service of quality q ∈ Q ⊂ IR+
where Q is a convex set. The gross value of this service is denoted by S(q) where we
normalize quality in such a way that S(q) = Sq for some S > 0.7 The cost of production
is denoted by the three times continuously differentiable cost function c(q, θ) where a
firm’s type θ is private information of the firm. We assume that each firm’s type is
drawn independently from a distribution F on [θ, θ̄] which has a strictly positive density
f . We also assume that c is (at least) three times continuously differentiable.
7This is, given our assumptions on the cost function, without loss of generality for weakly concave
gross values S(q).
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We make the following assumptions on the cost function c and distribution function
F .
Assumption 2.1. We assume that the function c(q, θ) satisfies cq, cqq > 0, cqθ < 0, cθθ ≥ 0, for q ∈ Q it is the case that S is high enough compared to c(q, θ) that the planner
always wishes to procure (regardless of the type realization) and the function F satisfies d((1−F (θ))/f(θ))
dθ
< 0 and d(F (θ)/f(θ))
dθ
> 0 .
These assumptions are standard in the literature. The first part says that c is in-
creasing and convex in q. Higher θ implies lower marginal costs cq (the Spence-Mirrlees
condition) and c is convex in θ. It will become clear that this convexity is part of the idea
of specialized firms. The second assumption formalizes the idea in our home care appli-
cation that the government cannot decide not to provide the service. That is, it is always
socially desirable for the service to be supplied. The third part is the monotone hazard
rate (MHR) assumption. Usually this assumption is only made “in one direction”. How-
ever, in the literature on countervailing incentives it is standard to have MHR “in both
directions”, see for example Lewis and Sappington (1989) or Jullien (2000). Well known
distributions that satisfy MHR include normal, uniform and exponential distributions.8
In section 2.5, we discuss what happens if MHR is not satisfied.
The following assumption states that firms are specialized which is the case we want
to analyze in this paper.





> 0 if q < k(θ)






≤ 0 if q < k(θ)





≥ 0 if q < k(θ)
≤ 0 if q > k(θ)
8See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a more complete overview.
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Hence, for high values of q, a higher type θ produces q more cheaply. This is the
usual assumption. We allow for the possibility where low values of q are actually more
cheaply produced by lower θ types. To illustrate, high θ incumbents may have invested
in (human) capital that makes it actually relatively expensive to produce low quality.
If the quality of the product is mainly determined by the qualification of the staff,
incumbents might have more expensive but also more qualified workers. Replacing these
workers is, especially in Europe, costly because of labor market rigidities and search
costs. Consequently, it is more expensive for incumbents to produce low q than for
entrants (and the other way around for high q). The function k(θ) is implicitly defined
by cθ(k, θ) = 0. By assumption 2.1, k(θ) is differentiable and monotonically increasing.
Put differently, as θ increases the quality level k(θ) where cθ = 0 (weakly) increases.
In some sense, our assumption that cθ switches sign in q follows naturally from the
sorting condition cqθ < 0. However, it is the main departure from the existing literature
on procurement which assumes cθ < 0 or equivalently that k(θ) < 0 which implies that
cθ < 0 in the relevant domain. Put differently, the existing literature assumes that types
can be ranked in terms of efficiency irrespective of q. We allow efficiency advantages to
depend on q and therefore firms can be specialized in producing a certain quality.9
To make sure that (i) the planner’s objective function is concave in q and (ii) quality q
increases in type, it is standard in the literature to make assumptions on third derivatives
cqθθ, cqqθ. If cθ does not switch sign, the usual assumption is that these derivatives should
not switch sign either. This is different in our case. To ease the exposition we make the
assumptions on the third derivatives above and discuss in section 2.5 what changes if
these assumptions are not satisfied. Note that we allow for the simple case where these
third derivatives are equal to zero.
As cθ can be positive, it is not clear how first best welfare varies with θ. Below we
define the two cases that we consider here. In order to do this, we introduce the following
notation. First best output is defined as
qfb(θ) = argmax
q
Sq − c(q, θ) (2.1)
which is a singleton as cqq > 0 by assumption 2.1. First best welfare is denoted by
W fb(θ) = Sqfb(θ)− c(qfb(θ), θ). (2.2)
9If q is interpreted as quantity, we allow firms to be specialized in a certain scale of production.
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Our final assumption makes sure that we can focus on two relevant cases only.
Assumption 2.3. Assume that c2qθ > cθθcqq.
This assumption implies that first best welfare is convex in θ. Hence, we only need
to consider two cases. Either first best welfare is increasing in θ or it is first decreasing
and then increasing in θ. Further, we can show that first best quality increases faster
with θ than k(θ) and therefore k can intersect qfb at (at most) one type; a result that
we use below.
Lemma 2.1. First best welfare W fb(θ) is convex in θ and qfbθ (θ) > kθ(θ).
Now we define the two cases that we focus on in this paper.
Definition 2.1. We consider the two cases
(WM) where first best welfare is monotone in θ: dW
fb(θ)
dθ
> 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] or
(WNM) where a θw exists such that
dW fb(θ)
dθ




θ ∈ (θw, θ̄]; further W
fb(θ̄) > W fb(θ).
Hence, we exclude the case where W fb(θ̄) < W fb(θ) (and by lemma 2.1 this is the
only case we exclude). In words, we keep on thinking of high (enough) θ as better.10
The following two examples give cost and surplus functions that correspond to cases
(WM) and (WNM) resp.
Example 2.1. Assume S(q) = q and c(q, θ) = (q−θ)2+q(1−θ/2) where θ is distributed
uniformly on [0, 1]. With these functions k(θ) = 4θ/5 and qfb(θ) = 5θ/4. First best
welfare is W fb(θ) = 9
16
θ2 which is increasing in θ ∈ [0, 1].
The interpretation of this example could be that by the qualification of its staff a firm
has the “natural quality level” θ. Producing at different qualities involves adjustment
costs that increase with the distance |q − θ|. Additionally, there is a linear cost of
quality, e.g. from additional (non-staff) input factors. A high type firm, e.g. a firm that
traditionally has had highly qualified staff and therefore is experienced in high quality
production, has lower additional costs of quality.
10It will become clear that the opposite case with W fb(θ̄) < W fb(θ) is symmetric and does not need
to be considered separately.
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Example 2.2. Assume S(q) = Sq and c(q, θ) = 1
2
q2−θq+θk with k ∈ (S+θ, S+θ̄). Thus
k(θ) = k in assumption 2.2. Then we find that qfb(θ) = S+θ and dW fb(θ)/dθ = S+θ−k.
Hence, with (k − S) ∈ (θ, θ̄) first best welfare increases for θ > k − S and decreases for
θ < k − S.
The second example reflects the standard idea that a firm with high fixed costs (kθ)
has lower marginal costs (cq = q− θ) of producing quality. That is, a firm that produces
with a more capital intensive technology might have lower marginal costs for quality but
higher fixed costs.
Now we are able to set up the mechanism design problem. The planner only needs
one firm to supply the desired service or product. Since n ≥ 2 firms are able to supply,
the planner needs to determine: which firm wins the procurement, what quality level
should this firm supply and how much money should be transferred to firms in return
for this.
Let t(θ) denote the (expected) transfer paid by the planner to a firm of type θ and
x(θ) the probability that type θ wins the procurement. That is, the planner offers a
menu of choices for firms and each firm chooses the option that maximizes its profits.
The planner’s objective is to maximize the expected value of Sq − t. The payoff for a
type θ player that chooses option (q, x, t) is written as t− xc(q, θ).11
Following Myerson (1981), we use a direct revelation mechanism. That is, we design
a menu of choices where (q(θ), x(θ), t(θ)) is the choice “meant for” type θ. Then we make
it incentive compatible (IC) for type θ to choose this option. That is, it is IC for θ to
truthfully reveal his type.
Type θ can misrepresent as θ̂ and its profits equal
π(θ̂, θ) = t(θ̂)− x(θ̂)c(q(θ̂), θ) (2.3)
A menu q(·), x(·), t(·) is IC if and only if
Φ(θ̂, θ) ≡ π(θ, θ)− π(θ̂, θ) ≥ 0 (2.4)
for all θ, θ̂ ∈ [θ, θ̄].
11Note that since firms’ and planner’s utility is quasilinear in money, it is without loss of generality
to assume that transfer payments t are paid without conditioning on winning: A price p which is paid
only when winning the auction is equivalent to an unconditional transfer t = px.
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Hence, using an envelope argument, incentive compatibility implies
πθ(θ) = −x(θ)cθ(q(θ), θ) (2.5)
This equation makes sure that the first order condition for truthful revelation of θ is
satisfied. The next result derives a tractable form for the local second order condition.
Lemma 2.2. For the second order conditions to be locally satisfied, we also need that
xθ(θ)cθ(q(θ), θ) + x(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ)qθ(θ) ≤ 0. (SOC)
As shown in textbooks like Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), first and second order
conditions above imply global IC (as in equation (2.4)) if cθ < 0 for all q ∈ Q. Because
we assume that firms are specialized (assumption 2.2), local IC does not automatically
imply global IC. Hence, we need to verify explicitly below that global IC is satisfied.
Intuitively, assumption 2.2 is similar to a violation of single crossing. Viewing firm’s
payoff, t − xc(q, θ) as a function of x, the standard single crossing assumption would
require that the derivative of t − xc(q, θ) with respect to x is monotone in type, i.e.
single crossing would require that cθ does not change sign. But assumption 2.2 states
exactly the opposite. It is well known that in models without single crossing non-local
IC can become relevant, see for example Araujo and Moreira (2010) or Schottmüller
(2011a). We will first neglect these non-local incentive constraints and verify ex post
that they do not bind. Although there are some issues with defining single crossing in
multidimensional models (see for example McAfee and McMillan (1988)), we refer to cθ
switching sign as a “violation of single crossing”.
Finally, because cθ can switch sign, it is not clear that π(θ) = 0 under the optimal
mechanism. That is, we cannot rule out that π(θ) > 0 while π(θ) = 0 for some θ > θ.
Hence, we need to explicitly track the individual rationality constraint
π(θ) ≥ 0 (2.6)
where we normalize firms’ outside option to zero.
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We assume that the planner maximizes utility Sq minus the transfer paid to firms. If
the planner assigns the project to player i with probability xi where i produces quality
qi and receives transfer ti, the planner’s utility from i can be written as xiSqi − ti =
xi(Sqi − ci) − πi. Above, we did not index q and x by i = 1 . . . n although we have n
firms. It will be shown now that this is indeed unnecessary because of the symmetry of











f(θ1) . . . f(θn)/f(θi)
{
f(θi)[xi(Θ)(Sqi(θi)− c(qi(θi), θi))− πi(Θ)]



















dθ1 . . . dθn
where λi(·) and µi(·), ηi(·) ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers (co-state variables) of the
constraints (2.5), (SOC) and (2.6). Here, xi(Θ) denotes the probability of firm i being
contracted when types are Θ = (θ1 . . . θn). The last constraint ensures that probabilities
sum to no more than 1. Because of assumption 2.1, this constraint will bind and σ(Θ) will
therefore be positive. The second but last term secures nonnegativity of the contracting
probabilities where the Lagrange multiplier τ i(Θ) ≥ 0.
The Euler equation for xi(Θ) can be rewritten as
f(θ1) . . . f(θn)/f(θi)
{




i(θi), θi) + µi(θi)cθiθi(q
i(θi), θi)
}
= σ(Θ) + τ i(Θ). (2.7)
As the objective function is linear in xi(·), we get what is called a “bang-bang” solution
in optimal control theory: For any Θ, the firm i with the highest left hand side in (2.7)
is contracted, i.e. xi(Θ) = 1, while the other firms are not, i.e. xj(Θ) = 0 for all j 6= i.
With this simple structure for the decision x(Θ), the maximization problem is totally
symmetric across all i. In particular, the first order conditions for qi(·) and πi(·) are the
same for all i. Consequently, we can use a notationally much simpler formulation of the
12We immediately focus on the case with non-random qualities, i.e. each type’s quality is a deter-
ministic function of his type only. Appendix E in Jullien (2000) can be easily adapted to our setting to
show that optimal mechanisms are indeed deterministic under our assumptions.
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f(θ)[x(θ)(Sq(θ)− c(q(θ), θ))− π(θ)] (2.8)
+ λ(θ)(πθ(θ) + x(θ)cθ(q(θ), θ))
− µ(θ)(xθ(θ)cθ(q(θ), θ) + x(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ)qθ(θ))
+ η(θ)π(θ)dθ
where λ(·) and µ(·), η(·) ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers (co-state variables) of the
constraints (2.5), (SOC) and (2.6) respectively.
The Euler equation for π(·) implies
λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ) (2.9)
The first order condition for q(·) can be written as
f(θ)(S − cq(q(θ), θ)) + λ(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ) + µ(θ)cqθθ(q(θ), θ) = −µθ(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ). (2.10)
Define the virtual valuation of type θ as




If constraint (SOC) is not binding, the planner’s objective function is linear in x(θ),
where x(θ) is multiplied by V V (θ). Hence, using standard arguments, the firm with the
highest V V wins the procurement contract. The virtual valuation includes next to the
first best welfare a rent extraction term. Roughly speaking, contracting a type more
often, i.e. increasing x(θ), changes the slope of the rent function π(θ); see equation (2.5).
If, for example, the incentive constraints is downward binding and the rent function is
increasing more steeply, types above θ will get a higher rent. λ(θ) is basically the weight
of the types that benefit from such a change.
The following two lemmas are useful in the analysis below. The first lemma establishes
that we have a monotone hazard rate property for our case with specialized firms.
Lemma 2.3. If either
(i) λ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] and λ(θ̄) = 0 or







for values of θ with η(θ) = 0.
As we will see below, the property in equation (2.12) is useful to have. It is part of
the set of conditions to make quality q monotone in θ. Case (i) is relevant for the (WM)
case and case (ii) for (WNM). If η(θ) > 0, it turns out that the monotonicity of quality
is easy to prove (see the discussion of profit bunching below).
Lemma 2.4. Assume µ(θ) = 0 and d(λ(θ)/f(θ))
dθ
< 0 for all θ with η(θ) = 0. Then
1. if there is θ̂ such that q(θ̂) = k(θ̂) then qθ(θ̂) ≥ kθ(θ̂),
2. if there is θ′ such that cθ(q(θ
′), θ′) ≤ 0 then cθ(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0 for all θ > θ
′ and
3. if there exist θ1, θ2 > θ1 with π(θ1) = π(θ2) = 0 then π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ2].
The first result says that if q and k coincide for some value θ̂, then it cannot be the
case that k exceeds q for higher values of θ. Further, it is the case that once cθ ≤ 0
for the optimal q(θ) then cθ stays non-positive for all higher θ. Finally, the third result
implies that if two types have zero profits then all types in between have zero profits
as well. That is, there cannot be a type θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] with positive profits (and negative
profits are excluded by equation (2.6)).
Finally, we use the following notation. Let qh(θ) denote the solution to13
S − cq(q(θ), θ) +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ) = 0 (2.13)
and ql(θ) the solution to14
S − cq(q(θ), θ)−
F (θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ) = 0 (2.14)
In the following two sections we solve the problem for the WM and then the WNM
case. The strategy will be to solve the first order condition and then to verify ex post that
(SOC) and non-local incentive constraints do not bind under our assumptions. Section
2.5 returns to the case where (SOC) is not satisfied.
13If several q solve this equation, we denote the highest by qh. By assumption 2.1 and 2.2, there can
be at most one q > k(θ) satisfying equation (2.13).
14If the solution to this equation is not unique, let the lowest solution be ql. By assumption 2.1 and
2.2, there is at most one q < k(θ) satisfying equation (2.14).
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2.3. First best welfare monotone
We will now characterize the optimal mechanism for the WM-case. The following lemma
is useful to characterize the optimal menu. The lowest type θ receives lowest profits (zero)
and the IC constraint (2.5) is binding downwards. That is, high types would like to mimic
low types (not the other way around).
Lemma 2.5. In the WM-case we have: π(θ) = 0 and λ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄].
Now we are able to characterize the solution for the WM case. There are two cases
to consider. In the first case, the solution (given by equation (2.13)) is such that the
specialization of the firms plays no role. This is basically the solution to a standard
problem. In the second case, low types up to a type θb are bunched on zero profits
(but with different quality levels) and from θb ≥ θ onwards, q(θ) follows the solution in
equation (2.13).
Proposition 2.1. There are two cases:
1. If cθ(q
h(θ), θ) < 0, then qh(θ) in equation (2.13) gives the optimal quality for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ̄]. We have πθ(θ), qθ(θ), xθ(θ) > 0 for each θ ∈ [θ, θ̄].
2. If cθ(q
h(θ), θ) ≥ 0 then there exists a largest θb ≥ θ such that
q(θ) = k(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θb]
and θb is determined by the unique solution to
S − cq(k(θb), θb) +
1− F (θb)
f(θb)
cqθ(k(θb), θb) = 0 (2.15)
For all θ > θb quality q(θ) = q
h(θ). We have
π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θb],
πθ(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θb, θ̄], and
xθ(θ), qθ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄].
The relaxed solution is globally incentive compatible.
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In the first case of proposition 2.1, the possibility that cθ can change sign does not
play a role in the relevant range of q. Therefore, the standard menu as in Che (1993)
results. In the second case, cθ would be positive for some types in the standard quality
menu which is given by (2.13). A direct corollary of lemma 2.1 is that cθ ≤ 0 at the
first best quality level. Hence, the standard downward distortion of q caused by the rent
extraction motive is responsible for having cθ > 0 for some types under q
h. By (2.5),
profits are decreasing at types where cθ > 0. If q
h was implemented, type θb would
therefore have zero profits while lower types would have positive profits. But now the
principal can do better than qh: By assigning k(θ) to types below θb, the principal (i)
saves rents as those types remain at zero profits and (ii) reduces distortion compared
to qh. Because each type is most cost efficient at his k(θ), no other type can profitably
misrepresent as θ if θ expects zero profits and produces quality k(θ). Put differently,
the incentive constraint is lax in this situation. Therefore, it is not necessary to distort
quality further down than k(θ) for rent extraction purposes. In some sense, specialization
leads to “less distortion at the bottom” and more rent extraction.
In conclusion, the menu in case 2 of proposition 2.1 consists of a standard part for
high types and one part where types produce at k(θ) and consequently the incentive
constraint is lax.
2.4. First best welfare non-monotone
In this section, first best welfare is U-shaped. The lowest type θ is no longer worst
(in a first best sense) and therefore he might have positive profits under the optimal
mechanism. The following lemma confirms this intuition.
Lemma 2.6. Under WNM, π(θ) > 0, π(θ̄) > 0 and λ(θ) = λ(θ̄) = 0.
One can think of the WNM case as having two standard menus. One for lower θ
in which lower types are better, profits are decreasing in type and quality is distorted
upwards. The other for higher θ with higher types being better, profits increasing in
type and quality distorted downwards. These two menus have to be reconciled.
In the principal agent literature, irregularities are often dealt with bunching types on
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Figure 2.1: Optimal q(θ) (solid, red) in the WNM case, together with (dashed)
ql(θ), qfb(θ), k(θ), qh(θ).
one decision15. Hence, a first idea could be that bunching on quality might be used to
connect the two menus. It is quickly shown that this does not work. To see this, suppose
–by contradiction– that q(θ) = qb for types θ in the bunching interval. As profits are
decreasing in θ for low θ and increasing in θ for high θ, the type θ′ with the lowest profits
(π(θ′) = 0) would have to be in the bunching interval. From (2.5), the profit minimizing
type has to satisfy cθ(q
b, θ′) = 0. Hence, he produces at qb = k(θ′) and is for this quality
level the most efficient type. But then he has the highest profits of all types in the
quality-bunching interval. This contradiction implies that a menu with quality bunching
cannot be the solution.16
The right way to reconcile the two standard menus is an interval of types with zero
profits (but differing quality levels). Incentive compatibility within the bunched interval
is no problem here. Each bunched type θ will produce at quality level k(θ) at which he
has lower costs than any other type. The following proposition describes the optimal
menu in the WNM case.
Proposition 2.2. There exist unique θ1 and θ2, with θ1 < θ2, such that q
l(θ1) = k(θ1)
15See, for instance, Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch. 7).
16Unless it happens at qb = k in the case where k(θ) = k is constant (on a subset of [θ, θ̄]). In this
case, those types that are bunched on zero profits would also have the same quality q(θ) = k.
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qh(θ) for all θ > θ2
k(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]
ql(θ) for all θ < θ1.
(2.16)
We have
π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]
πθ(θ) < 0 for all θ < θ1
πθ(θ) > 0 for all θ > θ2
qθ(θ) ≥ 0.
Type θw, who has the lowest first best welfare of all types, is in the zero profit interval
and produces his first best quality. It holds that
xθ(θ) < 0 for all θ < θw
xθ(θ) > 0 for all θ > θw.
The relaxed decision is globally incentive compatible.
Figure 2.1 illustrates proposition 2.2. Quality is above first best, i.e. upwards dis-
torted, for low θ and downwards distorted for high θ. This is a consequence of the
U-shaped first best welfare which implies that low types are better around θ and high
types are better around θ̄. Quality is not distorted at the (locally) best types θ and
θ̄ which resembles the well known “no distortion at the top” result. Quality is also
undistorted for the worst type θw which allows a continuous transition from upwards to
downwards distortion.
The boundaries of the zero profit interval [θ1, θ2] are at those types where the low
standard menu and the high standard menu feature q(θ) = k(θ). In the zero profit
interval, each type produces the quality for which he is the cost minimizing type, i.e.
k(θ). Any other quality could not be incentive compatible within a zero profit interval
as either types slightly higher or slightly lower would be more efficient. But then they
could achieve positive profits by misrepresenting. From q(θ) = k(θ), it is evident that
misrepresenting as any other type θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] cannot be profitable and this is exactly the
reason why the zero profit types do not receive any informational rent.
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At θ1 and θ2, q(θ) is kinked. At θ1, for example, the quality according to the standard
low menu (ql) would include additional informational distortion pushing quality upwards.
Therefore ql(θ) > k(θ) for types slightly above θ1 while q(θ) = k(θ) is necessary to stay
in the zero profit interval.
Note that for types above θw the optimal contract is similar to the one derived in
proposition 2.1, i.e. quality and virtual valuation are the same. This is quite intuitive
as first best welfare is increasing for those types. In this sense, proposition 2.2 “extends”
proposition 2.1.
The following proposition formalizes the “grudge” of high θ incumbents against low
θ entrants: although in second best the incumbent generates higher quality and higher
welfare than the entrant, it can happen that the entrant wins the procurement contract.
Incidentally, the opposite can happen as well: an incumbent wins from an entrant who
generates higher (second best) welfare.
Proposition 2.3. The optimal allocation is not (second best) efficient in the sense that
there exist types θ′, θ′′ such that θ′ wins against θ′′ while W sb(θ′′) > W sb(θ′).17
A similar result is well known in auctions with asymmetric bidders. Myerson (1981)
shows that it is optimal to discriminate between bidders drawing their valuations from
different distributions. For example, if bidder A draws his valuation from a distribution
putting more weight on high values and bidder B draws from a distribution with low
values, the auction will favor B. This decreases the rents A will get by stimulating
him to bid more aggressively. In our case, there is only one distribution from which
types are drawn. Nevertheless, the intuition is similar. The reason for discrimination
are informational distortions. For the lower standard menu, the relevant term inducing
distortion in the virtual valuation is −F (·)cθ(·). For high θ, the respective term is
(1−F (·))cθ(·). While discrimination in Myerson (1981) results from the fact that different
distributions govern the distortion, discrimination in our model is due to different parts
of the same distribution governing distortion: For low θ, the left tail is relevant and
for high types the right tail of the distribution matters for distortion. The reason is
that the local incentive constraint is upward binding in the lower standard menu and
17We use the term second best efficient to describe a situation where the selection rule picks the firm
providing the highest W sb. W sb is welfare under the optimal quality schedule derived in propositions
2.1 and 2.2.
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downward binding in the upper standard menu. On a more intuitive level, by ex ante
committing to let a worse low type θ′ < θw win against a better high type θ′′ > θw,
one can save informational rents for θ′′ and all types above him. The reason is that the
probability that θ′′ wins the auction, i.e. x(θ′′), decreases and therefore the slope of the
rent function πθ(θ
′′) = x(θ′′)cθ(q(θ
′′), θ′′) decreases. Loosely speaking, one stimulates θ′′
and higher types to bid more aggressively.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of how to implement the optimal
menus in propositions 2.1 and 2.2. We argue that this is more straightforward for the
WM than for the WNM case. In each case, we have in mind that the government
announces at the start its willingness p to pay (conditional on winning) for each quality
level q. Hence, p corresponds to t/x in the mechanism design notation used so far. In
case 1 in proposition 2.1, the government can then organize a second price auction to
determine the firm that wins the contract. The firm with the highest bid, wins and pays
the second highest bid. This firm is then allowed to choose its combination (q, p) from
the menu announced by the government. Since the planner wants the highest type to win
and profits are strictly increasing in θ, such an auction selects the right type as winner.
Since we assume that the service is valuable enough that it has to be supplied, there is
no reserve price in this auction.
However, in the second case in proposition 2.1 there are a number of types with equal
(zero) profits while the planner prefers higher θ for the case where quality increases
in θ. The auction described above is not optimal here since it cannot discriminate
between types with the same profits. In that case, the selection mechanism must be
based on quality directly. To be more precise, let firms bid qualities. The firm bidding
the highest quality wins, produces this quality and receives payment p (according to the
menu announced by the government).
In the WNM case, the auctions described above do not implement the optimal mech-
anism. The planner’s preference over winning types is given by the virtual valuation
V V in equation (2.11). Again, a price auction cannot work because of the zero profit
interval: These types have the same valuation for winning the auction but should have
different probabilities of winning (V V (θ) and thus x(θ) is not constant over θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]).
An auction based on quality does not work either because qθ and xθ do not have the
same sign for all types. Furthermore, a scoring rule auction, as analyzed in Che (1993),
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cannot implement the optimal mechanism either. This can be seen as follows.
In a scoring rule auction, each bidder bids a score and the bidder with the highest
score is contracted. Consider a scoring rule of the form score(p, q) = s(q) − p, where
the price p is (only) paid to the winner of the auction. In a second score auction, the
winner has to provide (q, p) which corresponds to the second highest score. Hence, the
second highest score, score(2), determines the rents going to the winner. Consequently,





To implement the optimal mechanism, it must be the case that the first order condition
sq(q)− cq(q, θ) = 0
yields q(θ) as given by equation (2.16). As shown by Che (1993), it then follows that






−1(s)) ds for q ∈ [q(θ), q(θ̄)]
and −∞ for all other q; where q−1(s) is the inverse of q(θ) and λ(θ) is the Lagrange
multiplier (co-state) of the optimal menu derived in proposition 2.2.
This implies that the winner is determined by the firm bidding the highest value of







while in the optimal mechanism, the winner has the highest value of V V as given by
equation (2.11).18 Put differently, if the scoring rule implements the optimal mechanism
it has to hold that bid(θ′) = bid(θ′′) whenever V V (θ′) = V V (θ′′) under the optimal
mechanism. The following proposition says that generically this is untrue under WNM.
Proposition 2.4. Generically, a simple scoring rule auction cannot implement the op-
timal mechanism in the WNM case.
Consequently, more general mechanisms are needed for implementation in the WNM
case. As shown in proposition 2.3, the (optimal) government’s decision may be criticized
18Note that there is also an issue in choosing the right tie-breaking rule. From the envelope theorem,
d bid(θ)
dθ
= −cθ(q(θ), θ). Therefore, all types with zero profits have the same bid because q(θ) = k(θ) for
them which implies d bid(θ)
dθ
= 0. The tie breaking rule should follow V V (θ) here, making the mechanism
not easy to implement.
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ex post in case a firm loses from a winner generating lower (second best) welfare. If the
government cannot implement the optimal mechanism because of its complexity, more
inefficiencies will be introduced in the WNM case.
2.5. Robustness
Above we made some assumptions on third derivatives of the cost function and the
distribution of θ for ease of exposition. Here we discuss how the solution changes when
these assumptions are no longer satisfied. In principle, there are two possible problems
that can arise: First, the second order condition (SOC) could be violated in the derived
solution. Second, the program is no longer globally concave.
2.5.1. Violation second order condition
For concreteness, we focus here on the WM case and assume that the problems arise
because of a violation of the MHR assumption. The cases where third derivatives cause
problems with (SOC) are dealt with analogously. In the WM case, the change in q for
θ > θb is given by
qθ(θ) =




d( 1−F (θ)f(θ) )
dθ




The assumptions made above are sufficient conditions for qθ(θ) ≥ 0. Hence, if F does
not satisfy the MHR assumption, it can still be the case that qθ(θ) ≥ 0 and xθ(θ) ≥ 0.
19
If q and x are non-decreasing in θ, we know that the second order condition (SOC) is
satisfied. Even if, say, qθ(θ) < 0 while xθ(θ) > 0, equation (SOC) can still be satisfied.
Now we consider the case where d((1 − F (θ))/f(θ))/dθ > 0 for θ > θb in such a
way that qθ < 0 causes a violation of (SOC). We first sketch how this is dealt with
in general. Then we work out an example. As shown by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984)
and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for the case of a single dimensional decision (say, only
quality), a violation of the second order condition leads to bunching: several θ-types
produce the same quality. However, in our case the decision is two dimensional: quality
q and the probability of winning x. In fact, below we do not work with x but with the
19Whether xθ ≥ 0 can be derived from the expression for dV V (θ)/dθ in equation (2.37).
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q
V V
(q(θ), V V (θ))
xθcθ + xcqθqθ = 0
Figure 2.2: Solution for quality q(θ) and virtual valuation V V (θ) for the case where
(second order) condition (SOC) is violated.
virtual valuation V V as there is a one-to-one relation between the two (i.e. higher V V
implies higher x and the other way around). We show that in this two-dimensional case,
it is not necessarily true that a violation of (SOC) leads to bunching of types θ to the
same quality q and probability of winning x.20
We use figure 2.2 to illustrate the procedure. This figure shows equation (SOC)
(where it holds with equality) in (q, V V ) space and the solution (q(θ), V V (θ)) that follows
from the planner’s optimization problem while ignoring the second order condition; i.e.











In the simple case (that we also use in the example below) where cθθ = 0, this curve
boils down to
x(θ)cθ(q(θ), θ) = −K < 0 (2.18)
for some constant K > 0, as differentiating equation (2.18) with respect to θ indeed gives
20A related point is already made by Garćıa (2005). He shows in a multidimensional screening model
where single crossing holds in all dimensions that non-monotone decisions can be optimal (even if second









Figure 2.3: Inverse hazard rate with f(θ) = (θ − a)2 + 1/50
xθcθ + xcqθqθ = 0.
The solution (q(θ), V V (θ)) ignoring the second order constraint, starts at θ in the
bottom left corner and moves first over the thick (red) part of this curve, then follows
the thin (blue) part, curving back (i.e. both q and x fall with θ) then both q and x
increase again with θ and we end on the thick (red) part of the curve. The part of the
curve where qθ, xθ < 0 violates equation (SOC).
Hence, we need to find θa, θb where (SOC) starts to bind and µ(θ) > 0. Then from θa
onwards, we follow the binding constraint till we arrive at θb, from which point onwards
we follow the solution (q(θ), V V (θ)) again. As shown in figure, the choice of θa determines
both the trajectory (q̃(θ), ˜V V (θ)) satisfying equation (SOC) and the end point of this
trajectory θb. Since µ(θ) = 0 both for θ < θa and for θ > θb, it must be the case that
∫ θb
θa
µθ(θ)dθ = 0. To illustrate, for the case where cqθθ = 0,




f(θ)(S − cq(q̃(θ), θ)) + (1− F (θ)cqθ(q̃(θ), θ)
cqθ(q̃(θ), θ)
dθ = 0 (2.19)
We now illustrate this approach with an example.
Example 2.3. To violate the monotone hazard rate assumption we use the density
f(θ) = (θ − a)2 + 1/50 with support [0, a+ 1/4] where a has to be approximately 1.42 to
satisfy the requirements of a probability distribution. The hazard rate of this distribution
is depicted in figure 2.3.
Assume that there are two firms and that c(q, θ) = 1
2
q2−qθ+θ. Then cθ(q, θ) = 1−q
which changes sign at q = 1. As cθθ = 0, the binding second order condition takes the
21If cqθθ 6= 0, the differential equation (2.10) has to be solved for µ(θ). Although a bit tedious, this is
do-able since the differential equation is linear and first order in µ(θ).
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for some K > 0. Note that this equation does not depend on θ. Hence, in this case,
“following the constraint” takes the form of bunching θ ∈ [θa, θb] on some point
(q̃, ˜V V ) (2.20)
where ˜V V corresponds to the probability x̃ = K
q̃−1
. Choosing θa, fixes q̃ = q(θa) and




f(θ)(S − (q̃(θa)− θ))− (1− F (θ))dθ = 0 (2.21)
Since equation (SOC) will already start to bind for θa where qθ(θa) > 0, it is routine to
verify that this equation is downward sloping in θa. The unique solution in this example
is θa ≈ 1.1685 which gives a corresponding θb = 1.428 and q̃ = 1.923.
While the ironing procedure described above takes care of the local second order
condition (SOC), this does not necessarily imply global incentive compatibility. Global
constraints are mathematically intractable in general frameworks; see Araujo and Mor-
eira (2010) and Schottmüller (2011a) for special examples of how to handle global con-
straints. However, the following proposition establishes that global constraints do not
bind for a family of cost functions. This family includes the functions we used in the
example and the most commonly used linear-quadratic cost functions.
Proposition 2.5. If cθθ = 0 and the local second order condition (SOC) is satisfied, the
solution is globally incentive compatible.
2.5.2. Concavity in q
The second possible problem with cqqθ not satisfying assumption 2.2 is that the planner’s
objective function (2.8) is not necessarily globally concave in q(·). However, in principle,
the solution will still satisfy the first order conditions derived before. In particular, it
is never optimal to choose q → ∞: Since costs are convex and the principal’s utility
is linear in q, costs are higher than benefits for q high enough and therefore optimal
qualities cannot be arbitrarily high. Hence, if Q is not bounded, the solution will be
interior and satisfy the conditions derived above.
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If the set of available qualities is a compact subset of IR+, corner solutions could play
a role; e.g. if quality cannot be higher than some level q̄, some types might have q(θ) = q̄
and the first order conditions do not apply for them. However, such a situation can be
easily approximated by a continuous cost function which is very steep around q̄ (instead
of jumping discontinuously to infinity) and to which our analysis would apply.
2.6. Conclusion
We analyzed a procurement setting in which the procurement agency cares not only
about the price but also about the quality of the product. In many post liberalization
situations incumbents seem to be good at producing high quality while entrants can
produce low quality at very low costs. A similar pattern emerges if there are gains from
specialization and firms can specialize in either high quality or low costs.
Standard procurement models do not account for this possibility because single cross-
ing is assumed in all dimensions. More precisely, it is assumed that “type” denotes effi-
ciency and not specialization. This implies that a more efficient type is simply better for
all quality levels. We relax this assumption and allow each type to be specialized, i.e. to
be the most most efficient type for some quality level. This leads to a bunching of types
on zero profits. The intuition is that distorting quality further than the quality level a
type is specialized in (for rent extraction reasons) is not necessary: A type producing
“his quality level” with expected profits of zero cannot be mimicked by any other type.
Hence, the incentive constraint is lax and an interval of zero profit types is feasible. In
short, specialization limits distortion and helps the principal to extract rents.
If we assume that first best welfare is U-shaped, e.g. there are gains from specializing
in low costs even from a welfare point of view, we get an interesting discrimination
result. Types with lower second best welfare can be preferred to types with higher second
best welfare. This is similar to auctions with asymmetric bidders where discriminatory
mechanisms are well known. Contrary to this literature, bidders are drawn from the
same distribution in our model. The intuition is that the incentive constraint is first
upward and then, for higher types, downward binding. Therefore, different parts of the
distribution govern the distortion for low and high types. By committing to let some
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worse types win against some better types, the principal can reduce the rents of the
best types. Loosely speaking, the better types are incentivized to bid more aggressively.
Put differently, competitive pressure can be exerted even by firms that are clearly worse.
Further, in this case “gold plating” can be optimal in the sense that some types produce









Then we find that
W fbθθ (θ) =
c2qθ
cqq
− cθθ > 0
from the assumptions made on the function c(q, θ). Further, it follows from cθ(k(θ), θ) ≡
0 that cqθkθ(θ) + cθθ = 0. Hence, q
fb






which holds by assumption 2.3. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2.2 Define the function
Φ(θ̂, θ) = π(θ, θ)− π(θ̂, θ) ≥ 0
By IC this function is always positive and equal to zero if θ̂ = θ. In other words, the


























































= xθ(θ)cθ(q(θ), θ) + x(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ)qθ(θ) ≤ 0
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which is the inequality in the lemma. Q.E.D.







We consider the following four cases:
λ(θ)
≥ 0 < 0
≥ 0 (α) (β)
fθ(θ) < 0 (δ) (γ)
Let’s consider the two cases in the lemma in turn.
Case (i): We can solve




Hence, we need to show
−f(θ)2 − λ(θ)fθ(θ) < 0 (2.26)
where we use η(θ) = 0. This is obviously satisfied in case (α). In case (δ) we have




Then this inequality is implied by the MHR assumption 2.1 where we write d((1 −
F (θ))/f(θ))/dθ < 0 as
−f(θ)2 − (1− F (θ))fθ(θ) < 0 (2.27)
because η(t) ≥ 0. As we assume λ(θ) ≥ 0, we do not need to consider cases (β, γ).
Case (ii): Here we have a second way in which we can write λ(θ):




Equation (2.26) is clearly satisfied in cases (α), (γ). Case (δ) is satisfied for the same
reason as above. Hence, we only need to consider case (β). Using equation (2.28), we
write inequality (2.26) as




where we use η(θ) = 0. Then this inequality is implied by the MHR assumption 2.1
where we write d(F (θ)/f(θ))/dθ > 0 as
−f(θ)2 + F (θ)fθ(θ) < 0 (2.29)
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and η(t) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2.4 We prove the parts in turn.
Part 1.: Suppose not, that is assume that q(θ̂) = k(θ̂) (i.e. cθ(q(θ̂), θ̂) = 0) and
qθ(θ̂) < kθ(θ̂). Then for ε > 0 small enough, it is the case that
cθ(q(θ̂ + ε), θ̂ + ε) > 0
and thus (by (2.5))
πθ(θ̂ + ε) < 0
This is only feasible if π(θ̂) > 0 and thus η(θ̂) = 0. With µ(θ) = 0 the first order
condition (2.10) becomes
S − cq(q(θ), θ) +
λ(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ) = 0 (2.30)






As derived in the proof of lemma 2.1, kθ =
cθθ
−cqθ
. Comparing qθ and kθ in the point θ̂
we can simplify the expression in (2.31) by noting that cqθθ = cqqθ = 0 for θ = θ̂ by







which leads to a contradiction because the left hand side is negative by assumption 2.3
and the right hand side is positive by assumption. Hence, it must be the case that
qθ(θ̂) ≥ kθ(θ̂) at such a point θ̂.
Part 2. Suppose not, that is there exists θ′′ > θ′ such that cθ(q(θ
′′), θ′′) > 0, i.e.
such that q(θ′′) < k(θ′′). This implies that there exists θ̂ ∈ [θ′, θ′′) such that q(θ̂) = k(θ̂)
and qθ(θ̂) < kθ(θ̂). Part 1 of this lemma shows that this is not possible.
Part 3. The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose, profits were positive on some
interval (θ̂1, θ̂2) with θ1 < θ̂1 < θ̂2 < θ2.
22 Quality q(θ) for θ ∈ (θ̂1, θ̂2) will be determined
by (2.30) with λ(θ) = 1−F (θ)−
∫ θ̄
θ̂2
η(θ) dθ. Clearly, there has to be a type θ̂ ∈ (θ̂1, θ̂2) at
which π(θ) attains a local maximum. Since profits are increasing for θ̂−ε and decreasing
22By continuity of π(θ), it cannot be the case that π(θ) > 0 only in a point.
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for θ̂+ε, (2.5) implies that q(θ̂−ε) > k(θ̂−ε) and q(θ̂+ε) < k(θ̂+ε). Hence, q(θ̂) = k(θ̂)
and
qθ(θ̂) < kθ(θ̂)
which is impossible by part 1 of this lemma. This is the required contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2.5 In order to proof this, we need the following result.
Lemma 2.7. At all qualities greater or equal to his first best quality qfb(θ), the costs of
type θ are lower than the costs of all θ̃ < θ, i.e. c(q, θ) < c(q, θ̃) ∀q ≥ qfb(θ) and θ̃ < θ.
Proof of lemma 2.7 At qfb(θ) the claim follows from the strictly increasing first
best net value assumption (WM): If a lower θ had the same or lower costs at qfb(θ), he
could produce at least the same net value by producing at qfb(θ). Given that θ has lower
costs for qfb(θ), it is sufficient to show that the incremental costs of producing higher q,
i.e. c(q, ·)− c(qfb(θ), ·), is lower for θ than for any θ̃ < θ. Since,




is strictly decreasing in θ̃ because of cqθ < 0, the claim follows. Note that an implication
of this claim is that
cθ(q, θ) < 0 for all q ≥ q
fb(θ) (2.34)
as otherwise a marginally lower type would have lower costs. Q.E.D.
The proof of lemma 2.5 is by contradiction. Suppose there exists θ′ such that λ(θ′) <
0.23 Since the transversality condition implies λ(θ̄) = 0,24 it follows from the continuity
of λ(θ) that there must be an interval of types in between θ′ and θ̄ where λθ(θ) =
−f(θ) + η(θ) > 0. This can only happen if η(θ) > 0 or equivalently π(θ) = 0 on this
interval. On such a zero profit interval cθ(q, θ) = 0 as πθ(θ) would not be zero otherwise.
25
Hence, each type produces a quality such that he is the cost minimizing type for this
quality. Furthermore, each of these types has π(θ) = 0. These two facts imply that
incentive compatibility cannot be a problem on the zero profit interval. In other words,
we can ignore constraint (SOC) on this interval, i.e. µ(θ) = 0 on this interval.
23As λ is continuous, it is without loss of generality to assume θ′ > θ.
24Because the highest type has strictly positive profits (see below).




Denote the lowest type with zero profits as θ1 = inf{θ|π(θ) = 0, θ ≥ θ1}. Note that
from what was said above λ(θ1) < 0 and µ(θ1) = 0. Furthermore, cθ(q(θ1−ε), θ1−ε) ≥ 0
for ε > 0 small enough.26 Equation (2.34) then implies q(θ1− ε) < q
fb(θ1− ε). However,
this contradicts the first order condition with respect to q:
f(θ)(Sq(q(θ))− cq(q(θ), θ)) + λ(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ) + µ(θ)cqθθ(q(θ), θ) = −µθ(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ)
(2.35)
Since µ(θ1) = 0, we can ignore the µ(θ1 − ε) term for ε > 0 small enough. Further,
µθ(θ1 − ε) ≤ 0 since µ(θ) ≥ 0. But then cθq < 0 and λ(θ1 − ε) < 0 imply Sq(q(θ1 −
ε))− cq(q(θ1 − ε), θ1 − ε) < 0 which contradicts q(θ1 − ε) < q
fb(θ1 − ε). Hence, there is
a contradiction and λ(θ) ≥ 0 has to hold.
To prove the other part of the lemma, suppose (again by contradiction) that π(θ) > 0.
Consequently, the dynamic optimization problem will include the transversality condition
λ(θ) = 0. Given that λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ), this implies that λ(θ) < 0 for some interval
of θ starting at θ.27 As we just proved, it is not possible to have λ(θ) < 0. This is the
required contradiction and we conclude that π(θ) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.1
We will analyze the problem without the incentive constraint (SOC) first, i.e. µ(θ) =
0, and show afterwards in lemma 2.9 that it is satisfied. The first order condition (2.10)
becomes
S − cq(q(θ), θ) +
λ(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ) = 0 (2.36)
Since θ̄ is the best type (in a first best sense), we expect his profits to be positive and
therefore η(θ̄) = 0 and also the transversality condition λ(θ̄) = 0 holds (indeed below we
verify that π(θ̄) > 0). Therefore (2.9) implies λ(θ) = 1 − F (θ) for some high types for
which the profit constraint does not bind. Note that for this case, equation (2.36) can
be written as (2.13).
Now we have two cases. With the solution qh(θ) given by (2.13) it is the case that
either
1. cθ(q
h(θ), θ) < 0 or
26This follows form the definition of θ1: Since π(θ1) = 0 and π(θ1−ε) ≥ 0, profits have to be decreasing
at θ1 − ε for ε small enough.
27To be precise, this follows from the continuity of π(θ): As π(θ) > 0, profits have to be positive for
some interval of low θ and consequently η(θ) = 0 for those θ. This implies λ(θ) < 0.
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2. cθ(q
h(θ), θ) ≥ 0
The first case implies that q(θ) > k(θ). Hence, for the first case, π(θ) = 0 and
πθ(θ) > 0 for (at least) θ close to θ (see equation (2.5)). It follows from part 2 of lemma
2.4 that cθ(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. Thus πθ ≥ 0 for each θ > θ and the profit constraint
π(θ) ≥ 0 does not bind for θ > θ. Therefore the solution in equation (2.13) is the overall
solution.
Finally, consider the virtual surplus in equation (2.11) with λ(θ) = 1 − F (θ). Using











cθθ > 0 (2.37)
Since the project is allocated to the firm with the highest V V , it is allocated to the firm
with the highest θ. Thus xθ(θ) > 0.
Now consider the second case in proposition 2.1 with cθ(q
h(θ), θ) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.8. If cθ(q
h(θ), θ) ≥ 0, then q(θ) = k(θ).
Proof of lemma 2.8 If cθ(q
h(θ), θ) = 0, the lemma is true.
If cθ(q(θ), θ) > 0 then πθ(θ) < 0. Then π(θ) = 0 (lemma 2.5) implies that this violates
the constraint that profits should be non-negative. In this case the solution cannot be
given by equation (2.13) as the profit constraint is binding. Hence, the solution q(θ)
is given by equation (2.30) where (see equation (2.9)) λ(θ) is given by equation (2.28).
This solution cannot feature cθ(q(θ), θ) > 0 as this would lead to a violation of π(θ) ≥ 0
for θ close to θ.
The following argument shows that cθ(q(θ), θ) < 0 is not possible either. In this case
πθ(θ) > 0. Then either (i) there exists θ
′ > θ such π(θ′) = 0 or (ii) q(θ) = qh(θ). Case
(i) leads to a contradiction because of lemma 2.4. If (i) does not happen, then η(θ) = 0
for all θ > θ, which implies case (ii). However, case (ii) with cθ(q(θ), θ) < 0 contradicts
the assumption in the lemma that cθ(q
h(θ), θ) ≥ 0.
Thus we have cθ(q(θ), θ) = 0 or equivalently q(θ) = k(θ). Q.E.D.
Because of lemma 2.8, there is a largest θb ≥ θ such that q(θ) = k(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θb].
This θb is uniquely defined.
Since π(θ) = 0 and πθ = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θb], we have π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θb].
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Uniqueness of θb as defined in (2.15) follows from the fact that the expression in
equation (2.15) is strictly increasing in θb. Differentiating the expression with respect to
θb and using assumption 2.2 we find:
1
−cqθ








We can only leave the interval [θ, θb] if πθ(θb + ε) > 0 for ε > 0 small enough. Then
π(θ) > 0 for all θ > θb. If not, there would be θ
′ > θb such that π(θ
′) = 0 which
contradicts lemma 2.4. Hence, q(θ) = qh(θ) for all θ > θb and equation (2.15) makes sure
that q(θ) is continuous.
As in the previous case, we have qθ(θ) > 0 for θ > θb. For θ ∈ [θ, θb] we have
q(θ) = k(θ) which is (strictly) increasing in θ if cθθ > 0. If cθθ = 0, quality is constant
over the range θ ∈ [θ, θb].











cθθ ≥ 0 (2.38)
where the inequality is strict for θ > θb and for θ ∈ [θ, θb] if cθθ > 0.
Finally, lemma 2.9 establishes global incentive compatibility. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.9. The relaxed solution in proposition 2.1 is globally incentive compatible.
Proof of lemma 2.9 The monotonicity of x(θ) and q(θ) together with cθ ≤ 0 and
cqθ < 0 imply that the local incentive compatibility constraint (SOC) is satisfied.
For global incentive compatibility we first show that no θ can profitably misrepresent
as θ̂ > θ. This is true if
π(θ)− π(θ̂)− x(θ̂)[c(q(θ̂), θ̂)− c(q(θ̂), θ)] ≥ 0
Using (2.5), this can be rewritten as
∫ θ̂
θ
x(t)cθ(q(t), t)− x(θ̂)cθ(q(θ̂), t) dt ≥ 0





xθ(s)cθ(q(s), t) + x(s)cqθ(q(s), t)qθ(s) ds dt ≤ 0 (2.39)
The second term of the integrand is negative by the monotonicity of q(θ) in proposition
2.1. Note that we saw in the proof of proposition 2.1 that cθ(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0 for all types.
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Since t ≤ s and cθθ ≥ 0, clearly ct(q(s), t) ≤ 0 in the first term of the integrand. As
xθ ≥ 0 in proposition 2.1, inequality (2.39) has to hold.
To show that no θ gains by misrepresenting as θ̂ < θ we use the following notation
introduced in equation (2.3).
π(θ̂, θ) = t(θ̂)− x(θ̂)c(q(θ̂), θ)
The idea is to define the following cost function
c̃(a, θ) = min{c(q(a), a), c(q(a), θ)} (2.40)
where q(a) is the optimal quality schedule derived above. Next define
π̃(a, θ) = t(a)− x(a)c̃(a, θ) (2.41)
The following inequalities show that the solution derived above satisfies IC globally as
well:
π(θ̂, θ)− π(θ, θ)


























xθ(a)(c̃(q(a), θ)− c(q(a), a)) + x(a)(c̃a(q(a), θ)− cq(q(a), a)qθ(a))da(2.43)
≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from the definition of c̃(·) and the observation that






= 0 by the first order
condition of truthful revelation. Equation (2.43) follows from the definitions of the
derivatives of π(a, θ) and π̃(a, θ) w.r.t. a. The final inequality follows from the properties
xa(a), qa(a) ≥ 0 and the following three observations. First, by definition of c̃(·) we have
c̃(q(a), θ)− c(q(a), a) ≤ 0
Second, for values of a where c̃(a, θ) = c(q(a), θ) we have
c̃a(q(a), θ)− cq(q(a), a)qa(a) = (cq(q(a), θ)− cq(q(a), a))qa(a) ≤ 0
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because cqθ ≤ 0. Finally for values where c̃(a, θ) = c(q(a), a) we have









because in our solution cθ(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2.6 We show that a menu featuring π(θ) = 0 is not optimal. In
the WNM case, first best welfare is decreasing in type around θ. A standard envelope
argument shows that this implies cθ(q
fb(θ), θ) > 0. Now suppose, π(θ) = 0. Then
πθ(θ) ≥ 0 which implies cθ(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0 by (2.5). Therefore, q(θ) > q
fb(θ). But then a
simple change in the menu would be beneficial and therefore the menu cannot be optimal:
Change q(θ) to qfb(θ) and adjust transfers such that π(θ) stays zero. As θ has again
zero profits his incentive compatibility does not change. Reducing quality will make θ’s
menu point even less attractive for other types.28 By the definition of qfb(·), this change
is beneficial. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.2 Again the global IC constraint will be neglected first and
checked ex post.
From lemma 2.6 we know that π(θ̄), π(θ) > 0 and therefore the transversality con-
ditions λ(θ̄) = λ(θ) = 0 have to hold. Furthermore, the positive profit constraint is
non binding and therefore η(θ̄) = η(θ) = 0. By (2.9) and the continuity of π, we have
λ(θ) = 1 − F (θ) > 0 close to θ̄ and λ(θ) = −F (θ) < 0 close to θ. For these two ex-
pressions of λ(·), the monotone hazard rate assumption implies that the quality schedule
determined in (2.30) is increasing in type, i.e. qθ(θ) > 0.
Next we proof the existence of θ1 and θ2. By continuity of λ(θ),
29 there exists an
interval [θ̃1, θ̃2] such that λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ) > 0 and thus π(θ) = 0. Consequently,
πθ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ̃1, θ̃2]. Let θ1 (θ2) denote the lowest (highest) θ̃1 (θ̃2) such that
this is true for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]. By continuity of q(θ) it follows that q
l(θ1) = k(θ1) and
qh(θ2) = k(θ2).
As shown in the proof of proposition 2.1 the expression in equation (2.15) is strictly
increasing in θb. This implies the uniqueness of θ2 = θb. With a similar argument one
shows that




28This argument can be made formal using the same dc expression as in the proof of lemma 2.7.
29In particular, to connect λ(θ) < 0 for small θ with λ(θ) > 0 for high θ, we need λθ > 0 over some
range.
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is increasing in θ. This implies the uniqueness of θ1 which solves
S − cq(k(θ1), θ1)−
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
cqθ(k(θ1), θ1) = 0
Since
S − cq(k(θ), θ)−
F (θ)
f(θ)




for all θ it follows that indeed θ1 < θ2.
By the uniqueness of θ1 and θ2, cθ is positive for θ < θ1 and negative for θ > θ2.
Together with (2.5) this implies the sign of πθ as stated in the proposition.
In (θ1, θ2), there has to be a type with λ(θ) = 0. From (2.30), this type produces his
first best quality and as he is in the zero profit interval qfb(θ) = k(θ). The only type
satisfying this conditions is the type with the lowest first best welfare θw. Note that all
θ < (>)θw have cθ(q(θ), θ) ≥ (≤)0 and also λ(θ) < (>)0. Differentiating the virtual













From the paragraph above and the monotone hazard rate assumption, the virtual val-
uation, and therefore x(θ), has to be decreasing on [θ, θ1] and increasing on [θ2, θ̄]. On
(θ1, θ2), cθ is zero and as λ flips sign at θw the proposition follows.
It was already mentioned that q(θ) is increasing for types with positive profits. Since
k(θ) is non-decreasing, q(θ) is non-decreasing for all θ.
Finally, lemma 2.10 establishes global incentive compatibility. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.10. The relaxed solution in proposition 2.2 is globally incentive compatible.
Proof of lemma 2.10 All θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] produce at k(θ) which is the quality level
at which a type has lower cost than any other type. Since these types also have zero
profits, no other type can profitably misrepresent as θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]. For θ ≥ θw the menu
is equivalent to the one described in proposition 2.1. Therefore, lemma 2.9 implies non-
local IC on this part of the menu. The same proof as for lemma 2.9 with reversed signs
implies that the menu for θ < θw is non-locally IC.
What remains to be shown is that no type θ < θw can profitably misrepresent as







′), t) dt < 0 (2.45)
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The inequality follows from the fact that k(θ), k(θ2) < q(θ
′) and cqθ < 0. Therefore, the
integrand is negative over the whole range. Incentive compatibility for θ requires
π(θ) ≥ π(θ′) + x(θ′)[c(q(θ′), θ′)− c(q(θ′), θ)]





The first term in the last expression is negative because incentive compatibility between
θ2 and θ
′ is satisfied (see lemma 2.9 and recall that π(θ2) = 0). The second term is also
negative because of equation (2.45). As π(θ) ≥ 0, the inequality above and therefore
incentive compatibility holds.
The proof for θ > θw and θ
′ < θw works in the same way with θ1 in place of θ2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.3 Consider θ′ = θ. Define W = W fb(θ) = W sb(θ). Since θ
produces his first best quality and first best welfare is decreasing at θ, there are types
θ > θ with lower welfare than W . By the definition of the (WNM)-case, W fb(θ̄) > W .
Taking these two points together and applying the intermediate value theorem yields




= (S − cq(q(θ), θ))qθ(θ)− cθ(q(θ), θ) = −
λ(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ)qθ(θ)− cθ(q(θ), θ)
where the first order condition for q(·) is used for the second equality. From proposition
2.2 and its proof we know that λ and cθ both change sign at θw and therefore sign(λ(θ)) =
−sign(cθ(q(θ), θ)). Consequently, W
sb
θ (θ
′′) > 0 implies λ(θ′′) > 0 and cθ(q(θ
′′), θ′′) < 0.
The virtual valuation can be written as




and thus V V (θ) ≤ W sb(θ) since λ and cθ have opposite signs and the inequality is strict
if λ(θ), cθ(q(θ), θ) 6= 0.
If cθ(q(θ
′′), θ′′) < 0 it then follows that V V (θ) > V V (θ′′). By continuity, there exist
types θ that yield strictly higher welfare than θ but still lose from θ in the procurement.
Now consider the case where θ′′ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that cθ(q(θ
′′), θ′′) = 0. In this case
there are types close to θ that lose from types close to θ′′ although the former yield higher
(second best) welfare W sb. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 2.4: If the scoring rule implements the optimal mechanism
it has to hold that bid(θ′) = bid(θ′′) whenever V V (θ′) = V V (θ′′) under the optimal
mechanism.
Now take θ1 and θ2 as defined in proposition 2.2. Because bidθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ), θ) and
all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) have q(θ) = k(θ), it follows that bid(θ1) = bid(θ2). As virtual valuation
and bids are continuous in type, this implies that V V (θ1) = V V (θ2) has to hold if the
scoring rule implements the optimal mechanism: Otherwise, types slightly below θ1 and
slightly above θ2 have the same bid but different virtual valuations. Since q(θi) = k(θi),
the virtual valuation for θi is Sk(θi)−c(k(θi), θi) for i = 1, 2. Consequently, the following






This can be rewritten as
∫ θ2
θ1
(S − cq(k(θ), θ))cθθ(k(θ), θ)
−cqθ(k(θ), θ)
dθ = 0.
Note that this equation uniquely pins down θ2 for a given θ1.
30 Furthermore, it does




which depends on f(θ2). Hence, slightly perturbing f around
θ2 changes θ2 but not the equation above. Consequently, a scoring rule auction cannot
implement the optimal mechanism in a generic sense. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.5 As shown in the proof of lemma 2.9, incentive compati-





xθ(s)cθ(q(s), t) + x(s)cθq(q(s), t)qθ(s) ds dt ≤ 0.
Now note that cθθ = 0 implies
xθ(s)cθ(q(s), t) + x(s)cθq(q(s), t)qθ(s) = xθ(s)cθ(q(s), s) + x(s)cθq(q(s), s)qθ(s).
But then global incentive compatibility has to be satisfied as xs(s)cθ(q(s), s)+x(s)cθq(q(s), s)
qs(s) ≤ 0 by the local second order condition. Q.E.D.
30The reason is that the integrand is negative around θ1, positive around θ2 and changes sign only at
one type which is between θ1 and θ2. This follows from lemma 2.1.
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Health insurance without single
crossing:
Why healthy people have
relatively high coverage31
3.1. Introduction
A well documented problem in health insurance markets with voluntary insurance (like
the US) is that people either have no insurance at all or are underinsured.32 Standard
insurance models (inspired by the seminal work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS)
and Stiglitz (1977)) predict that healthy people have less than perfect insurance or –in
the extreme– no insurance at all. However, both popular accounts like Cohn (2007) and
academic work like Schoen et al. (2008) show that people with low health status are
overrepresented in the group of uninsured and underinsured.33 We develop a model to
explain why sick people end up with little or no insurance. We do this by adding two well
documented empirical observations (discussed below) to the RS model: (i) richer people
tend to be healthier and (ii) health is a normal good. Technically speaking, introducing
the latter two effects can lead to a violation of single crossing in the model.
Another indication that the standard RS framework (with single crossing) does not
31This chapter is based on Boone and Schottmüller (2011a).
32In empirical studies, underinsurance is defined using indicators of financial risk. To illustrate, one
definition of underinsurance used by Schoen et al. (2008) is “out-of-pocket medical expenses for care
amounted to 10 percent of income or more”. In our theoretical model, underinsurance refers to less than
socially optimal/efficient insurance.
33In the words of Schoen et al. (2008, pp. w303): “underinsurance rates were higher among adults
with health problems than among healthier adults”.
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capture reality well is the following. The empirical literature that is based on RS does
not unambiguously show that asymmetric information plays a role in health insurance
markets. One would expect people to have private information about their health risks–
think for example of preconditions, medical history of parents and other family members
or life style. However, some papers, like for example Cardon and Hendel (2001) or
Cutler et al. (2008), do not find evidence of asymmetric information while others do, e.g.
Bajari et al. (2005) or Munkin and Trivedi (2010). The test for asymmetric information
employed in these papers is the so called “positive correlation test,” i.e. testing whether
riskier types buy insurance contracts with higher coverage.34
We show that an insurance model with a violation of single crossing is capable of
explaining why healthy people have better insurance (in equilibrium) than people with
a low health status. In particular, the positive correlation property no longer holds if
single crossing is violated. Consequently, testing for this positive correlation can no
longer be viewed as a test for asymmetric information. As mentioned, we use two well
documented stylized facts to motivate this violation of single crossing in the market for
health insurance.
Single crossing means that people with higher health risks have a higher willingness
to pay for marginally increasing coverage, e.g. reducing copayments. If this property
holds for all possible coverage levels, a given indifference curve of a high risk type can
cross a given indifference curve of a low risk type at most once. A rough intuition
for why the stylized facts above can lead to a violation of single crossing is given by
the following: At full coverage (indemnity insurance that pays for all medical costs),
high risk (low health) types will tend to spend more on treatments than low risk types.
Hence, a small reduction in coverage, leads to a bigger loss in utility for high risk types.
Now consider health insurance with low coverage where the insured faces substantial
copayments. Because health is a normal good, it is possible that the rich-healthy type
spends more on treatment than the low income, low health type. Put differently, a rich-
healthy type might utilize the insurance more conditional on falling ill. In that case, a
small change in coverage can have a bigger effect on the utility of the healthy type than
of the low health agent. The healthy type will therefore have a higher willingness to
34“Risk” is in structural estimation papers–broadly speaking–interpreted as a parameter on which the
distribution of health shocks depends.
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pay for a marginal increase in coverage than the low health type. This violates single
crossing.
We show that in insurance models without single crossing higher health risks are not
necessarily associated with more coverage while this prediction is inevitable with single
crossing.
The starting point for our paper is the positive correlation property which is es-
tablished in various forms in the theoretical literature. The most general treatment is
Chiappori et al. (2006). However, their main focus is a positive correlation between
coverage and insurance payout while we are more interested in the correlation between
patient risk and coverage.35 On a technical level, their assumption (NIP) does not hold
in our setting when firms have market power.
The literature on violations of single crossing is relatively scarce. There are three
papers analyzing perfectly competitive insurance markets with 2×2 types: People differ
in two dimensions and both dimensions can either take a high or a low value. In Smart
(2000) and Wambach (2000) the two dimensions are risk and risk aversion. Netzer and
Scheuer (2010) model an additional labor supply decision and the two dimensions are
productivity and risk. All papers have a pooling result, i.e. if single crossing does not
hold two of the four types can be pooled. Only in Netzer and Scheuer (2010) there can
be equilibria where some low risk types have more coverage than some high risk types.
Nevertheless, also in their paper the type having the highest coverage in equilibrium
is a high risk type. Furthermore, in their model the wealthiest types have the lowest
coverage. This contrasts with the empirical observation in the health sector mentioned
above.36 In Smart (2000) and Wambach (2000) the high risk/high risk aversion type
receives full coverage and the (low, low) type gets partial coverage. The (high, low) and
(low, high) type can be pooled on an intermediate coverage level. Although two types
with different risks are pooled, the positive correlation property still holds (weakly) in
those models. The pooling itself is a result of the fact that some high risk types are less
risk averse than some low risk types. Given that high risk types are likely to be poor
35As we argue below, when single crossing is violated, higher risk types do not necessarily have higher
insurance payout.
36On a technical level, agents in Netzer and Scheuer (2010) make an endogenous decision (labor
supply) before the risk realizes. We focus on the decision how much to spend on treatment which is
made after the risk realizes.
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in the health insurance context, even this pooling result does not arise naturally in the
health insurance sector.
Another contribution of our paper is to deviate from the perfect competition assump-
tion. We show that under imperfect competition types cannot only be pooled but high
risk types might get less coverage in equilibrium than low risk types. Under perfect com-
petition this is not the case in our model: There would always be a profitable pooling
contract in such a situation. If firms have market power, they do not offer this pooling
contract as this will reduce their profits from low risk types.
Jullien et al. (2007) take a different approach to answer the question why high risk
types might have lower coverage in general insurance markets. They use a model where
types differ in risk aversion and single crossing is satisfied. Hence, types with higher risk
aversion will have more coverage in equilibrium. At the same time more risk averse agents
might engage more in preventive behavior. If types are still separated in equilibrium and
risk aversion differences remain the driving force, high risk aversion types will exhibit
less risk (due to prevention) and higher coverage. The differences in risk could together
with the differences in risk aversion lead to a violation of single crossing, see Araujo and
Moreira (2003) for a model of this.37 We contribute by explicitly analyzing a framework
where single crossing is violated and show how different modes of competition on the
supply side affect market outcomes. Similar explanations for “advantageous selection”
as in Jullien et al. (2007) can be found in Hemenway (1990) and De Meza and Webb
(2001).
Since risk in the health sector is exogenously different for different persons (e.g. due
to genetics),38 we follow RS and take a different starting point than Jullien et al. (2007).
We assume risk differences instead of risk aversion differences. The result that high
risk people have low coverage is in our paper not the result of low risk aversion. The
driving force is the violation of single crossing caused by empirically documented income
differences between high risks and low risks (see section 3.3). This is also in line with,
for example, Fang et al. (2008) who show for the medigap insurance market that income
37This is not analyzed in Jullien et al. (2007) as single crossing holds in their setup with CARA utility
function.
38Also, with the observed correlation between coverage and income in the health insurance market,
the assumption by Jullien et al. (2007) implies that high income people are more risk averse than low
income people. It is not clear that this is a reasonable assumption in our health insurance context.
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is a source of advantageous selection while risk aversion is not.
In the following section, a general insurance model is introduced and equilibrium
results for perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly settings are derived without
assuming single crossing. Section 3.3 explains why single crossing is likely to be violated
in the health insurance market. In section 3.4, setup and results are illustrated with a
numerical example. Section 3.5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2. Insurance model
This section introduces a general model of (health) insurance that allows us to consider
both the case where single crossing (SC) is satisfied and the case where it is not satisfied
(NSC). After describing the demand side of the insurance market, we consider three
alternatives for the supply side: perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly.
3.2.1. Demand side model
Following RS, we consider an agent with utility function u(q, p, θ) where q ∈ [0, 1] denotes
coverage or generosity of her insurance contract,39 p ≥ 0 denotes the price of insurance
(insurance premium) and θ ∈ {θl, θh} with θh > θl > 0 denotes the type of consumer.40
Higher θ denotes a higher risk in the sense of higher expected costs (in case qh = ql = 1;
see below). This could, for instance, be the case due to chronic illness or higher risk due
to a genetic precondition. We make the following assumptions on the utility function
(where subscripts denote partial derivatives).
Assumption 3.1. The utility function u(q, p, θ) is continuous and differentiable. It
satisfies uq > 0, up < 0. We define the indifference curve p(q, u, θ) as follows:
u(q, p(q, u, θ), θ) ≡ u (3.1)
39Apart from literal coverage –where 1 − q denotes the agent’s copayments– q could, for example,
be interpreted as 1/(1 + deductible). Note that in models without moral hazard both parameters are
similar in the sense that high risk types dislike co-payments and deductibles more relative to low risk
types.
40We follow RS in assuming that there are only two types. For an analysis of a violation of single
crossing with a continuum of types θ, see Araujo and Moreira (2010) and Schottmüller (2011a).
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We assume that these indifference curves p(q, u, θ) are differentiable in q and u with
pq = −uq/up > 0, pu = 1/up < 0.
Further, the crossing at q = 1 satisfies:
pq(1, u
h, θh) > pq(1, u
l, θl) (C1)
for all ul ≥ ūl = u(0, 0, θl), uh ≥ ūh = u(0, 0, θh).
In words, utility u is increasing in coverage q and decreasing in the premium p paid for
insurance. For given type θ and utility level u, the indifference curve p(q, u, θ) maps out
combinations (q, p) that yield the same utility. Because higher coverage leads to higher
utility, p has to increase to keep utility constant. Hence, indifference curves are upward
sloping in (q, p) space (pq > 0). Increasing u (for a given coverage level q) requires a
lower price. Thus, raising u shifts an indifference curve downwards (pu < 0).
Type k ∈ {h, l} buys insurance if it leads to a higher utility than her outside option
ūk. This outside option is given by the “empty insurance contract”: q = p = 0.
At q = 1 a marginal reduction in q should be compensated by a bigger decrease in
p for θh compared to θl. This reflects the fact that the θh type faces higher expected
health care expenditures, i.e. he is the high risk type. At q = 1, i.e. at full coverage,
other factors like willingness to pay for treatment (which could be different for different
types) do not play a role. In this sense, this assumption “defines” what higher θ means:
at q = 1, higher θ types face higher expected costs. With the same idea we assume that
expected costs for the insurer of a contract with q = 1 is higher for the θh than for the
θl type: c(1, uh, θh) > c(1, ul, θl) for all uh ≥ ūh, ul ≥ ūl. Intuitively, u should not matter
for health care consumption at full coverage and the high risk type will use the insurance
more.
To allow for income effects (for instance, in treatment choice; see below) the cost
function depends on u. However, we assume two regularity conditions.
Assumption 3.2. For each type k ∈ {h, l} and q ∈ [0, 1] we assume that cu(q, uk, θk) ≥ 0 for uk ≥ ūk, c(1, uk, θk) = c(1, ũk, θk), for uk, ũk ≥ ūk.
In words, as the income of the agent increases (which ceteris paribus leads to higher
utility), the agent has more money to spend on treatment. As the insurer pays a fraction
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q ≥ 0 of these treatments, this leads to (weakly) higher costs for the insurer. Second,
costs at full coverage (q = 1) do not vary in utility. Intuitively, if q = 1 treatments are
for free for the agent and there is no reason to forgo treatments, irrespective of the level
of uk ≥ ūk.41
Because of (C1), the single crossing condition reads42
pq(q, u
h, θh) > pq(q, u
l, θl) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1] (SC)
and uh ≥ ūh, ul ≥ ūl such that p(q, uh, θh) = p(q, ul, θl). The intuition is the following.
Suppose an indifference curve of type θh intersects with an indifference curve of type θl
in some point (p, q). Then (SC) implies that the slope of the θh indifference curve will
be higher. It follows that these two indifference curves can intersect only once.
We consider both the case where (SC) is satisfied and the case where it is violated
(NSC). In both the SC and NSC cases, we maintain the assumption that q = 1 is the
efficient insurance level (EI) for each type θ ∈ {θl, θh}.
Assumption 3.3. For a given utility level uk, welfare (and therefore profits) are maxi-
mized at full coverage, i.e.
max
q∈[0,1]
p(q, uk, θk)− c(q, uk, θk) (EI)
is uniquely maximized by q = 1 for each k ∈ {h, l} and uk ≥ ūk.
This basically means that the insurance motive, i.e. transferring risk from a risk
averse agent to a risk neutral insurer, is not overruled by other considerations. To
illustrate, we do not assume that the low income agent’s preference for health/treatment
is so low that foregoing insurance would be socially optimal. Put differently, we assume
that full insurance is socially desirable. Underinsurance–with no insurance as extreme
case–results therefore not from first best but from informational distortions and price
discrimination motives.
Our motivation for making this assumption is twofold. First, this assumption simply
normalizes the socially efficient insurance level in the same way as in RS. Hence, we
41By assumption 3.3 full coverage is socially desirable. Hence we do not consider the case where
insurance leads to inefficiency by inducing over-consumption of treatments.
42This is also called sorting, constant sign or Spence-Mirrlees condition (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991,
pp. 259).
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only deviate from the RS set up by allowing for both SC and NSC. Second, we want
to argue that under realistic assumptions, θh types have less than full insurance. If
the optimal insurance level is actually below one, than this result would follow rather
trivially. Another way of putting this is to say that a θh type would buy full insurance if
he could choose from all actuarially fair insurance contracts. In this sense, the answer to
our question“why healthy people have high coverage” is not simply that unhealthy people
cannot afford actuarially fair insurance. In equilibrium, types are separated because the
θh type prefers the cheap low coverage insurance above the expensive generous insurance
contract.
To illustrate that the assumptions encompass standard models of the insurance lit-
erature, we show that the RS setup satisfies all of our assumptions.
Example 3.1. In the RS setup an agent faces with probability θ a monetary loss D. He
has initial wealth w and expected utility u(q, p, θ) = θv(w−(1−q)D−p)+(1−θ)v(w−p)
where v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Using the implicit function theorem, pq(1, u, θ) = θD and
therefore (C1) is satisfied. Note that (C1) will also be satisfied if w depends on θ. The
insurer is risk neutral and has profits p − θqD. As profits do not depend on u (or w),
assumption 3.2 is trivially satisfied. Since the agent is risk averse and the insurer is risk
neutral, assumption 3.3 is also satisfied.
3.2.2. Supply side
An insurer offers a menu of two contracts; one contract for each type. The contract of
type θk consists of a coverage level qk and a price pk resulting in utility level uk. The
two contracts can be identical (pooling) or differ from each other (separating). In case
of separating, the contracts have to satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
for each type:
p(ql, ul, θl) ≥ p(ql, uh, θh) (ICh)
p(qh, uh, θh) ≥ p(qh, ul, θl) (ICl)
The first constraint implies that the contract intended for θh (i.e. (qh, p(qh, uh, θh)))
lies on a (weakly) lower indifference curve for θh than the contract that is meant for the
θl type (ql, p(ql, ul, θl)). That is, the inequality implies u(qh, ph, θh) ≥ u(ql, pl, θh) where









Figure 3.1: incentive compatibility constraints
binding: The θh indifference curve (dashed line) goes through both contracts. Similarly,
the second inequality implies that u(ql, pl, θl) ≥ u(qh, ph, θl). In figure 3.1 (ICl) is satisfied
with inequality: The θl indifference curve through the (ql, pl) contract is below ph at qh.
Irrespective of the mode of competition and whether (SC) holds, we have the following
result that we use below.
Lemma 3.1. At least one type has full coverage. If the types are separated under the op-
timal contract scheme (ql, pl), (qh, ph) with ql 6= qh, then at most one incentive constraint
binds.
Perfect competition
The literature on insurance models considers mostly perfect competition.43 We show
that with the assumptions made so far, perfect competition implies qh = 1 (even if (SC)
is not satisfied). Hence, in our model, market power on the insurance side is needed to
get qh < 1.
Following the RS definition of the perfect competition equilibrium, we require that (i)
each offered contract makes nonnegative profits and (ii) given the equilibrium contracts
there is no other contract yielding positive profits.
Proposition 3.1. If an equilibrium exists under perfect competition, then qh = 1.
43See Jack (2006) and Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2007) for exceptions using a Hotelling model to
formalize market power on the insurer side of the market. These papers assume that (SC) is satisfied
and hence find efficient insurance for the θh type.
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As is well known, existence of equilibrium in the RS framework is not guaranteed.
Equilibrium does not exist if the only possible (separating) equilibrium is broken by a
pooling contract. If the fraction of θh type agents in the population is high enough, then
such a deviation to a pooling contract is not profitable and an equilibrium exists. If an
equilibrium exists, it has qh = 1.
The proposition shows that even with violations of single crossing, high risk types will
get (weakly) higher coverage than low risk types. Hence we need to deviate from perfect
competition to get qh < ql. Put differently, the positive correlation property holds in
models of perfect competition irrespectively of single crossing. To explain violations of
the positive correlation property which are pointed out in the empirical literature, it is
necessary to deviate from the perfect competition assumption.
Indeed, recent research for the US (see Dafny (2010)) shows that health insurers have
market power. More generally, in most countries where health insurance is provided
by private companies, these firms tend to be big (due to economies of scale in risk
diversification). Hence, one would expect them to have some market power.
Monopoly
Now, we want to consider an insurance monopolist. It turns out that the positive corre-
lation property can be violated in the (NSC) case.
Proposition 3.2. The type with the highest willingness to pay for full coverage, i.e.
the type θk with highest p(1, ūk, θk), obtains a full coverage contract in an insurance
monopoly. Either his incentive compatibility or his individual rationality constraint is
binding (or both). The other type’s individual rationality constraint is binding.
Let θk denote the type with the highest willingness to pay for full coverage. It follows
from the proposition that θk obtains a contract (q, p) = (1, pk) for some pk ≤ p(1, ūk, θk).
The monopoly outcome is now pinned down by the choice of pk. If pk = p(1, ūk, θk),
then both individual rationality constraints are binding. In this case, type θ−k might be
excluded, i.e. θ−k gets the contract (0, 0). If pk = p(1, ū−k, θ−k), both types are pooled.
If pk ∈ 〈p(1, ū−k, θ−k), p(1, ūk, θk)〉, the equilibrium separates the types and θ−k gets an
insurance contract with partial coverage. The optimal level of pk is determined by the
share of θk types in the population.
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A direct implication of proposition 3.2 is that high risk types will always have full
coverage if single crossing is satisfied. To see this, note that the indifference curve
corresponding to ūk (that is the individual rationality constraint) goes through the origin
(p, q) = (0, 0) for both types. With (SC) the indifference curve of the high risk type is
steeper and lies therefore above the individual rationality constraint of the low risk type
for all coverage levels.
Without single crossing this is no longer the case. We will give a numerical example
below where the low risk type θl has the higher willingness to pay for full coverage.
Therefore, the low risk type will receive full coverage. If the types are separated (which
depends on the share of each type in the population), we find that qh < ql = 1. Put
differently, the positive correlation property no longer holds in the monopoly setup.
Of course, a monopolistic market structure is an extreme case and not entirely realistic
in the health insurance market. However, the idea that the positive correlation property
does not hold in the (NSC) case is more general. To illustrate this, we turn to an
oligopoly setting next.
Oligopoly
This subsection uses a tractable duopoly model on the supply side. It serves as an illustra-
tion that the results from the monopoly setting also carry over to imperfect competition
settings.
We assume that there are two profit maximizing insurers located at the end points
0 and 1 of a Hotelling line. Agents of both types are uniformly distributed over the
[0, 1] interval. The share of high risk types in the population is denoted by φ which is
assumed to be independent from location x ∈ [0, 1]. An agent at position x ∈ [0, 1]
incurs transportation cost xt ((1 − x)t) when buying from insurer a (b). The agent
maximizes the expected utility from the insurance contract minus the transportation
costs. Each insurer offers a menu of contracts {(qh, ph), (ql, pl), (0, 0)} where the first
contract is intended for the θh type, the second for the θl type and the third “contract”
denotes the agent’s outside option of not buying insurance at all (which will not be
used in equilibrium).44 Insurers simultaneously offer menus and consumers choose their
44This means that “transportation costs” are not relevant for the participation decision. This ensures
that firms compete also for high values of t. Hence, we rule out the case of (local) monopoly which was
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preferred contract afterwards.
For the following result, we need the fairly standard assumption upp ≤ 0, i.e. the
higher the price the higher is the utility loss from a marginal price increase. Put differ-
ently, there is a decreasing marginal utility from other goods.
Proposition 3.3. Assume upp(1, p, θ
l) ≤ 0 for p ∈ (0, p(1, ūl, θl)). If p(1, ūl, θl) >
p(1, ūh, θh), then there exist parameter values φ > 0 and t > 0 such that type θl obtains
a full coverage contract in a separating equilibrium.
This proposition is similar to the result obtained for the monopoly setup. If the low
risk type has a higher willingness to pay for full coverage, there are separating equilibria
where he obtains full coverage. As noted above, since p(0, ūl, θl) = p(0, ūh, θh), (SC)
implies that p(1, ūl, θl) < p(1, ūh, θh). But with a violation of single crossing it can
indeed be the case that p(1, ūl, θl) > p(1, ūh, θh). This is illustrated with a numerical
example in section 3.4. Before going to the example, we first explain why single crossing
is likely to fail in the health insurance context.
3.3. Income and health
We present a model where SC is violated due to differences in income between types.
The idea that income differences can lead to a violation of single crossing can already
be found in Wambach (2000), De Meza and Webb (2001) and in some sense also in
Netzer and Scheuer (2010). The idea of these papers is that the degree of risk aversion
depends on the wealth level. As the degree of risk aversion influences the shape of the
indifference curve, this can lead to a violation of single crossing if the third derivative
of the utility with respect to money has the corresponding sign. This effect exists in
a simple RS framework that has no particular relation to the health insurance sector.
As mentioned above, we are reluctant to make this assumption in a health insurance
context: A violation of single crossing would only result if poor, high risk individuals
are less risk averse than rich, low risk types. We do not believe that the uninsured, for
instance in the US, forgo health insurance because they are risk neutral. Indeed, if this




Also Fang et al. (2008) reject this channel as an explanation of advantageous selection
in their empirical analysis of the medigap market.
In our model, there is an additional channel causing a violation of single crossing
and consequently generating advantageous selection. This additional channel does not
depend on third derivatives of the utility function. The idea of the model is that for q < 1
people have to finance a part of the costs of treatment out of their own pocket and low
income agents may decide to choose cheaper treatment or forgo treatment altogether.
This effect is documented in the medical literature, see for example Piette et al. (2004b),
Piette et al. (2004a) or Goldman et al. (2007).45 Put differently, the fact that health is
a normal good can lead to a violation of single crossing. The reason is that poor, high
risk types do not utilize the insurance fully when copayments are substantial. Therefore,
their willingness to pay for a marginal increase in coverage can be lower than the one of
rich, low risk types who fully utilize the insurance.
This utilization effect is well established in the medical literature. By extrapolating
from their sample to the US population Piette et al. (2004a, p. 1786) conclude that “2.9
million of the 14.1 million American adults with asthma (20%) may be cutting back on
their asthma medication because of cost pressures.” They also document for a number of
chronical conditions that people from low income groups are much more likely to report
foregoing prescribed treatment due to costs.46 Further examples can, for instance, be
found in Piette et al. (2004b), Goldman et al. (2007), Schoen et al. (2010) or Schoen et al.
(2008, pp. w305) who report that “[b]ased on a composite access indicator that included
going without at least one of four needed medical care services, more than half of the
underinsured and two-thirds of the uninsured reported cost-related access problems”.
With full coverage (q = 1) health insurance, such cost related access problems would not
exist.
The utilization effect leads to a violation of single crossing if richer people face lower
health risks, i.e. income and health risk are negatively correlated. This is also well
45While especially well documented in the health literature, this effect is not exclusively applicable
to health insurance. Any insurance where the agent can choose between different ways to repair the
damage ex post features this effect.
46For most chronic diseases people with income less than $ 20000 are roughly 2 (5) times more likely
to forego prescribed treatment due to costs than people with an income between $ 20000 and $ 40000
(more than $ 60000); see table 3 in Piette et al. (2004a) for details.
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documented in the empirical health literature, see for example Frijters et al. (2005),
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Gravelle and Sutton (2009) or Munkin and Trivedi
(2010). Potential explanations for this correlation between income and health include
the following. High income people are better educated and hence know the importance
of healthy food, exercise etc. Healthy food options tend to be more expensive and
therefore better affordable to high income people. Or (with causality running in the
other direction) healthy people are more productive and therefore earn higher incomes.
To illustrate how the described features of the health sector can lead to a violation of
single crossing and also to exemplify the assumptions made in the reduced form model,
we present a simple model of health insurance. We assume that a type θ consumer faces
a health shock s ∈ [0, 1] with distribution (density) function F (s|θ)(f(s|θ)). We take
s = 1 as the state in which the agent is healthy and needs no treatment. Lower health
states s correspond to worse health. The assumption that the θh type has worse health
than the θl type can now be stated as F (s|θh) > F (s|θl) for each s ∈ 〈0, 1〉. In words,
low s states are more likely for θh then for the θl type.
Once an agent receives a health shock s < 1, she can increase her health by treatment
h ∈ H(s) to health level s+h, where H(s) denotes the set of possible treatments in state
s. We assume that the set H(s) is compact and 0 ≤ s + h ≤ 1 for each h ∈ H(s) and
each s ∈ [0, 1]. That is, treatment cannot lead to a higher health state than not falling
ill. If H(s) is a singleton, the consumer has no treatment choice. If the set H(s) has
more than one element, low income consumers with partial insurance, i.e. q < 1, may
decide to choose cheaper treatment than if they have full insurance, i.e. q = 1.47 We
define h̄(s) = max{h ∈ H(s)} as the best possible treatment and assume that h̄(s) is
non-increasing in s. This means that a less afflicted agent (high s < 1) cannot increase
his health by treatment more than an agent who is more seriously ill (low s). If 0 ∈ H(s),
an agent can forgo treatment altogether.
47Implicitly, we assume that contracts cannot be contingent on treatment choice. Given the problems
of verifiability of treatment and quantity choice as well as the possibility of doctor and patient to




Let w(θ) denote the wealth (or income) of a type θ agent. Then we write
u(q, p, θ) =
∫ 1
0
{v(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+ h(s, q, θ))}dF (s|θ)
where h(s, q, θ) is defined as:
h(s, q, θ) = arg max
h∈H(s)
v(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h, s+ h)
(3.2)
where v(y, h) is the utility function of an agent which depends on consumption of other
goods (y) and health (h). We assume that v(y, h) satisfies vy, vh > 0, vyy, vhh < 0
and that health is a normal good: vhy ≥ 0. That is, utility increases in both health
and consumption of other goods at a decreasing rate. As income increases, people’s
preference for health increases as well. In line with the empirical literature cited above,
we assume that income and health status θ are negatively correlated: w(θh) ≤ w(θl).
Using this notation, we can write
c(q, u, θ) = q
∫ 1
0
h(s, q, θ)dF (s|θ) (3.3)
The first order condition for an interior solution h(s, q, θ) ∈ H(s) can be written as
(1−q)vy(w(θ)−p−(1−q)h(s, q, θ), s+h(s, q, θ)) = vh(w(θ)−p−(1−q)h(s, q, θ), s+h(s, q, θ))
(3.4)
To see the implications of this model for single crossing, consider the slope of the
indifference curves in (q, p)-space:






vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+ h(s, q, θ))h(s, q, θ)dF (s|θ)
∫ 1
0
vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+ h(s, q, θ))dF (s|θ)
(3.5)
In words, the slope pq equals the weighted average of treatment h(s, q, θ) over the states
s with weight
vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+ h(s, q, θ))f(s|θ)
∫ 1
0
vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+ h(s, q, θ))dF (s|θ)
(3.6)
on state s (where the weights integrate to 1).
To illustrate (C1), assume that s + h̄(s) = 1 (the best treatment makes a patient
healthy again),48 then it is routine to verify that
pq(1, u, θ) =
∫ 1
0
vy(w(θ)− p, 1)h̄(s)dF (s|θ)
∫ 1
0





48Alternatively, we can assume that h̄′(s) ∈ 〈−1, 0〉 such that s + h̄(s) is increasing in s. In words,
if an agent falls ill, treatment does not bring back full health. Then a sufficient condition for (C1) is
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where the last equality follows from the fact that vy(w(θ)− p, 1) is constant in s. Note
that we use here that h(s, 1, θ) = h̄(s) for both types. If treatment is free (q = 1), each
agent uses the highest treatment (h̄(s)). The stochastic dominance assumption implies
that θh puts more weight on low s states (where h̄(s) = 1 − s is high) compared to θl.
Hence under these assumptions, condition (C1) is satisfied.
(SC) is satisfied if there are no wealth differences between types, i.e. w(θh) = w(θl),
and H(s) satisfies some regularity condition. The idea is that without wealth differences,
(3.4) yields for both types the same optimal treatment. Put differently, h(s, q, θ) is
independent of θ. If patients choose more treatment in worse health states, single crossing
will be satisfied: due to stochastic dominance, θh types have higher weight (3.6) on low s
states with high h(s). Hence, pq in (3.5) is higher for θ
h than for θl types for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Treatment h(s, q, θ) is indeed non-increasing in s if H(s) is well behaved: H(s) is convex
for each s and non-increasing in s.49 It then follows from equation (3.4) –using the
implicit function theorem– that
(−(1− q)2vyy + 2(1− q)vyh − vhh)
dh
ds
= vhh − (1− q)vyh (3.7)
From the assumptions on v it follows that h(s, q, θ) is non-increasing in s. As H(s) is
non-increasing, this also holds true for boundary solutions where the implicit function
theorem cannot be used.
However, if w(θh) < w(θl) then q < 1 can imply that h(s, q, θh) < h(s, q, θl). This




−(1 − q)vyy + vhy
−(1− q)2vyy + 2(1− q)vyh − vhh
> 0 (3.8)
Hence, if h(s, q, θl) ∈ H(s) is an interior maximum, the θh type tends to choose lower
treatment h. In words, since a fraction 1− q of the treatment cost has to be paid by the
insured, a low income θh patient may choose cheaper treatment than the richer θl type
(as health is a normal good). Since he does not utilize the insurance as much as the (rich)
vyyh ≥ 0: Suppose it were the case that h̄
′(s) = 0, then pq(1, ·) would be the same for both types.
h̄′(s) < 0 will now put more weight on low states (as h̄(s2) ≤ h̄(s1) for s1 ≤ s2). vyyh ≥ 0 guarantees
that vy is increasing less in s for the high type. Hence, putting more weight on low states where vy is
low affects the θl type less than the θh type. Consequently, (C1) is satisfied.
49We say that the set H(s) is non-increasing in s if for each s1, s2 with s1 ≤ s2 we have that for each
h ∈ H(s2) there exists h
′ ∈ H(s1) such that h
′ ≥ h. As a special case this includes the possibility that
H(s) = h(s) is a singleton, with h′(s) < 0.
60
Example
low risk type, type θh has a lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance coverage (for
q close to zero). However, for high levels of coverage, i.e. q close to 1, wealth differences
matter less in the treatment choice because the patient does not have to pay (much) for
the treatment. Consequently, although (C1) is satisfied with w(θh) < w(θl), (SC) can
be violated.
This model –where agents differ in income and treatment choice h ∈ H(s) is endogenous–
can generate the violation of (SC) mentioned above. In the following section, we give a
numerical example where (SC) is indeed violated.
3.4. Example
As an example of an utility function that satisfies the assumptions (C1) and (EI) above
and violates (SC), consider the following mean-variance utility set up.50
There are two states of the world: An agent either falls ill or stays healthy. The
probability of falling ill is denoted by F h (F l < F h) for type θh (θl). We choose F h =
0.07 > 0.05 = F l. Once an agent falls ill, the set of possible treatments is denoted by
H = {h, h̄}. The utility of an agent of type i = h, l with treatment choice h ∈ {h, h̄} is
written as:
u(q, p, θi) = F i(v(h, θi)− (1− q)h) + (1− F i)v(1, θi)− p
−1
2
riF i(1− F i)(v(1, θi)− v(h, θi) + (1− q)h)2
(3.9)
where v(h, θi) denotes the utility for type i = h, l of having health h and ri > 0 denotes
the degree of risk aversion. Hence an agent’s utility is given by the expected utility minus
1
2
ri times the variance in the agent’s utility. This is a simple way to capture that the
agent is risk averse.51
50For the Python code used to generate this example, see:
http://sites.google.com/site/janboonehomepage/home/webappendices.
51When an agent of type i buys a product at price p that gives utility v, there are two ways to capture
the marginal utility of income for agent i. First, overall utility can be written as v − αip where v is
the same for each type i and αi can differ. Low income types are then modelled to have high αi; high
marginal utility of income. Alternatively, one can write vi −αp where α is the same for all types. Then
low income types have low vi. We have chosen the latter formalization with α = 1. The assumption
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Along an indifference curve where u is fixed, we find the following slope:
dp
dq
= F ih(q, θi) + riF i(1− F i)(v(1, θi)− v(h(q, θi), θi) + (1− q)h(q, θi))h(q, θi) (3.10)
where h(q, θi) is the solution for h solving
max
h∈{h,h̄}
v(h, θi)− (1− q)h.
In words, once an agent falls ill, she decides which treatment to choose based on the
benefit v(h, θi) and the out-of-pocket expenses (1− q)h.
With the parameter values that we consider below, it is the case that
rhF h(1− F h)(v(1, θh)− v(h̄, θh))h̄ = rlF l(1− F l)(v(1, θl)− v(h̄, θl))h̄ (3.11)
In words, at q = 1 (where both types choose the highest treatment h̄) the variance terms
in the slope dp/dq (equation (3.10)) are equalized. Hence, assumption (C1) is satisfied
because F hh̄ > F lh̄ in equation (3.10).52
For the numerical example, we assume h̄ = 0.6, h = 0.2 and the associated utilities
for the θh type equal v(1, θh) = 0.9, v(h̄, θh) = 0.7, v(h, θh) = 0.45 and similarly for the
θl type: v(1, θl) = 1.1, v(h̄, θl) = 0.9, v(h, θl) = 0.5. Hence, having high health is more
important for the θl type compared to the θh type. This implies that θl type is willing to
spend more on treatment than the θh type. Since 0.9−0.6 ≥ 0.5−0.2 the θl type chooses
h̄ even if q = 0 (and the inequality is strict for q > 0). This implies that condition (EI)
is satisfied for the θl type as q does not affect treatment choice and higher q leads to
more insurance (provided by a risk neutral insurer). The θh type chooses h̄ if q = 1 but
prefers h for low values of q. In particular, for q = 0 we have v(h̄, θh)− h̄ < v(h, θh)− h.
Let q̃ denote the value for q such that the θh type is indifferent between treatment h̄ and
h:
v(h̄, θh)− (1− q̃)h̄ = v(h, θh)− (1− q̃)h (3.12)
that treatment is a normal good is then implemented by assuming that
v(h̄, θh)− v(h, θh) < v(h̄, θl)− v(h, θl).
52Note also that the numerical values below are chosen such that the variance term in the utility
function is also equal at full coverage (and weakly higher for θh if q < 1). Therefore, the violation of
single crossing in our example is due to the different utilization of health insurance and not to differences
in risk aversion that were the driving force in other papers on the violation of single crossing.
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To verify that (EI) is satisfied for the θh type, we proceed in two steps. First, consider
q > q̃ such that h(q, θh) = h̄. Then increasing coverage q reduces the variance in utility
for the risk averse θh type and hence (EI) is satisfied for q > q̃. Now consider q < q̃
such that h(q, θh) = h. In order to satisfy (EI), it must be the case that profits (price53
minus expected costs) when offering full coverage are higher than profits when offering
a partial coverage contract yielding the same utility. This can be written as:
F h(v(h̄, θh)− h̄) + (1− F h)v(1, θh)− uh − 1
2
rhF h(1− F h)(v(1, θh)− v(h̄, θh)2 ≥
F h(v(h, θh)−h)+(1−F h)v(1, θh)−uh− 1
2
rhF h(1−F h)(v(1, θh)−v(h, θh)+(1−q)h)2
Note that the right hand side of this inequality increases in q and hence is highest at q̃.
In our numerical example, we choose rh such that the inequality holds with equality at
q = q̃.54 This implies that it is satisfied for all q ≤ q̃ and hence (EI) is satisfied.
With the parameter values above, it is routine to verify that (SC) is violated. Figure
3.2 shows two indifference curves for the θl type (in red) and one for the θh type (in
blue). Indeed, for q < q̃ the indifference curve for the θl type is steeper than for the θh
type. This is due to the fact that the θl type buys the expensive treatment h̄ while the
θh type buys h. The kink in the indifference curve for the θh type happens at q̃ where the
θh type switches from the cheap to the more expensive treatment. Hence small increases
in q for q > q̃ are worth more to the θh type than small increases in q < q̃. In fact, the
figure shows that for q > q̃, the indifference curve for the θh type is steeper than the one
for the θl type. This is the violation in single crossing.
Hence in a simple mean-variance utility framework, it is straightforward and intuitive
to generate a violation of (SC).
In our numerical example, the low risk type has a higher willingness to pay for full
coverage compared to the high risk type. This can be seen in figure 3.2: The solid lines
are the indifference curves of both types that go through the empty contract (0, 0), i.e.
the indifference curves corresponding to individual rationality. Willingness to pay for
full coverage is given by the value at q = 1 where the low risk type’s indifference curve
is above the high risk type’s indifference curve.
By proposition 3.2, this implies that in a monopoly framework ql = 1. If the share of
53Price is derived from solving equation (3.9) for ph as a function of uh and qh < q̃.
54Given this value of rh, rl is chosen to satisfy equation (3.11).
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Figure 3.2: Example with parameter values in section 3.4 and t = 0.018
low risk type’s is high enough, the optimal monopoly menu separates the two types and
the positive correlation property will be violated.
3.4.1. Duopoly
In this subsection, we use the example to illustrate the logic behind proposition 3.3. We
will show that it is straightforward to find examples where ql = 1 and qh < 1. The
easiest way to do this is to find parameter values such that the individual rationality
(IR) curve (that is, the indifference curve p(q, ū, θ)) for the θl type lies everywhere above
the IR curve for the θh type. As shown in figure 3.2, this is the case for the parameter
values of our numerical example. Clearly, the Hotelling equilibrium contracts have to lie
on or below the relevant IR curves.
First, assume that φ = 0. In words, there are only θl types. Then it is routine to
verify that ql = 1 (because of assumption 3.3) and the Hotelling equilibrium price on
the θl-market equals pl = F lh̄+ t.55 This contract is denoted (1, pl) in figure 3.2 for the
parameter values given above and t = 0.018. As this contract lies below θl’s IR curve, it
is, indeed, the equilibrium outcome. Let ulhotel. denote θ
l’s utility level associated with the
55Recall that in a Hotelling model with constant marginal costs c, the equilibrium price is given by




(1, pl) contract: ulhotel. = u(1, p
l, θl). Contract (qh, ph) (although not bought by anyone
as φ = 0) is defined by the intersection of indifference curve p(q, ulhotel., θ
l) (dashed curve
in the figure) and θh’s IR curve. This is the best contract on θh’s IR curve that satisfies
θl’s incentive compatibility constraint.
Now increase φ slightly to φ > 0 (but small). We claim that this results in an
equilibrium with ql = 1 > qh. For this to be an equilibrium we need that the indifference
curve for the θl type at q = 1 lies above the indifference curve for the θh type at q = 1.
Note that the equilibrium indifference curve for the θh type (p(q, uhhotel, θ
h)) cannot lie
above θh’s IR curve. Hence, a sufficient condition for an equilibrium with ql = 1 > qh
is that θl’s indifference curve p(q, ulhotel., θ
l) at the new Hotelling equilibrium lies above
θh’s IR curve at q = 1. This is formally shown in the proof of proposition 3.3 and is
intuitively clear: Small changes in φ will lead to small changes in the indifference curve
p(q, ulhotel., θ
l). As this curve is above θh’s IR curve at q = 1 in case φ = 0, it will be
above θh’s IR curve for small positive values of φ.
Hence a straightforward way to generate equilibria where the positive correlation
property fails, is to find examples where the IR constraint for the θl type lies above the
IR constraint for the θh type for each q ∈ 〈0, 1]. Then there exist t > 0 and φ > 0 such
that the example has an equilibrium with ql > qh.
3.5. Conclusion
Standard insurance models, e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) or Stiglitz (1977), predict
higher coverage for agents with higher risks. We show that this prediction no longer holds
if single crossing is violated and firms have market power.
In the health care sector, agents with higher income have lower risks and more in-
surance. Put differently, the predictions of the standard insurance model with single
crossing are contradicted by the data. We show that the negative correlation between
income and risk can cause a violation of single crossing. With a violation of single cross-
ing, the empirical findings in the health literature can be reconciled with a standard
insurance model.
From an empirical point of view, our paper casts doubt on the positive correlation
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test: Given our result that separating equilibria exist in which agents with higher risk
have less coverage (negative correlation), it is evident that the results of such a test have
to be interpreted with care. In particular such a test cannot be used to test for the
presence of asymmetric information when single crossing is violated.
Further, our analysis shows that one should be careful with interpreting actual ex-
penditure as a signal of risk type. Indeed, in equilibria in which the low risk type has full
coverage it is not clear which type has the highest expected health care expenditure. On
the one hand, the high risk type is more likely to fall ill and need treatment. On the other
hand, because the low type has a more generous contract, conditional on falling ill the
low type spends more on treatment than the high type (who faces high co-payments).
Expected costs of a type are the product of the former and the latter and cannot be
ordered unambiguously. Hence, it is not necessarily correct to identify types based on
their expenditure.
We conclude with a discussion of advantageous selection. The standard in this litera-
ture is to assume that people differ in their preferences for risks. If high risk individuals
are less risk averse than low risk people, it can happen that consumers who are willing
to pay the most for health insurance are people with low expected health care costs.
Hence, offering health insurance with high coverage is especially attractive for agents
with low expected costs: advantageous selection. The implication of some advantageous
selection models is that policies that stimulate insurance coverage are welfare reducing,
see for example De Meza and Webb (2001). In fact, there may be over-insurance in equi-
librium. See Einav and Finkelstein (2011) for a recent review of advantageous selection
and empirical papers documenting this in health care markets.
In our model, we also see that at the margin low risk types are willing to pay more
for insurance than high risk types. This is caused by the fact that at less than perfect
coverage, low income, high risk types tend to reduce expenditure on treatments. Basi-
cally, they cannot afford the treatments that they need. Hence, although the equilibrium
is an advantageous selection equilibrium, in our model stimulating insurance coverage





Proof of lemma 3.1. We start with the proof of the second statement. Suppose
both incentive constraints were binding, i.e. θh and θl are both indifferent between the
two contracts. First, look at the case where qh, ql < 1. Call the utility levels of the
two types under the equilibrium contracts ul and uh. Now take the indifference curves
corresponding to these utility levels and call them p(q, ul, θl) and p(q, uh, θh) and define
ι = argmaxk∈{l,h} p(1, u
k, θk). Changing θι’s menu point to (1, p(1, uι, θι)) will increase
profits by assumption 3.3. By the definition of ι, this change is also incentive compatible.
Second, take the case where qk = 1 and q−k < 1 for some k ∈ h, l and suppose
again that both incentive constraints were binding. But according to assumption 3.3
pooling on the contract of θk would lead to higher profits. Hence, at most one incentive
constraint is binding.
qι = 1 follows from the argument in the first step and therefore at least one type has
to have full coverage. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3.1. Suppose to the contrary that qh < 1 in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 implies then that ql = 1. Note that θh has to prefer his contract strictly to
the θl contract: Otherwise, pooling on the θl contract would be a profitable deviation by
assumption 3.3. Given that (ICh) is not binding, the θ
l contract leads to zero profits:
Otherwise, marginally decreasing its price (and thereby attracting all demand of θl types)
would be a profitable deviation.
The contract (qh, ph) leads to nonnegative profits; otherwise it would not be offered
in equilibrium.56 Denote by uh the utility level θh derives from (qh, ph) and by p(q, uh, θh)
the indifference curve of θh associated with his contract. By assumption 3.3, the contract
(1, p(1, uh, θh)) for type θh yields higher profits than (qh, ph). For ε > 0 small enough,
the contract (1, p(1, uh, θh) − ε) is strictly preferred by θh to (qh, ph) and yields higher
profits than (qh, ph). If the contract (1, p(1, uh, θh) − ε) also attracts θl types, profits
from those θl types will be positive as well as those are better risks. This would be an
additional gain as it was shown above that the θl contract yields zero profits. Therefore,
(1, p(1, uh, θh)− ε) is a profitable deviation, i.e. a contract with strictly positive profits
and demand. Consequently, qh < 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
56In fact, it has to be a zero profit contract.
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Proof of proposition 3.2. Define ι = argmaxk∈{h,l} p(1, ū
k, θk). By lemma 3.1,
one type has full coverage. Suppose that qι < 1 and therefore qκ = 1 with κ ∈ {h, l} and
κ 6= ι. Note that the individual rationality constraint of θι cannot be binding as otherwise
θι would misrepresent as θκ by the definition of ι. But then the incentive compatibility
constraint of θι has to be binding as the monopolist could increase pι otherwise. By
assumption 3.3, the monopolist could achieve a higher profit by pooling both types on
θκ’s contract. This contradicts the optimality of qι < 1.
If both types are pooled, the optimal contract will be (q, p) = (1, p(1, ūκ, θκ)) and
the individual rationality constraint of θκ will be binding. If the types are separated,
the incentive compatibility constraint of θκ cannot bind: Since qι = 1, pooling on θι’s
contract would lead to higher profits by assumption 3.3 if the incentive constraint was
binding. As increasing pκ relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of θι, the indi-
vidual rationality constraint of θκ has to bind: Otherwise, increasing pκ would increase
profits.
Last note that increasing pι would be feasible and increase profits if neither the in-
centive compatibility nor the individual rationality constraint of θι was binding. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3.3. The first step is to analyze the game where φ = 0, i.e.
a standard Hotelling game where only low risk type exist. From assumption 3.3, ql = 1
in this setting and firms only compete in prices. By assumption 3.2, costs do then not






ub is the utility offered by the other firm. Because of the assumption upp(1, p, θ
l) ≤ 0,
the objective is concave and the best response is defined by the first order condition
t + u(1, p, θl)− ub + (p− c̄)up(1, p, θ
l) = 0.
Note that there is a symmetric equilibrium defined by the equation (p−c̄)up(1, p, θ
l) = −t.
The left hand side of this equation is decreasing in p and therefore there is only one
symmetric equilibrium. We will now argue that there are also no asymmetric equilibria,
i.e. the game has a unique equilibrium. The argument is that the slope of the best
response function is less than one whenever crossing the 45° line where p = pb: By the
implicit function theorem, p′(pb) = −up(1,p
b,θl)
−2up(1,p,θl)+(p−c̄)upp(1,p,θl)
. Consequently, 0 < p′(pb) < 1
whenever p = pb. Given that there is a symmetric equilibrium where p = pb, this implies
that the best response functions can only intersect once, i.e. there is a unique equilibrium.
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The second step is to see that by choosing t appropriately the game with φ = 0 leads
to an equilibrium price p∗ ∈ (p(1, ūh, θh), p(1, ūl, θl)). This simply follows from the fact
that t “shifts” the first order condition above. For the rest of the proof let t take such a
value.
The third step is to show that for φ small enough ql = 1 and qh < 1.57 By lemma 3.1,
at least one type has to have full coverage. If qh = 1, then ph ≤ p(1, ūh, θh) to satisfy
individual rationality. Suppose, both types were pooled. Recall that pl < p(1, ūh, θh) is
not an equilibrium when φ = 0, i.e. there exists a profitable deviation for at least one
insurer. For φ small enough, this deviation is again profitable as profit functions are
continuous in all variables and parameters. Hence, there cannot be pooling for small but
positive φ. Next suppose there were separating equilibria with qh = 1 and ql < 1 for all
φ > 0. By assumption 3.3, ql has to converge to 1 as φ decreases (otherwise setting ql = 1
and adjusting the price to keep ul fixed is a profitable deviation for small enough φ). But
then the same argument as in the pooling case shows that there is a profitable deviation
for φ small enough. It follows that ql = 1 and qh < 1 for small enough φ > 0. Q.E.D.




Adverse selection without single
crossing
4.1. Introduction
Adverse selection models–sometimes also referred to as screening models–are among
the most used microeconomic models. The main feature of these models is that one
(or more) agents have private information which is relevant for transactions with other
players. This private information can be the efficiency of a firm in models of regulation
(Baron and Myerson, 1982; Laffont and Tirole, 1987), the productivity of a worker in
labor market (Guasch and Weiss, 1981) as well as in optimal taxation models (Mirrlees,
1971), the risk of an accident in insurance models (Stiglitz, 1977) or the willingness to
pay for a product in models of monopoly pricing (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) and auctions
(Myerson, 1981).
In screening models, the principal offers a menu of options from which the agent
who has private information will choose his preferred option. The chosen option will
normally not be what a benevolent planner with complete information would assign.
Hence, informational distortions exist and will reduce welfare. The reason in a nutshell
is that the agent reveals (some of) his private information by his choice. This will not be
costless for the principal who designs the menu: The agent receives an informational rent.
By distorting the menu away from first best, the principal can reduce this informational
rent to his own benefit.
In the regulation example, a regulator will want a more efficient firm to produce a
higher quantity than a less efficient firm. But an efficient firm could claim to be inefficient
and choose the (low quantity) option intended for an inefficient firm from the menu. By
distorting the quantity intended for an inefficient firm, the regulator can make such
misrepresentation less attractive for an efficient firm. Consequently, an efficient firm is
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willing to choose the high quantity option at a lower price and the regulator can save
money.
Single crossing–which is also referred to as Spence-Mirrlees condition or sorting
condition–is a technical assumption usually made in adverse selection models. In one
dimensional models, single crossing states that types58 can be ordered according to their
marginal rate of substitution between monetary transfers and the decision, e.g. produced
quantity in the regulation example above. With the usual quasilinear preferences, single
crossing is equivalent to a type ordering according to marginal utilities.
In the regulation example above, the firm’s cost depends on quantity and type. Single
crossing means that higher types have lower marginal costs for any admissible quantity.
Single crossing is violated if such an ordering is impossible, e.g. a higher type has lower
marginal costs for high quantities but higher marginal costs for low quantities.
This paper analyzes a screening model in which single crossing is violated. Agents
have quasilinear preferences and a one-dimensional type. The setting allows for a one
time violation of single crossing; e.g. for a given quantity, marginal costs are first increas-
ing and then decreasing in type. Without single crossing, local incentive compatibility
does no longer guarantee global incentive compatibility. Therefore, non-local incentive
compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. The paper analyzes monotone
solutions in this setup, e.g. situations in which higher types produce higher quantities
under the optimal contract. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone solution
and an algorithm to calculate such a solution are presented.
With single crossing, there is no distortion at the top and the distortion for all types
goes in the same direction, e.g. all types produce a quantity which is weakly below their
first best quantity. If single crossing is violated, neither result has to hold. The reason is
that binding non-local incentive constraints will counteract the normal distortion stem-
ming from local incentive compatibility and rent extraction motives. A rough intuition
for this result is the following: With single crossing, distortions occur because the prin-
cipal wants to lower the agent’s informational rent. If a non-local incentive constraint is
violated, a certain type’s rent at “his contract” is too low compared with another type’s
contract. To satisfy his non-local incentive constraint, his rent has to be increased. Re-
58A “type” is an agent with a specific private information attribute, see Harsanyi (1967). In the
regulation example types correspond to cost functions of the firm.
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ducing the normal distortion (or even distorting the decision in the opposite direction)
will result in such an increase.
The following section gives several examples of settings in which single crossing is
violated. The related literature is reviewed in section 4.3 and the formal model is in-
troduced in section 4.4. Section 4.4 also states a sufficient condition for the existence
of a monotone solution. Section 4.5 analyzes the solution: Subsection 4.5.1 introduces
necessary conditions which have to hold at types where non-local incentive constraints
are binding. The core of the paper are the subsections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3: The former char-
acterizes monotone solutions while the latter focuses on the special case of monotone and
continuous solutions. An explanation why the no-distortion-at-the-top property is not
always satisfied follows in subsection 4.5.4. Section 4.6 discusses some assumptions and
section 4.7 concludes by pointing out direct implications of the paper for applied work.
4.2. Examples
This section illustrates why single crossing is violated in a number of reasonable economic
settings. Section 4.2.1 gives several examples with a common theme: There are more
than one input/option/relevant characteristic. It is then a priori unclear (and sometimes
even unreasonable) that a higher type is “better” on all dimensions. But this is exactly
what single crossing would require. Section 4.2.2 presents a three type example which
shows not only how preferences can directly violate single crossing but also gives some
intuition for the results of the paper.
4.2.1. Example settings where single crossing is violated
Example 1: two factor production. Take a setting where a firm or government has
to contract with the provider of a good (input or public good/infrastructure etc.). If
the principal is a government, this setting is mathematically equivalent to incentive reg-
ulation (compare for example Laffont and Tirole (1993)). Assume now that production
uses variable input factors in fixed proportions. These input factors fall in one of two
groups depending on how they affect costs: The first group are inputs which increase
costs proportional to output, e.g. energy costs and unskilled labor. The second group
are inputs increasing costs convexly in output, e.g. skilled labor (due to search costs)
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and machine utilization. Type indexes the possible production technologies and denotes
which of these two groups of inputs is used more efficiently by the firm. A cost function
representing this setting could be59




where γ(θ) are (possibly type dependent) fixed costs. To give a more straightforward
interpretation, let type represent whether a firm uses a labor intensive or capital inten-
sive production technology. A labor intensive production technology requires especially
unskilled labor which can be hired at a constant market wage (linear part). A capital
intensive technology requires less but more skilled employees. Finding them is increas-
ingly difficult and results therefore in convexly increasing costs. A more capital intensive
technology might be associated with higher fixed costs (of capital).
Whether marginal costs cq(q, θ) = θ+
2q
θ
are increasing or decreasing in type depends
on the produced quantity q. Put differently, the cross partial derivative cqθ(q, θ) =
1 − 2q/θ2 can change sign and therefore single crossing is violated. The idea is simple:
For low quantities, the linear part of the cost function dominates marginal costs and
therefore high types have higher marginal costs. For high quantities, the convex part of
the cost function is more relevant and therefore high types have lower marginal costs.
It should be mentioned that the cost function in this example can be viewed as a
simplified version of the flexible fixed cost quadratic cost function suggested by Baumol
et al. (1982). Beard et al. (1991) estimate such a cost function for savings and loans
associations. Interestingly, they allow for two unobservable types of production technol-
ogy in their estimation. In table 5, Beard et al. (1991) report estimated costs for the
two types (“mixtures” in their language) at different quantity levels. If one interprets
estimated cost differences between the output levels as marginal costs, it turns out that
mixture 1 has lower marginal costs at low output levels but higher marginal costs at high
output levels. Hence, single crossing is violated.
Example 2: hiring talent and productivity. This example is in the context of
compensation of workers.60 The principal is the owner of a firm and the agent a worker
the firm wants to hire. For the quality of the worker talent and effort are relevant, e.g.
talent is what the worker produces in a regular working time like the 40 hours week and
59The alternative cost function c(q, θ) = θq + (1− θ)q2 + γ(θ) also violates single crossing.
60A similar example can be found in Araujo and Moreira (2010).
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effort is the additional time he is willing to invest. Assume the worker creates value
q = eθ + T where T is his talent, e is the unobservable effort and θ is his type. The
owner of the firm observes a public signal, e.g. education, which is a mix of talent and
productivity (he does not observe T and θ directly). To be precise, assume that the
signal is σ = θ ∗ T . Given this signal, a more productive worker will have lower talent
and vice versa. The production function of the manager for a given signal is q = eθ+σ/θ
where q is the quantity/value produced by the worker. If costs of effort are e2 and the
worker’s preferences are quasilinear in money, his utility function can be written as




where w is wage. It is easy to check that single crossing is violated. The intuition is
that a low type can produce a low output q without much effort just within the regular
working time. Hence, his marginal costs of effort (and therefore of q) are low. A high
type already has to exert some effort to reach the same output level and therefore his
marginal costs of effort (and q) are higher. Note here that the contract is conditional on
education, i.e. given σ a more productive type will be less talented. For high output,
where effort of both types is substantial, higher types have lower marginal costs since
they are more productive.
Example 3: common agency. As already mentioned in Martimort and Stole
(2009), violations of single crossing can arise if more than one principal contract with
the same agent. Interestingly, the utility function itself will satisfy single crossing (for a
fixed decision with the other principal) and the violation of single crossing results from
the existence of multiple principals. This example tries to convey the idea in a simplified
setup.
The source of hidden information in this example is the inability of firms to know the
exact preferences of a customer. A firm cannot observe the preferences of a customer
but it can engage in non-linear pricing, i.e. second degree price discrimination.
Say, consumers can buy two goods which are imperfect substitutes: Good A is sold
only by firm A while good B is available on a perfectly competitive market at a constant
per unit price pB.61 For concreteness, let the demand function for good B of a type θ
61See Martimort and Stole (2009) for a model in which the second good is also offered by a strategically
acting principal.
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consumer be
qB(qA, θ) = θ(β − pB − δqA) (4.2)
which means that type rotates the inverse demand function outwards. The following
quadratic utility function yields such a demand function:










− δqAqB − pBqB − pAqA
Firm A faces consumers buying product B according to (4.2). By plugging (4.2) into the
utility function, one can obtain utility as a function of qA and θ alone, i.e. v(qA, θ) =
u(qA, qB(qA, θ), θ). This is the utility function firm A has to take into account in its
profit maximization problem. Because consumers buy also product B, single crossing is
violated:
vqAθ(q
A, θ) = uqAθ(q
A, qB(qA, θ), θ) + uqBθ(q








− δ(β − pB)
Clearly, vqAθ is negative for low q
A and positive for high qA. The reason for the violation
of single crossing is that high type consumers have, on the one hand, a higher marginal




term in the utility
function u(qA, qB, θ)). On the other hand, a high type buys more of product B which
reduces his willingness to pay for product A as the two goods are substitutes.
The basic intuition of this example is also reflected in the following story: Think
of fixed line internet access. Heavy internet users will certainly have a higher marginal
utility from the fifth gigabyte of data than light users. If heavy users, however, also own
smartphones with internet access (and light users do not), light users will probably have
a higher willingness to pay for the first 50 megabyte: They cannot switch to their mobile
devices to check emails etc.. Hence, single crossing would be violated.
Example 4: insurance with mean variance utility. An agent faces a risk of
losing a (money equivalent) amount D with probability θ where θ is private information.
His preferences are given by the mean variance utility function
u(q, θ) = E[wealth]− 1/2r V ar[wealth]
= θ(w − (1− q)D) + (1− θ)w − p− 1/2rθ(1− θ)(1− q)2D2
where p is the insurance premium of an insurance covering fraction q of the loss, w
is initial wealth and r > 0 is a measure of risk aversion. The cross derivative uqθ =
76
Examples
D + (1 − q)rD2(1 − 2θ). If θ > 1/2 and rD > 1, the cross derivative can change sign
depending on q. Hence, single crossing is violated.
The intuition is that for θ > 1/2 a higher risk also implies less variance. Consequently,
a higher type is on the one hand more eager to buy insurance because he has a higher
risk on the other hand he is less eager to buy insurance because there is less variance
in his payoffs. At full coverage, i.e. for q = 1, the payoff variance is zero and the latter
effect is no longer present. For lower coverage levels, however, it might dominate.
Example 5: nonlinear pricing with heterogeneity in demand elasticity. A
monopolist sets a nonlinear price schedule. Consumers differ in their demand elasticity.
More specifically, their utility from consuming q units for a price p is given by
u(q, θ)− p = qθ − p
where θ is distributed on a subset of (0, 1). If the relevant quantities are in (0, 1), higher
types have a lower willingness to pay and a higher price elasticity of demand.62 The
cross-derivative uqθ = q
θ−1(1 + θln(q)) changes sign at q = e−1/θ. Hence, single crossing
is violated.
4.2.2. Three type example
In the airline industry there are often three classes: First class, business class and econ-
omy class. The simplest model leading to this result is a model of non-linear pricing with
three possible consumer types which differ in their taste for quality. For economy class,
think of poor leisure traveler with a low willingness to pay for quality, say θlq where q
is quality and θl is some positive number. For the first class, think of luxury travelers
with a high willingness to pay for quality, say θhq with θh > θl. So far, single crossing
is satisfied: Luxury travelers have a higher marginal willingness to pay for quality than
poor leisure travelers at every quality level.
The third group of travelers are business travelers and I define them the following
way: Business travelers have a very high willingness to pay for the first units of quality,
e.g. for a higher seat pitch, a socket at the seat, internet access and the option to leave
the plane first. However, they have a lower willingness to pay than the luxury traveler
62The price elasticity of demand is here defined as the relative demand change caused by a 1% increase
in the marginal price. Using the first order condition p′(q) = θqθ−1, the elasticity can be derived as
|1/(θ − 1)|.
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at high levels of quality, e.g. for an exquisite wine card, limousine service at the airport





θmaxq, for q ≤ q̃
θmaxq̃ + (q − q̃)θb, for q > q̃
with θb < θh < θmax. Now single crossing is violated since business travelers have a
higher willingness to pay than luxury travelers for the first q̃ units of quality but not for
additional quality/luxury.
In screening models with single crossing, see for example Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005, ch. 2), quality is downward distorted for all but the highest type (compared to
the symmetric information first best). This helps the principal (here: the airline) to
extract rents. Or, as Dupuit (1849) explains for railway travel:
It is not because of the few thousand francs that would have to be spend to
put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats
that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches [. . . ]
What the company is trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay
the second-class fare from traveling third-class.
Another standard result with single crossing is that only local incentive constraints are
binding, i.e. with single crossing luxury travelers are indifferent between first class and
business class and business travelers are indifferent between business and economy class.
If single crossing is violated also non-local incentive constraints can bind: The solid lines
in figure 4.1 depict indifference curves for the three types in a situation where the local
downward constraints are binding.64 But now–because of the violation of single crossing-
–the luxury traveler prefers economy to first class, i.e. his indifference curve through the
first class offer lies above the economy class offer. Hence, a non-local incentive constraint
is violated. The problem is that the price difference between economy and business class
is determined by the huge utility difference of business travelers. The utility difference
of luxury travelers between economy and business class quality is smaller than this price
difference. To satisfy also the non-local incentive constraint, the contracts have to be
63Instead of collapsing all items in a one-dimensional quality index, one could alternatively look at a
multidimensional model. See section 4.3 for the relation between the two approaches.
















Figure 4.1: indifference curves: three type airline pricing example
changed to those indicated by “×” in fig 4.1. The dashed indifference curves in figure
4.1 go through these changed contracts.65 Here, local and non-local incentive constraints
bind. Essentially, two things happen when changing contracts: First, the price for first
class travel has to decrease to prevent the luxury traveler from traveling economy class.
As this also relaxes the incentive constraint between first and business class, the quality
for business travelers can be brought closer to their first best quality. Second, the quality
in the economy class increases. This helps to relax the non-local incentive constraint
because it reduces the utility difference between economy and business class for business
travelers more than for luxury travelers.
The main features of this example are (i) non-local incentive constraints can bind
if single crossing is violated and (ii) binding non-local incentive constraints increase
quality/reduce distortions. Both results will be generalized later on.
4.3. Literature
The standard screening model with single crossing is well known and explained in many
textbooks, see for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Bolton and Dewatripont
65A completely solved numerical example corresponding to figure 4.1 can be found on https://sites.
google.com/site/christophschottmueller/research/webappendices.
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(2005). The literature on violations of single crossing in screening models remains rela-
tively scarce.
Some insights have been gained for discrete type insurance models with perfect com-
petition among principals. Several papers analyze settings where private information
has two dimensions and can take either a high or a low value in each dimension, i.e
there are 2 × 2 types. In Smart (2000), the two dimensions are risk and risk aversion
while in Wambach (2000) they are wealth and risk. Netzer and Scheuer (2010) model an
additional labor supply decision and the two dimensions are productivity and risk. All
three papers share a pooling result, i.e. if single crossing is violated two of the four types
can be pooled. Boone and Schottmüller (2011a) show that with imperfect competition
among principals there can even be an order reversal: Types with higher risk can have
more but also less insurance coverage if single crossing is violated.
My paper will analyze a model with a continuum of types and one principal. As
I will illustrate in the next section, the main technical difficulty caused by a violation
of single crossing are non-locally binding incentive constraints. In discrete type models
one can take all incentive constraints explicitly into account. This is more difficult in
a continuous type model since a continuum of constraints exists. Also, some additional
qualitative results emerge from the continuous type model, e.g. distortion above as well
as below first best and distortion at the top.
Araujo and Moreira (2010) characterize in a continuous type framework (inversely) U-
shaped solutions in a setup where single crossing is not satisfied. In these solutions, some
contracts are chosen by two types (“discrete pooling”). It turns out that in (inversely) U-
shaped solutions non-local incentive constraints are only binding between types choosing
the same contract from the menu. My paper complements their work by characterizing
monotone solutions in the same model. The main technical difference is that non-local
incentive constraints can bind between types choosing different contracts from the menu.
Qualitatively, the solution in Araujo and Moreira (2010) features either a discontinuity
or a bunching interval. Furthermore, there is a no distortion at the top result, i.e.
the type with the highest first best decision66 will be assigned this first best decision
66In Araujo and Moreira (2010), the function s(θ) is downward sloping and the analyzed solution is
actually U-shaped (not inversely U-shaped as it would be when applied to my setting). In this setting,
the undistorted top type is then the type with the lowest decision.
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under the optimal contract. My paper shows that monotone solutions can be strictly
monotone and continuous and therefore bunching and discontinuities are not a necessary
implication of a violation of single crossing. Furthermore, I show that distortion a the
top is possible in monotone solutions. The (inverse) U-shape solution and its critical
condition (see section 4.5.1 and 4.8.1) is also applied in an insurance model (Araujo
and Moreira, 2003), in signalling games (Araujo et al., 2007, 2011), non-linear monopoly
pricing (Araujo et al., 2010) and auctions (Araujo et al., 2008).
Violations of single crossing are also related to the literature on multidimensional
screening, see Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and Choné (1998) for seminal contributions,
Rochet (2009) for a recent related paper and Rochet and Stole (2003) for a survey. As
pointed out in the survey, “the problems arise not because of multiple dimensionality
itself, but because of a commonly associated lack of exogenous type-ordering in multiple-
dimensional environments.” A violation of single crossing also conveys a lack of type-
ordering. To make the relationship clear, think of a multidimensional, discrete type
model. Clearly, one can reassign types to a one-dimensional parameter but this reassigned
type will normally not satisfy single crossing. Consequently, an applied researcher will
often have the choice between a multidimensional type model or a one-dimensional type
model violating single crossing. My paper provides tools to make the latter way feasible.
The paper also relates to work relaxing the basic assumptions of the textbook model,
e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 2). Jullien (2000) allows for type dependent
participation constraints while Hellwig (2010) analyzes the case of irregular type distri-
butions, i.e. distributions with mass points and zero densities. Hellwig (2010) shows
that this leads to discontinuities as well as bunching in the optimal decision schedule.
Contrary to my paper, there is no distortion above first best and no distortion at the
top. In Jullien (2000), distortion can be above as well as below first best. The reason is
that incentive constraints can bind upward as well as downward. If a participation con-
straint binds in the interior, it is relaxed by increasing the decision of lower types: This
increases the slope of the rent function and leads to higher rents for the interior type. I
show that binding non-local incentive constraints can also lead to distortion above first
best although incentive constraints are only downward binding. The intuition is that if
a type θ wants to misrepresent as a lower type θ̂, one can relax this non-local incentive
constraint by increasing the decisions of types between θ̂ and θ: This will increase the
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slope of the rent function and lead to higher rents for θ at his own contract. Hence,
misrepresentation is less attractive.
There are also some papers in which violations of single crossing emerge but non-local
incentive constraints are (assumed to be) non-binding due to the specific functional forms
of the setup, see for example Calzolari (2004), Martimort and Stole (2009) or Hoffmann
and Inderst (2011).
4.4. Model
There is a one-dimensional decision in a principal agent relationship which is denoted
by q ∈ R+. Furthermore, there is a monetary transfer t ∈ R. The agent’s utility is
π = t − c(q, θ) where θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ, θ̄] ⊂ R is the type of the agent which is his private
information. The function c(q, θ) is assumed to be three times continuously differentiable
with cq > 0, cθ < 0. The assumption cθ < 0 ensures that the participation constraint
can only bind at the lowest type. Hence, any deviation from the standard solution will
not be due to participation constraints binding in the interior, see Jullien (2000) for this,
but to the violation of single crossing.
The principal’s utility is u(q, θ)− t and is two times continuously differentiable with
uq > 0. The principal has the prior distribution F (θ) with continuous density f(θ) > 0
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄]. To simplify the exposition, I assume full participation, i.e. the surplus
from trade is so high that it is not beneficial to exclude some types.67
For example, the principal could be the regulator of a natural monopolist and q could
be the quality (or quantity) of service provided. The regulator might maximize expected
consumer surplus which could be q−p where p is the price paid. The natural monopolist
would have cost function c(q, θ) and maximize profits. A higher type would correspond
to a more efficient firm in the sense that its costs are lower than the costs of a lower
type.
By the revelation principle, any general mechanism can also be implemented by a
67This is less restrictive than it might seem. By cθ < 0, only types at the low end could be excluded.
If exclusion is optimal, the characterization in this paper applies to the set of not excluded types. Using
the methods of this paper, one can calculate the solution for any given cutoff type and then maximize
the principal’s payoff over the cutoff type.
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direct revelation mechanism in which the agent truthfully reports his type (Myerson,
1979). The task is to design a menu q(θ), implemented by transfers t(θ), which is
individually rational (ir) and incentive compatible (ic) for the agent and maximizes the
principal’s objective under these two constraints.
Define π(θ) as the rents (in the regulation example: profits) a type θ gets under an
implementable menu (q(θ), t(θ)). Faced with a menu (q(θ), t(θ)), a type θ agent will
maximize t(θ̂) − c(q(θ̂), θ) over his type announcement θ̂. The envelope theorem and
truthful revelation require πθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ), θ).
Incentive compatibility of a decision q(θ) requires in general for any θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ
Φ(θ, θ̂) ≡ π(θ)− [π(θ̂) + c(q(θ̂), θ̂)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
t(θ̂)
−c(q(θ̂), θ)] ≥ 0. (IC)









cqθ(s, t) ds dt







cqθ(s, t) ds dt ≥ 0. (IC’)
Single crossing in this model is equivalent to cqθ(q, θ) not changing sign for any value of
q and θ. But then incentive compatibility in (IC’) boils down to a simple monotonicity
condition on q(θ) (plus the envelope condition): If cqθ < 0, then inequality (IC’) will
hold whenever q(θ) is monotonically increasing. If however cqθ can change sign, this
is no longer true. It remains true that q(θ) has to be increasing (decreasing) at θ if
cqθ(q(θ), θ) < (>)0. Otherwise, (IC’) would be violated for types close enough to θ. But
this no longer implies global incentive compatibility for two arbitrary types θ and θ̂.
This paper focusses on a one-time violation of single crossing also used by Araujo
and Moreira (2010): It is assumed that cqθ changes sign only once for a given q (or
a given θ). More precisely, I assume cqθθ > 0 and cqqθ < 0. Hence, there exists a
strictly increasing function s(θ) such that cqθ(s(θ), θ) = 0. Put differently, s(θ) gives for
each type the decision level at which the cross derivative cqθ is zero. The assumption
on third derivatives are normally made to ensure concavity of the objective function
and monotonicity of the decision, see for example section 7.3.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole
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θ
cqθ > 0
cqθ < 0 s(θ)
q(θ)







Figure 4.2: possible solution shapes
(1991). Here, however, they provide some structure on the way single crossing is violated.
Note that in all examples of section 4.2.1 single crossing is violated only once.
As incentive compatibility requires sgn(−cqθ(q(θ), θ)) = sgn(qθ(θ)), the optimal de-
cision schedule cannot have arbitrary shapes. Araujo and Moreira (2010) analyze inverse
U-shape decisions, see figure 4.2a. I will analyze monotone solutions in this paper, see
figure 4.2b.68
Although cqθ < 0 at the decision q(θ) for all types, the violation of single crossing still
plays a role in monotone solutions. It follows from (IC’) that one can represent incentive
compatibility as an integral over the shaded area in figure 4.2b: If the integral of cqθ
over this shaded area is negative, incentive compatibility is satisfied for θ and θ̂. Hence,
the region where cqθ > 0 plays a role although the solution does not pass through this
region.
The intuition is the following: Take two types θ and θ̂ with θ > θ̂. Type θ̂ is assigned
a transfer decision pair (t̂, q̂) and likewise θ has pair (t, q) with q > q̂. When deciding
whether he should misrepresent, type θ will compare the transfer difference t− t̂ with the
cost difference c(q, θ) − c(q̂, θ). Note that the transfer difference t − t̂ does not depend
on type θ while the cost difference does. With single crossing, the cost difference is
decreasing in type. If a type θ′ ∈ (θ̂, θ) with q′ ∈ (q̂, q) is introduced, it follows that
c(q, θ)− c(q̂, θ) < c(q, θ)− c(q′, θ) + c(q′, θ′)− c(q̂, θ′). On the other hand, the equivalent
68I will only look at monotonically increasing solutions. It is easy to show that in solutions that
are below s(θ) for all types (and therefore are decreasing) non-local incentive constraints do not bind.
Hence, standard methods are sufficient for such problems.
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expression for transfers holds with equality: t− t̂ = t− t′ + t′ − t̂. Therefore, incentive
compatibility between θ and θ̂ is implied by incentive compatibility between θ and θ′
as well as between θ′ and θ̂. Local incentive compatibility implies non-local incentive
compatibility because single crossing implies that the cost difference is decreasing in
type. Without the single crossing assumption, the cost difference c(q, θ)− c(q̂, θ) is not
necessarily decreasing in type and therefore local incentive constraints are not necessarily
more demanding than non-local ones.
Before turning to the analysis of the solution, some definitions and one assumption
is needed. I define the first best solution denoted by qfb(θ) as the solution to
max
q(θ)
u(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ), θ)
which would be the optimal decision if the principal observed the agent’s type. As a
second reference point, it is useful to look at the relaxed program. This is the program





{u(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ), θ)− π(θ)}f(θ) dθ (RP)
s.t. : πθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ), θ)
qθ(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0
π(θ) ≥ 0
The first and second constraint are the local incentive compatibility constraints. More
specifically, the first constraint is the envelope condition. It corresponds to a first order
condition of the problem in which the agent maximizes his utility over his type announce-
ment. The second constraint is the so called monotonicity constraint which corresponds
to the second order condition of the same problem.69 The third constraint is the partic-
ipation constraint which will bind only for θ by the assumption cθ < 0. I will call the
solution of (RP) the relaxed solution and denote it by qr(θ).
Since this paper focuses on the violation of single crossing in monotone solutions, the
following assumption is made:
69For a brief proof of this (also for the case where single crossing is violated), see lemma 1 in Araujo
and Moreira (2010).
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Assumption 4.1. The relaxed program is strictly concave in q(θ) and the relaxed so-
lution is strictly monotonically increasing and strictly above s(θ), i.e. qrθ(θ) > 0 and
qr(θ) > s(θ).70
Put differently, I assume that the monotonicity constraint does not bind and the
relaxed solution is fully characterized by the first order condition. It is easy to show
that uqq ≤ 0 and cqq ≥ 0 are sufficient for concavity. For strict monotonicity and
qr(θ) > s(θ), the following assumptions would be sufficient: uqθ ≥ 0, q
fb(θ) > s(θ)
and the commonly made monotone hazard rate assumption, i.e. f(θ)/(1 − F (θ)) non-
decreasing in θ. Note that the principal’s utility is not influenced directly by the agent’s
type in most applications, i.e. even uqθ = 0 is often satisfied. The monotone hazard
rate assumption is satisfied by the most common distributions as uniform, normal or
exponential, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for details. The assumption that qr(θ)–
or equivalently qfb(θ)–is above s(θ) for all types sets the monotone case apart from the
inverse U-shape case.
Under assumption 4.1, it is routine to verify that the relaxed solution is characterized
by the first order condition
{uq(q(θ), θ)− cq(q(θ), θ)}f(θ) + (1− F (θ))cqθ(q(θ), θ) = 0. (4.3)
Since qr(θ) > s(θ), it follows that cqθ(q
r(θ), θ) < 0. Therefore, (4.3) implies that qr(θ) ≤
qfb(θ) where the inequality is strict for all types but θ̄. The fact that for the highest type
θ̄ relaxed solution and first best coincide is the famous “no distortion at the top” result.
As already indicated, solutions can be monotone or inversely U-shaped (or even
jumping over s(θ) discontinuously). It is therefore useful to have a sufficient condition
under which the solution is monotone. To get such a sufficient condition, a technical
condition has to be added to assumption 4.1. This technical assumption is sufficient to
rule out solutions jumping discontinuously over s(θ). Given this, assumption 4.1 ensures
that the solution is not inversely U-shaped but monotone.
To state this technical condition some “mirror images” have to be defined: Take a
decision q below s(θ) and consider mirroring this decision in two ways: First, mirror it
along s(θ): Define qs(q, θ) by
∫ qs(q,θ)
q
cqθ(x, θ) dx = 0. Second, mirror q along the relaxed
70Strict concavity of the relaxed program means that the partial derivative of the left hand side of
equation(4.3) below with respect to q is negative.
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solution qr such that {u(q, θ)− c(q, θ)}f(θ) + (1− F (θ))cθ(q(θ), θ) is the same for q and
its mirror image qv(q, θ). Since cθ(q, θ) and (RP) are concave in q, the two mirror images
are well defined. Last define qf(θ) < s(θ) such that qs(qf(θ), θ) = qr(θ), i.e. qf (θ) is a
kind of mirror image of the relaxed solution along s(θ).71
Appendix 4.8.3 shows that an optimal contract exists under the technical condition
qv(q, θ) ≥ qs(q, θ) for all q ∈ [0, qf(θ)] and all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄]. The following proposition
implies that this technical condition is–together with assumption 4.1– also sufficient for
the monotonicity of the solution.
Proposition 4.1. If qv(q, θ) ≥ qs(q, θ) for all q ∈ [0, qf(θ)] and all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄], then any
incentive compatible decision function q(θ) which imposes decisions below s(θ) for some





q(θ) if q(θ) ≥ s(θ)
qs(q(θ), θ) if q(θ) < s(θ)
combined with transfers such that πcθ = −cθ(q
c(θ), θ). This changed decision is above
s(θ) and monotonically increasing. The changed decision is also incentive compatible.
Proof. see appendix
Put differently, the optimal decision has to be above s(θ) if the conditions of propo-
sition 4.1 are met. To satisfy local incentive compatibility, a decision above s(θ) has to
be monotonically increasing. The conditions of proposition 4.1 are therefore sufficient
for monotonicity.
Note that the imposed condition is automatically satisfied for q close to qf(θ) by
assumption 4.1. Hence, the condition roughly states that qs(q, θ) is not much steeper in q
than qv(q, θ). This holds, for example, true if {u(q, θ)−c(q, θ)}f(θ)+(1−F (θ))cθ(q(θ), θ)
and cθ(·) are both symmetric in q as then q
v
q (q, θ) = q
s
q(q, θ) = −1.
To illustrate, take example 1 from section 4.2.1 and assume that u(q, θ) = Sq with
S > 0. In this case, qv(q, θ) is defined by the equation
(












(q2 − qv2) = 0.
Straightforward calculation shows that this is solved by qv(q, θ) = 2qr(θ) − q. Hence,
qvq (q, θ) = −1 regardless of the type distribution and the conditions of the proposition
are satisfied whenever assumption 4.1 holds.
71If no qf (θ) ≥ 0 exists, take qf (θ) = 0.
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Given that the condition qv(q, θ) ≥ qs(q, θ) is sufficient but not necessary for a mono-
tone solution, this condition will not be used in the remainder of the paper where mono-
tone solutions are characterized.
4.5. Optimal contract
4.5.1. Necessary conditions
This subsection presents necessary conditions which have to be met whenever a non-local
incentive constraint is binding. Since these conditions are only a slight generalization of
those presented in Araujo and Moreira (2010), the presentation will be brief and more
intuitive than formal.
Take an optimal decision schedule q(θ) and let transfers be determined by local in-
centive compatibility, i.e. such that πθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ), θ) and π(θ) = 0. Furthermore,
suppose that IC is binding for two types θ and θ̂, i.e. Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0. By incentive compat-
ibility, Φ(·) has to be non-negative for all types. Therefore, (θ, θ̂) ∈ argmin(s,t)Φ(s, t) as
Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0.




= −cθ(q(θ), θ) + cθ(q(θ̂), θ) ≤ 0 with “=” if θ < θ̄ (C1)





−cq(q(θ̂), θ̂) + cq(q(θ̂), θ)
)
≥ 0 with “=” if θ̂ > θ (C2)
Hence, θ̂ is either bunched or marginal costs of θ and θ̂ are equal at q(θ̂).
The interpretation of these two conditions is the following: Recall that πθ(θ) =
−cθ(q(θ), θ) while cθ(q(θ̂), θ) is how profits of misrepresenting as θ̂ change in the misrep-
resenting type θ. Then condition (C1) says that profits π(θ) should change in type in the
72It turns out that non-local incentive compatibility constraints are only downward binding, see lemma
4.1. For this reason as well as notational convenience, I ignore the possibilities Φ(θ, θ̄) = 0 and Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0
already here.
73Differentiability of q(·) at θ̂ is not essential for this condition; see theorem 1A in Araujo and Moreira
(2010) and the graphical interpretation below.
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same way as misrepresentation-profits change in type. For a graphical interpretation, it
is worthwhile to rewrite (C1) as
∫ q(θ)
q(θ̂)
cqθ(q, θ) dq = 0 (C1’)
which means that the right hand side boundary of the shaded area in figure 4.2b is zero
when weighted with cqθ. If the integral above was positive and Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0, then incentive




i.e. the “shaded area” for θ + ε would be the same plus some area having the “wrong”
sign.
If the integral above is negative, the same applies accordingly for θ − ε, i.e. Φ(θ −




The second condition simply says that either θ̂ is bunched with other types or also
the weighted lower boundary of the shaded area in figure 4.2b is zero, i.e.
∫ θ
θ̂
cqθ(q(θ̂), t) dt = 0. (C2’)
Again, figure 4.2b illustrates the idea. If the integral was positive, incentive compatibility




The graphical interpretation also allows to quickly generalize these conditions at
points of discontinuity and bunching. This situation is depicted in figure 4.3. Assume
Φ(θ, θ̂i) = 0 for i = 1, 2. To keep incentive compatibility for types close to θ, θ̂1 and θ̂2
the following conditions have to hold:74 ∫ q−(θ)
q(θ̂i)
cqθ(q, θ) dq ≥ 0 as otherwise Φ(θ − ε, θ̂i) < 0 ∫ q+(θ)
q(θ̂i)
cqθ(q, θ) dq ≤ 0 as otherwise Φ(θ + ε, θ̂i) < 0 ∫ θ
θ̂1
cqθ(q(θ̂), t) dt ≤ 0 as otherwise Φ(θ, θ̂1 − ε) < 0 ∫ θ
θ̂2
cqθ(q(θ̂), t) dt ≥ 0 as otherwise Φ(θ, θ̂1 + ε) < 0
Given (C1) and (C2), one can use variational calculus to derive a third necessary
condition for types at which the incentive constraint binds. While (C1) and (C2) are
purely driven by incentive compatibility, this third condition will be derived from the
principal’s optimization. The idea is to to have a variation of the optimal decision
74I use the superscript “–” (“+”) to indicate limits from below (above).
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Figure 4.3: necessary conditions at discontinuity
around θ and θ̂ such that the two necessary conditions (C1) and (C2) are still satisfied.
The method differs only slightly from the one used in Araujo and Moreira (2010) for
discretely pooled types and therefore the steps are relegated to appendix 4.8.1. The
following variational condition results:
[uq(q(θ), θ)− cq(q(θ), θ)]f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ)
+1−F (θ) =
[uq(q(θ̂), θ̂)− cq(q(θ̂), θ̂)]f(θ̂)
cqθ(q(θ̂), θ̂)
+1−F (θ̂) (C3)
Section 4.5.2 will give a shadow value interpretation to the terms on both sides of (C3)
and thereby provide some intuition for this condition.
4.5.2. Monotone solution
The remainder of the paper deals with the characterization of monotone solutions. As
pointed out before, the main difficulties are non-locally binding incentive constraints.
The following two lemmata show that only a certain subset of non-local incentive con-
straints can be binding. Lemma 4.1 implies that incentive constraints cannot be upward
binding in monotone solutions. Put differently, no type will be indifferent between the
contract designated for him and the contract of a higher type. The only possible way a
non-local incentive constraint can be binding is downward, i.e. a type might be indifferent
between his contract and the contract of a lower type.
Lemma 4.1. If q(θ) ≥ s(θ) and q(θ) is locally incentive compatible, then no type wants













θ4 θ3 θ2 θ1
(b) no overlap
Figure 4.4: non-binding constraints
Proof. Recall that local incentive compatibility requires monotonicity of q(θ), i.e.
q(θ) has to be monotonically increasing as q(θ) ≥ s(θ). Now take θ̂ > θ. Incentive
compatibility requires
Φ(θ, θ̂) ≡ π(θ)− π(θ̂)− c(q(θ̂), θ̂) + c(q(θ̂), θ) ≥ 0. (4.4)
Because of local incentive compatibility, this can be rewritten as
∫ θ̂
θ





cqθ(s, t) ds dt ≥ 0.
But the last inequality holds automatically since q(θ) ≥ s(θ) and qθ(θ) ≥ 0. This implies
that the integrand is non-positive for all (s, t) in question. Figure 4.4a gives a graphical
representation of this fact. Q.E.D.
The intuition for lemma 4.1 is the same as in models with single crossing. A higher
decision increases the costs for higher types less than for lower types. For a low type, this
holds true for all decisions above his own. Local incentive compatibility induces transfer
differences making higher types indifferent between their decision and a marginally higher
decision. A lower type will face the same transfer differences but higher cost differences
when opting for a higher decision. Therefore, local incentive compatibility of higher
types implies that low types do not want to misrepresent upwards non-locally.
The following lemma puts more structure on the ways incentive compatibility con-
straints can bind. It states that binding non-local incentive constraints cannot overlap,
i.e. if a non-local incentive constraint binds between θ and θ̂, then no other incentive
constraint can bind between a type in the interval [θ̂, θ] and a type outside this interval.
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I will use the following phrase to describe binding non-local incentive constraints: A
non-local incentive constraint binds from θ to θ̂ if Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0.
Lemma 4.2. Assume the solution is monotone and assume q(θ̂) < q(θ). If the non-
local incentive constraint binds from θ to θ̂, it cannot bind from any θ′ ∈ [θ̂, θ) to any
θ̂′ 6∈ [θ̂, θ). Neither can it bind for any θ̂′′ ∈ (θ̂, θ] and θ′′ 6∈ (θ̂, θ).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, contrary to the lemma, there are
types θ1 > θ2 ≥ θ3 > θ4 with Φ(θ1, θ3) = 0 and Φ(θ2, θ4) = 0. Then the incentive
constraint between θ1 and θ4 will be violated, i.e. Φ(θ1, θ4) < 0:

















































cqθ(s, t) ds dt < 0
The first and second equality are simple splitting up the integral steps (and can
readily be seen in figure 4.4b), the third uses the fact that Φ(θ1, θ3) = Φ(θ2, θ4) = 0 and
the last inequality follows from the incentive compatibility between θ2 and θ3 as well as




cqθ(s, θ2) ds ≥ 0 holds by C1 (with equality if q(θ) is continuous at




cqθ(s, θ2) ds ≥ 0 (see
figure 4.4b). The inequality above follows then from cqθθ ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
As a special case, i.e. with θ̂ = θ′, the preceding lemma includes the following: If
θ is indifferent between his and θ̂’s contract, i.e. Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0, then no other type θ′ is
indifferent between his contract and θ’s contract, i.e. Φ(θ′, θ) > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Θ \ θ.
Put differently, incentive compatibility can bind non-locally from a type or to a type but
not both. Figure 4.5 summarizes the two previous lemmata by showing how non-local
incentive compatibility constraints can bind in a monotone solution.
One of the contributions of this paper is that a violation of single crossing can affect
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Figure 4.5: how incentive constraints can bind
lowing lemma shows that some irregularities can be ruled out on the grounds of incentive
compatibility alone.
Lemma 4.3. Assume a non local incentive constraint binds from θ to θ̂, i.e. Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0.
The decision is continuous at θ̂ if θ̂ is not the boundary type of a bunching interval.
Furthermore, θ cannot be bunched if the decision is continuous at θ and θ < θ̄.
Proof. see appendix
After these technical results, it is possible to obtain a qualitative result of practical
importance. If the solution is monotone, non-local incentive compatibility might require
“distortions”that are unusual: With single crossing, local incentive constraints are down-
ward binding. This explains why the relaxed solution is below the first best decision.
With single crossing, a high type has lower marginal costs than a low type. By distorting
the low type’s decision downward, the cost advantage of the high type is reduced, i.e. the
low type’s decision becomes less attractive. Consequently, the rent paid to the high type
can be lower without inducing misrepresentation. Without single crossing, it is no longer
clear that a high type has lower marginal costs than a low type at the low type’s deci-
sion. Figure 4.2b, for example, illustrates that
∫ θ
θ̂
cqθ(q(θ̂), t) dt = cq(q(θ̂), θ)− cq(q(θ̂), θ̂)
could be positive. Therefore, making the low type’s contract unattractive might require
increasing the low type’s decision. Informational distortion from local and non-local
incentive constraints will then go in opposite directions. In short, binding non-local
incentive constraints reduce the usual downward distortions.
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Proposition 4.2. If the optimal decision is monotone, it will be above the relaxed solu-
tion, i.e. if q(θ) is monotonically increasing, then q(θ) ≥ qr(θ) for all θ.
Proof. see appendix
The previous proposition highlights how violations of non-local ic are dealt with under
monotone solutions. This can also be illustrated with figure 4.2b. Incentive compatibility
is violated if the grey area weighted by cqθ is positive. To satisfy incentive compatibility
one can raise q for all types between θ̂ and θ. The additional grey area features cqθ < 0
and therefore the incentive problem is mitigated.
One noteworthy point is that the incentive constraint is mainly relaxed by increasing
q for types at which the incentive constraint is non-binding; i.e. if ic is binding from θ′ to
θ̂′, it is less q(θ′) and q(θ̂′) that have to be increased but q for the types between θ̂′ and θ′.
To see the intuition, recall that πθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ), θ) and that cqθ(q(θ), θ) < 0. Therefore,
increasing q will raise the slope of the rent function π(θ). Increasing q for types in (θ̂′, θ′)
will therefore increase the rent of θ′ at his assigned menu point. Obviously, the non-local
incentive constraint is relaxed.
The last paragraph illustrates that non-local incentive constraints are potentially dif-
ficult to handle: The decision of a type is not only influenced by the incentive constraints
binding for him but also by binding incentive constraints of other types. The following
theorem structures this intuition and characterizes the solution.
Theorem 4.1. A monotone solution is characterized by the equation
[uq(q(θ), θ)− cq(q(θ), θ)]f(θ) + (1− F (θ))cqθ(q(θ), θ) = η(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ) (4.5)
where η(θ) is a non-negative function with the following properties: η(θ) is constant on each interval of types for which non-local incentive constraints
are not binding and the decision is strictly increasing. η(θ) is non-decreasing at types θ̂ to which non-local incentive constraints are binding
whenever θ̂ is not bunched. η(θ) is non-increasing at types from which non-local incentive constraints are bind-











Figure 4.6: feasible changes η(θ) is zero if no non-local incentive constraint is binding to θ.
Proof. see appendix
Before giving an intuitive interpretation to η(θ), let me briefly sketch the idea behind
the proof of the theorem. Given the solution q(θ), one can simply define η(θ) by (4.5).
The properties of η(θ) are derived by showing that q(θ) could be changed in a way that
(i) is incentive compatible and (ii) increases the principal’s payoff if these properties were
not satisfied. Figure 4.6 shows feasible changes when a non-local incentive constraint is
binding from θ′ to θ̂′. Increasing the decision for types slightly below θ′ will relax (or not
affect) binding non-local incentive constraints. Since this change relaxes the incentive
constraints from types above θ′ to types below θ′, it is then feasible to assign types slightly
above θ′ a lower decision, see figure 4.6. Note that lemma 4.2 is essential for feasibility
as it assures that no non-local incentive constraint is binding to types slightly above θ′.
It can then be shown that such a feasible change would increase the principal’s payoff if
η(θ) was increasing at θ′. At θ̂, a different change in the decision is feasible, see figure 4.6,
which can be used to show that η(θ) cannot be decreasing at θ̂. At types where non-local
incentive constraints are lax, both kind of changes are feasible and consequently η(θ) has
to be constant.
The properties of η(θ) have an intuitive interpretation. The left hand side of (4.5) is
well known from models with single crossing: Increasing q(θ) affects the surplus from type
θ but also the rents of all types above θ. But marginally increasing q(θ) will also relax
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all non-local incentive constraints binding from types θ′ > θ to types θ̂′ < θ, see figure
4.2b. As these incentive constraints can be expressed as integrals over cqθ (see equation
(IC’)), the “amount” by which those non-local incentive constraints are relaxed is given
by cqθ(q(θ), θ) which can be found on the right hand side of (4.5). Consequently, η(θ)
could be interpreted as the shadow value of all non-local incentive constraints binding
from types θ′ > θ to types θ̂′ < θ. These binding constraints are the same for all types
in an interval of types for which non-local incentive constraints are lax, see figure 4.5.
This explains the first property of η(θ).
The other properties can also be explained by the shadow value interpretation of η(θ).
If a non-local incentive constraint is binding to a type θ̂, then there are more non-local
incentive constraints binding “over” θ̂+ ε than “over” θ̂− ε.75 Consequently, the shadow
value of non-local incentive constraints binding over a type has to be higher for θ̂+ε than
for θ̂− ε. Put differently, increasing q(θ̂+ ε) relaxes more non-local incentive constraints
than increasing q(θ̂ − ε).
Also the last two properties are straightforward: Increasing the decision of the bound-
ary types does not affect non-local incentive constraints of other types.
Furthermore, the interpretation as shadow value provides some intuition for the nec-
essary condition (C3) which basically says that η(θ) = η(θ̂) when a non-local incentive
constraint is binding from θ to θ̂. This makes sense in light of lemma 4.2. Because
there is no overlap in binding incentive constraints, the non-local incentive constraints
binding over θ are the same as the ones binding over θ̂. Consequently, the shadow value
of relaxing those constraints is the same for the two types.
Theorem 4.1 establishes what happens at types where non-local incentive constraints
are binding (or lax). Here I want to argue that non-local incentive constraints are typ-
ically binding from and to intervals of types. Put differently, there are intervals [θ0, θ1]
and [θ̂1, θ̂0] such that a non-local incentive constraint is binding from each θ
′ ∈ [θ0, θ1] to
some θ̂′ ∈ [θ̂1, θ̂0]. From theorem 4.1, it follows that η(θ
′) = η(θ̂′) and η(θ) is increasing
(decreasing) on [θ̂1, θ̂0] (on [θ0, θ1]). The intuition for this structure is the following: Take
types θ′ and θ̂′ such that a non-local incentive constraint between θ′ and θ̂′ is violated
under the relaxed solution. Proposition 4.2 indicates that the decision of the types be-
tween θ̂ and θ′ is increased to establish incentive compatibility. The usual optimization
75With binding “over” θ I mean binding from a type θ′ > θ to a type θ̂ < θ.
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intuition suggests that it should be optimal to increase the decision for all those types
by “the same amount.”76 However, this is not possible because of incentive compatibility
constraints: Clearly, the decision of types θ′ − ε cannot be increased discretely because
of the monotonicity constraint at θ′. Lemma 4.3 establishes that the monotonicity con-
straint cannot even be binding for θ′ as then the non-local constraint from θ′ − ε to θ̂′
would be violated. Lemma 4.3 also makes clear that the decision should not jump at
θ̂′ as otherwise the non-local constraint from θ′ to θ̂′ + ε would be violated. One could
now conjecture that non-local incentive constraints are binding from θ′ not only to θ̂′
but also to slightly higher types and–with the same logic–from types slightly below θ′
to θ̂′. However, it is not difficult to show that the incentive constraint between θ′ − ε
and θ̂′ + ε would be violated in this case. Consequently, one is left with the interval
structure described above where non-local incentive constraints are binding from types
slightly below θ′ to types slightly above θ̂′.
The following lemma takes another perspective on the structure by establishing that
non-local incentive constraints cannot bind at a finite number of interior types. With
the additional properties established in the lemma, one should indeed expect the set of
types where non-local incentive constraints bind to contain an interval.77
Lemma 4.4. If the optimal solution is monotone and the relaxed solution is not im-
plementable78, non-local incentive constraints cannot bind only from a finite number of
interior types to a finite number of interior types. The set of types from (to) which
non-local incentive constraints bind cannot consist of isolated interior types.79
The solution can be chosen such that (i) the set of types from which non-local incentive
constraints are binding is closed and (ii) the set of types to which non-local incentive
constraints are binding is closed.
Proof. see appendix
76Theorem 4.1 confirms this intuition by establishing that η(θ) is constant at types where non-local
incentive constraints are lax.
77Strictly speaking, the lemma leaves the option that non-local incentive constraints are binding at a
Cantor set of interior types. As the following results do not depend on this artificial looking case, I will
ignore this possibility and speak of intervals in the remainder of the paper.
78The relaxed decision is said to be not implementable if it violates non-local incentive constraints.
79Isolated means here that for each type θ from (to) which a non-local incentive constraint binds,
there exists a neighborhood of θ in which non-local incentive constraints are lax for all types but θ.
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Some of the properties of η(θ) in theorem 4.1 hold only at types where the decision
is strictly increasing. The reason is that, the way (4.5) is written, η(θ) captures not only
the effect of non-local incentive constraints but also the effect of the monotonicity con-
straint. If one wants to avoid this cluttering of effects, it is straightforward to introduce
a monotonicity parameter ν(θ) which captures the effect of the monotonicity constraint.
In this case it is easy to see that the properties of η(θ) described in theorem 4.1 extend
also to bunched types. Instead of (4.5) the solution would then be characterized by
νθ(θ) = (uq(q(θ), θ)− cq(q(θ), θ))f(θ) + (1− F (θ)− η(θ))cqθ(q(θ), θ)
where ν(θ)qθ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, i.e. ν(θ) corresponds to the Lagrange parameter
of the monotonicity constraint. If the start and ending type of a bunching interval are





νθ(θ) dθ = 0. As described in the existing
literature on ironing, see Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) or the exposition in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, ch. 7), the bunching interval is characterized by this last condition
and the endpoint conditions ν(θbs) = ν(θ
b
e) = 0. The following lemma formalizes the
discussion of the last paragraph.
Lemma 4.5. If types in the interval (θbs, θ
b
e) are bunched in the optimal solution, then
there exists a function η(θ) which satisfies the properties of theorem 4.1 also for bunched
types. In particular, η(θ) is non-decreasing on (θbs, θ
b
e) and constant if no non-local in-
centive constraint binds to the bunched types. Furthermore, η(θ) satisfies (i) η(θ) = η(θ̂)
if Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0 and (C1’) as well as (C2’) hold, (ii)
∫ θbe
θbs




This subsection has two goals: First, to provide sufficient conditions under which a
monotone solution is continuous and, second, to introduce an algorithm for determining
such a continuous solution.
The first sufficient condition for continuity is loosely based on the idea of having
a one-to-one relationship between η and q for a given type θ; i.e. the idea that for a
given type θ and η(θ) > 0, equation (4.5) yields a unique solution for q. The condition
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in the proposition ensures this and also ascertains that this relationship is monotonic,
i.e. a higher η(θ) results in a higher q. Furthermore, the same condition ensures that
the principal’s objective is concave when the optimization problem is written as an
optimization over the rent profile π(θ) instead as an optimization over q(θ), see the proof
of proposition 4.6.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that the first best is concave, i.e. uqq − cqq ≤ 0. A monotone
solution is continuous if
uqq(q, θ)− cqq(q, θ)
cqqθ(q, θ)
>
uq(q, θ)− cq(q, θ)
cqθ(q, θ)
(CVR)
holds for all types and all q ≥ qfb(θ).80
Proof. see appendix
Hence, if the social objective u(q, θ)−c(q, θ) is concave enough or if the cross derivative
cqθ(q, θ) is in absolute value large enough (at the first best decision), the optimal decision
will be continuous. Take for example the cost function in example 1 in section 4.4 and
assume that u(q, θ) = βq. It turns out that (CVR) is equivalent to the condition for
qfb(θ) > s(θ), i.e. β > 2θ̄.81
The following proposition gives an alternative condition under which the optimal
solution is below the first best decision. Having a solution below first best turns out
to be sufficient for continuity and strict monotonicity of the solution (under a standard
monotone hazard rate assumption). This is in itself remarkable. As the relaxed solution
is below first best, one should expect the solution to be below first best whenever non-
local incentive constraints are not violated “too much” by the relaxed solution. Hence,
there is a broad class of problems in which the solution will be strictly monotone and
continuous. Furthermore, the proof of the following proposition shows that the property
holds also locally. That is, if the decision is below first best on some interval (θ1, θ2),
then the decision will be strictly monotone and continuous on (θ1, θ2).
Before stating the proposition some additional notation is needed. Define qm(θ) such
that cθ(q
fb(θ), θ) = cθ(q
m(θ), θ). Hence, qm(θ) is a mirror image of qfb(θ) along s(θ) with
respect to cθ(q, θ).
80Obviously, it is enough if the condition holds for all q ∈ [qfb(θ), q̄] where q̄ is defined as in appendix
4.8.3.
81In fact, this also holds true if q2 in the cost function is replaced by any increasing and convex
function.
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Proposition 4.4. Assume that qm(θ) is non-decreasing and that there is no distortion
at the top.82 Then the optimal solution is below first best and continuous. The optimal
solution is strictly increasing at all types where it is below first best if f(θ)/(1−F (θ)) is
non-decreasing and uqθ ≥ 0.
Proof. see appendix
One example for a class of function where qm(θ) is increasing are cost functions of
the form c(q, θ) = θq + φ(q − αθ) + γ(θ) where φ(·) is a function of which the first
three derivatives are positive.83 Any increasing and concave benefit function u(q, θ) with
uqθ = 0 and q
fb(θ) > s(θ) yields an increasing qm(θ).
Note that in many applications uqθ = 0 will hold. For example, in regulation models,
labor market models and monopoly pricing, this property will typically hold because the
principal’s utility depends only on the decision and the transfer and not directly on the
agent’s type.
Now it is time to turn to the issue of calculating a solution. In principle, the solution
is already described by (4.5), the properties of η(θ) and the necessary conditions C1,
C2 and C3. If a non-local incentive constraint binds from a type θ, the three necessary
conditions could be used to determine θ̂, q(θ) and q(θ̂) (assuming that there is a unique
solution). If non-local incentive constraints are lax at a type θ, (4.5) can be used to
calculate q(θ) where η(θ) equals η(θ̂′) with θ̂′ being defined as the next lower type to
which a non-local incentive constraint is binding. While nothing is wrong with this
description, it might be burdensome to calculate a solution in this way. Hence, a more
structured alternative to obtain a continuous solution might be helpful. This alternative
will also give some additional insights into the logic behind the solution. The algorithm
is based on the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Define Φη(θ, θ̂) as Φ(θ, θ̂) under q̃(θ) where q̃(θ) is derived from
{uq(q̃, θ)− cq(q̃, θ)}f(θ) + (1− F (θ)− η)cqθ(q̃, θ) = 0.
If the incentive constraint binds between θ′ and θ̂′ in a continuous solution q(θ), then
82See the following section for a simple sufficient condition for no distortion at the top.
83The interpretation of this cost function is that there is a “normal scale” of αθ. Producing above
this normal scale is increasingly costly. Type reflects a tradeoff between the size of the normal scale and
marginal cost when producing within the normal scale.
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(θ′, θ̂′) minimize Φη(θ, θ̂) on [θ̂′, θ′] where η = η(θ′) = η(θ̂′). Furthermore, Φη(θ′, θ̂′) <
Φη(θ′′, θ̂′′) for any θ′′ > θ′ and θ̂′′ < θ̂′.
Proof. see appendix
To get a feeling for this proposition take η = 0. Then q̃(θ) = qr(θ). Denote the global
minimizer of Φ0(θ, θ̂) by (θr, θ̂r). Although a little extra work is needed, the following
result follows almost directly from proposition 4.5:
Corollary 4.1. If the relaxed solution is not implementable, the non-local incentive
constraint from θr to θ̂r will bind in the optimal decision. If one of the two types (both)
is interior, his (their) optimal decision is the relaxed decision; i.e. q(θ) = qr(θ) or (and)
q(θ̂) = qr(θ̂) respectively.
Proof. see appendix
The proposition then says that a similar logic applies for all pairs (θ′, θ̂′) at which
incentive compatibility is binding: One only has to replace qr(θ) in the corollary by the
corresponding q̃(θ). This q̃ is the decision that would result if all types had the same
η(θ) and this η(θ) would equal η(θ′) in the optimal decision.
The last proposition in connection with theorem 4.1 gives a method for determining
q(θ).
Solve (4.5) for q as a function of type θ and η. Plugging this q(θ, η) into Φ(·) yields
a function Φη(θ, θ̂) which can be minimized over θ and θ̂ yielding θ(η) and θ̂(η) as min-
imizers. There could be several pairs (θ(η), θ̂(η)) locally minimizing Φη(θ, θ̂). Relevant
is each pair (θ, θ̂) (i) that globally minimizes Φη(·) on the interval [θ̂, θ], (ii) for which
no Φη(·) minimizer (θ′, θ̂′) with θ′ > θ, θ̂′ < θ̂ and Φη(θ′, θ̂′) < Φη(θ, θ̂) exists. For now,
assume there is only one such relevant pair.
Under the optimal decision, the constraint will bind from θ(η) to θ̂(η) for all η ∈ [0, η̄]
where η̄ is determined by Φη(θ(η), θ̂(η)) = 0. The optimal decision for types θ where
the constraint binds is given by q(θ, η) where η is such that θ = θ(η). Types for which
the constraint does not bind can be sorted into two categories: First, types θ such that
non-local incentive constraints do not bind from any type above θ to any type below
θ. These types simply have q(θ) = qr(θ). Second, types θ such that the constraint is
binding from some θ′ > θ to some θ̂′ < θ. These types have η(θ) equal to η(inf{θ′ :
Φ(θ′, θ̂′) = 0 with θ′ > θ > θ̂′}), i.e. their η is the same as the one of the next lowest
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type to which a non-local incentive constraint binds. Their q(θ) is then q(θ, η(θ)).
One remark on the possibility that several relevant pairs (θ(η), θ̂(η)) exist. For exam-
ple, say there exist the pairs (θ1(η), θ̂1(η)) and (θ2(η), θ̂2(η)) both satisfying (i) and (ii)
above. The non-local incentive constraint could in this case bind from an interval [θ0, θ1]
to the interval [θ̂1, θ̂0] as well as from the interval [θ2, θ3] to the interval [θ̂3, θ̂2] where
θ̂1 < θ̂0 < θ0 < θ1 < θ̂3 < θ̂2 < θ2 < θ3; see figure 4.5 for an illustration. Indeed one
has to be a bit more precise in this case: There will be different η̄ for the two “brackets”
of binding incentive constraints. In this case η(θ) will not be single peaked. Hence, the
algorithm will then be applied to the two brackets separately and nothing else changes.
A second remark has to be made with regard to bunching. Some types might have an
ironed out solution. This solution is then not q(θ, η(θ)) as described above but an ironed
out version of it. The condition for determining η̄, i.e. Φη(θ(η), θ̂(η)) = 0 has to hold for
the ironed out decision whenever ironing is relevant. If the monotone hazard rate holds
and uqθ ≥ 0, one does not have to worry about ironing as long as η ≤ 1− F (θ(η)): This
implies q(θ) ≤ qfb(θ) for all types for which bunching could have been possible and the
decision will be strictly increasing (see the proof of proposition 4.4).
The algorithm is illustrated with a numerical example in the following section.
4.5.4. Distortion at the top
If the non-local incentive constraint binds from θ̄, something unusual can happen. Recall
that the necessary condition (C1) might hold with inequality at θ = θ̄. It is therefore
possible that non-local incentive constraints bind from θ̄ to several non-bunched θ̂ even
if the solution is continuous. Note that this is impossible for interior types: For a given
q(θ), (C1) and (C2) will uniquely determine θ̂ and q(θ̂).
Now consider the case where the non-local incentive constraint binds not only to
several but to a mass of types θ̂ (or to θ as will be shown below). Then the shadow
value of the constraint η(θ) will be strictly positive and bounded away from 0 for types
slightly below θ̄. Hence, these types have a decision q(θ) which is at least ε away from
their relaxed decision qr(θ) for some ε > 0. Obviously, the same has then to apply for
θ̄ because of the monotonicity constraint. Put differently, η(θ̄) > 0 and therefore q(θ̄) is
distorted: There is distortion at the top.
The algorithm described above works also in this situation. The minimizer θ(η) will
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then be the boundary type θ̄. The decision of θ̄ and his shadow value are determined by
the highest θ̂ to which his non-local incentive constraint binds. At this θ̂ also condition
(C1) holds with equality (if θ̂ is above θ).
It should be pointed out that distortion at the top is a generic property. Put differ-
ently, there will still be distortion at the top if, for example, the distribution of types is
slightly perturbed. By proposition 4.5, distortion at the top implies that θ̄ will minimize
Φη(θ, θ̂) for all η < η̃ for some η̃ > 0. Φη(θ, θ̂) is continuous in q(θ, η) which in turn
is continuous in the density f(θ). Therefore, θ̄ will remain global minimizer of Φη(θ, θ̂)
under minor perturbations of the density. Consequently, distortion at the top has to be
generic by proposition 4.5.
A natural question is whether there is a sufficient condition for no distortion at the
top. Indeed corollary 4.1 allows to formulate such a condition. If θ̄ is not the global
minimizer of Φr(θ, θ̂) where Φr(·) is Φ(·) under the relaxed solution qr(·), then non local
incentive constraints cannot bind from θ̄. Therefore, the relaxed decision is optimal for
θ̄ implying that q(θ̄) = qfb(θ̄).
Another sufficient condition for no distortion at the top can be formulated using (C1):
∫ qfb(θ̄)
0
cqθ(q, θ̄) dq ≤ 0 is sufficient since (C1) cannot hold with inequality.
To illustrate the distortion at the top result and also the algorithm introduced in the
previous section, consider the following numerical example which is inspired by example
1 in section 4.2.84





. The principal’s valuation function
is u(q) = 8q
5
. Furthermore, I assume that types are distributed on [1/4, 3/4] with density
f(θ) = 4/5(9θ − 2). Recall from subsection 4.5.3 that with these parameter values the
sufficient condition in proposition 4.3 is met. The solution will therefore be continuous.











(8θ − 2) +








which leads to the relaxed solution
qr(θ) =
−347θ2 + 1660θ3 − 2444θ4
330 + 1440θ2
.
84A Mathematica notebook with detailed calculations can be found under https://sites.google.
com/site/christophschottmueller/research/webappendices.
103











Figure 4.7: numerical example 1
To use the algorithm, q(θ, η) has to be calculated. In this example
q(θ, η) =
−2160θ4 + 2944θ3 − 347θ2 − 200ηθ2
330− 400η + 1440θ2
.
Φη(θ, θ̂) can be numerically minimized. The result is that θ̄ and θ minimize Φη(θ, θ̂) for
all η ≤ η̄ ≈ 0.47298. This means that a non-local incentive constraint is only binding
from θ̄ to θ and η(θ) = 0.47298 for all types. Consequently, there is distortion at the top











Graphically, figure 4.7 shows that q(θ) (upper solid line) is above qr(θ) (dotted line) for
all types and that q(θ) is above qfb(θ) (dashed line) for high types.
4.5.5. Stochastic contracts
So far, this paper concentrated on deterministic contracts. Although hardly observed
in practice, one could think of stochastic contracts. In the framework of this paper,
this would mean that a type θ is assigned a probability distribution over the decision
q instead of one deterministic decision q(θ). The idea behind a stochastic contract is
to relax (non-local) incentive constraints. Intuitively, this could work if different types
have different degrees of risk aversion. See Rochet (2009) for an example where random
contracts are optimal. The following proposition gives a sufficient condition under which
deterministic decisions are optimal.











Condition (CVR) and (4.6) differ from the conditions for non-stochastic contracts in
Maskin and Riley (1984). In Maskin and Riley (1984), only local incentive constraints
bind and they bind “downward”. It is then shown that assigning the expected decision
increases the principal’s payoff and relaxes local incentive constraints if risk aversion
is decreasing in type. Decreasing risk aversion is therefore a sufficient condition for the
optimality of deterministic contracts. This reasoning is flawed in case non-local incentive
constraints are binding: Assigning the expected decision decreases the slope of the rent
function π(θ) because −cθ is convex in q. Hence, profit differences between θ and θ̂ are
smaller under the expected decision compared to the stochastic contract, i.e. non-local
incentive constraints are harder to satisfy.
Proposition 4.6 takes therefore another way which is also taken in Jullien (2000).
When rewriting the principal’s optimization problem as an optimization over rent pro-
files π (instead of over decision q) condition (CVR) ensures that the resulting program is
concave. Condition (4.6) ensures that the set of implementable utility profiles is convex.
These two properties imply that a stochastic decision is worse for the principal than a de-
terministic decision implementing the same utility profile. The conditions of proposition
4.1 allow to focus on decisions above s(θ) which correspond to monotone solutions.
4.6. Discussion
I want to discuss the assumptions on third derivatives, i.e. cqqθ < 0 and cqθθ > 0. The
fact that these derivatives do not change sign ensures that the cross derivative cqθ changes
sign only once for any given θ (or q). While this property is admittedly important for
the analysis, it is immaterial which sign the third derivatives have (as long as the sign
is the same for all relevant decisions and types). To illustrate this (and also to show
an example where the monotonicity constraint binds) consider the following version of
example 2:85 Types are distributed uniformly on [2, 3] and the principal’s objective is
85A Mathematica notebook with detailed calculations can be found under https://sites.google.
com/site/christophschottmueller/research/webappendices.
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Figure 4.8: numerical example 2
the expected value of q(θ)− t(θ). The agent’s utility is given by




Here the parameter values σ = 27 and γ = 12 are used. In this case, third derivatives
have the following signs in the relevant range of the decision: cqqθ < 0 and cqθθ < 0.
Consequently, the sign switching decision s(θ) is downward sloping. As depicted in
figure 4.8a, first best decision and relaxed decision are also downward sloping.
Although the example looks different on first sight, it is equivalent to the model of the
main text and all results apply accordingly. It turns out that also in this example (θ̄, θ)
minimize Φη(θ, θ̂) and therefore only the non-local incentive constraint from the highest
to the lowest type is binding. However, the monotonicity constraint is binding for the




[uq(q(θ, η), θ)− cq(q(θ, η), θ)]f(θ) + (1− F (θ)− η(θ))cqθ(q(θ, η), θ) dθ = 0.
Here, η̄ turns out to be approximately 0.18 and the solution for the highest types is
depicted in figure 4.8b. The solution exhibits bunching of types in [2.9, 3].
It should be pointed out that the results in this paper do not necessarily hold if one
of the third derivatives cqqθ or cqθθ changes sign in the relevant range of q. To see this,
imagine that in figure 4.4a there was a second s(θ) function where the cqθ changes sign
again and assume that this second s(θ) was above q(θ) but intersecting the shaded area
in figure 4.4a. In this case, lemma 4.1 would not necessarily hold and the results building
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on lemma 4.1 might also be affected. For example, theorem 4.1 would have to be refined:
The properties for ηθ at types from and to which non-local incentive constraints bind
will only hold at types θ > θ̂ where non-local incentive constraints are only downward
binding.
4.7. Conclusion
This paper characterizes monotone solutions in a screening environment where single
crossing is violated. Although the model restricts itself to a one time violation of single
crossing, the main effects of a violation of single crossing can be illustrated. Non-local
incentive constraints can become binding. The distortion caused by non-locally binding
incentive constraints can counteract the normal rent extraction distortion. Therefore,
the solution can be partly above as well as below the first best decision. There can be
distortion at the top if non local incentive constraints are binding from the top type to
a mass of types (or the lowest type). Furthermore, sufficient conditions for monotonic-
ity and continuity are provided and an algorithm for determining such a continuous,
monotone solution is proposed.
Possible applications can be found in various fields of economics. While the paper
uses the notation of a regulation or procurement setting, the same model is applicable,
for example, in models of labor, insurance, monopoly pricing or optimal taxation. The
characterization of continuous and monotone solutions is relatively simple and reasonable
classes of functions satisfy sufficient conditions for falling into this class of solutions.
I conclude with some immediate implications of the qualitative results in this paper.
In optimal taxation models where single crossing is violated, the distortion above first
best result would correspond to negative marginal tax rates. Earned income tax credit
schemes often lead to negative marginal tax rates for low income workers. Previous
theoretical arguments based on externalities or general equilibrium effects as in Stiglitz
(1982) could only explain negative marginal tax rates for productive types but are less
applicable for low income workers. Non-local incentive constraints binding to low ability
types could however lead to the observed pattern.86
86An alternative explanation presented by Chone and Laroque (2010) is based on the possibility that
participation constraints might be binding not for the lowest type but for types of higher ability.
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Negative marginal tax rates for top incomes can be rationalized because of the distor-
tion at the top result. Note that distortion at the top is always in an “unusual” direction,
i.e. above first best. The rough intuition is that subsidizing productive types to work
more increases their rent and therefore relaxes their incentive compatibility constraint.
Overinsurance can be optimal in insurance models where single crossing is violated.
This gives an alternative explanation for so called “Cadillac” health insurance plans.
While the political debate focuses on viewing them as (insufficiently taxed) part of a
compensation package, screening by insurers with market power could also explain parts
of the phenomenon.
In Martimort and Stole (2009) the ordering of first best quantities and the competitive
menu under substitutes is no longer clear cut if one considers the cases without single
crossing. Put differently, firms using non-linear pricing might optimally offer packages
which lead to overconsumption of the good. Telecommunication might be an example for
this: Consumers often buy packages where an additional unit of calling (or internet use)
is for free. If the marginal costs of the provider are only ε above zero, such a price scheme
will lead to consumption above the socially optimal consumption. Overconsumption in
terms of quality even at the top is already described in Dupuit (1849) following his
explanation of downward distortion of quality in the third and second class he continues:
And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost
cruel to third-class passengers and mean to second-class ones, have become
lavish in dealing with first class passengers. Having refused the poor what is
necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.
The last point also relates to the empirical literature on non-linear pricing. The
standard no distortion at the top result allows for a simple way to identify (constant)
marginal costs: For the highest type, marginal tariff and marginal costs have to be equal.
Miravete and Röller (2004), for example, use this condition to recover marginal costs.
As there can be distortion at the top without single crossing, this possibility is no longer
available. This is especially relevant for competitive non-linear pricing since Martimort
and Stole (2009) show that single crossing can be violated even with standard preferences





In Araujo and Moreira (2010), it always holds that q(θ) = q(θ̂) whenever Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0.87
Consequently, (C1) does not play a role. Starting from (C2), they derive the following
condition (with q = q(θ) = q(θ̂)):












To derive a similar condition for q(θ) 6= q(θ̂) take θ and θ̂ such that cq(q(θ̂), θ̂) =
cq(q(θ̂), θ), cθ(q(θ), θ) = cθ(q(θ̂), θ), Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0 and assume that q(·) is strictly monotone
and continuous at θ and θ̂.
Given θ and q(θ), the equation cθ(q(θ), θ) = cθ(q(θ̂), θ) pins down a decision q(θ̂)
where incentive compatibility could be binding. Given this q(θ̂) as well as θ and q(θ),
the equation cq(q(θ̂), θ̂) = cq(q(θ̂), θ) determines θ̂. Therefore, the critical θ̂ can be
written as a function of θ and q(θ), i.e. θ̂ = φ(θ, q(θ)).






(cqq(q̂, θ)− cqq(q̂, θ̂))(cθθ(q, θ)− cθθ(q̂, θ))
cqθ(q̂, θ̂)cqθ(q̂, θ)
φq(θ, q) =
cqθ(q, θ)[cqq(q̂, θ)− cqq(q̂, θ̂)]
cqθ(q̂, θ̂)cqθ(q̂, θ)
where q̂ = q(θ̂) and q = q(θ).
Denote by h an admissible perturbation of the optimal solution q∗ on some interval
[θ1, θ2], i.e. h(θ1) = h(θ2) = 0. Admissibility implies that if the incentive constraint
binds from θ to θ̂, then θ̂ = φ(θ, q(θ)).88
The idea of the variational argument is the following: I want to derive a necessary
condition for a type θ such that Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0 for some θ̂. To do so, it is assumed that
also under the perturbed decision the incentive constraint is binding for θ and some
(other) θ̂. The type θ̂ to which the non-local incentive constraint binds depends on
87The variational condition of this appendix was also derived in the working paper version Araujo
and Moreira (2001).
88Furthermore, admissibility requires monotonicity.
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the perturbation and is given by φ(θ, q(θ)). The way one should think about it is that
incentive compatibility is binding from each θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] to some θ̂ in some interval
[θ̂1, θ̂2].
89 The specific type θ̂ to which a non-local incentive constraint binds from a
given θ depends on the perturbation h.
For brevity, I denote in the remainder of this section the optimal solution by q∗(θ)
and the perturbed solution by q(θ) = q∗(θ) + εh(θ). Hence the part of the principal’s











{g(q(θ), θ)− g(q̂(θ, q(θ)), φ(θ, q(θ))) [φq(q(θ), θ)qθ(θ) + φθ(q(θ), θ)]} dθ(4.8)
where g(q(θ), θ) =
[




f(θ) is the virtual valua-
tion weighted by the density. The second line is a normal change of variables where q̂(θ, q)







θ + φqθ)h + φqhθ)− (ĝq q̂q + ĝθφq)(φqq
∗
θ + φθ)h} dθ = 0
where arguments are omitted and a hat denotes evaluation at (θ̂, q∗(θ̂)). Integrating
∫ θ2
θ1
(ĝφq)hθ dθ by parts and substituting yields for the previous equation
∫ θ2
θ1








h dθ = 0.
As h was arbitrary, the following condition has to hold at optimum:




This is condition (C3). For q(θ) = q(θ̂), (C3’) boils down to (4.7).
4.8.2. Proofs
Proof of proposition 4.1: First, it is shown that the principal’s payoff is higher under
qc(θ) than under q(θ): The principal maximizes expectation of u(q, θ) − c(q, θ) + (1 −
F (θ))/f(θ)cθ(q, θ). If q
s(q, θ) ≤ qr(θ), the principal’s objective increases due to the
89As it turns out, this is indeed the typical structure of a continuous solution, see lemma 4.4.
90It follows from lemma 4.2 that φ(θ1, q(θ1)) > φ(θ2, q(θ2)).
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change because of the concavity of (RP) and qr(θ) > s(θ). If qs(q(θ), θ) > qfb(θ), then
the same conclusion follows from qv(q(θ), θ) ≥ qs(q(θ), θ) > qr(θ) and the concavity of
(RP).
Second, the changed decision qc(θ) is monotonically increasing: From local incentive
compatibility q(θ) was already increasing wherever it was above s(θ). At types with
q(θ) < s(θ) the decision q(θ) had to be decreasing because of local incentive compatibility.
But then qs(q(θ), θ) is clearly increasing in θ for these types because of cqθθ > 0. This
leaves types at which q(θ) jumped discontinuously over s(θ). But at these jump types
local incentive compatibility required cθ(q
−(θ), θ)−cθ(q
+(θ), θ) ≥ 0 at downwards jumps
(and the converse inequality at upwards jumps) across s(θ). This implies that also at
jump points of q(θ) monotonicity of qc(θ) is guaranteed.
Third, the changed decision qc(θ) is incentive compatible: Since qc(θ) is monotoni-
cally increasing, only downward misrepresentation has to be considered (see lemma 4.1).
Note that the profit function π(θ) was not affected by the change from q(θ) to qc(θ) be-
cause of the definition of qs(θ) and πθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ), θ) by local incentive compatibility.
Therefore, one has only to check whether any type wants to misrepresent as a lower type
θ̂ at which q(θ̂) < s(θ̂). Since π(θ) is unchanged, one can write incentive compatibility
under the changed decision as





















cqθ(q, t) dq dt+ Φ(θ, θ̂) > 0
where the inequality follows from
∫ qc(θ̂)
q(θ̂)
cqθ(q, θ̂) dq = 0 by the definition of q
s(·) and
cqθθ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 4.3: First, it is shown that there cannot be a discontinuity
at θ̂. Take a type θ̂ to which non-local incentive constraint is binding from some
type θ. Suppose that q(·) is discontinuous at θ̂, i.e. q−(θ̂) < q+(θ̂) by local incen-










cqθ(q, t) dq dt = 0 or (iii) q






cqθ(q, t) dq dt = 0.
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91Case (iii) does not imply that all/several decisions between q−(θ̂) and q+(θ̂) are offered. Only one
decision is offered for each type and at a discontinuity this decision might be strictly between the two
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−(θ̂), t) dt ≤ 0 which is just (C2) adapted to
apply for a right hand side discontinuity, i.e. if this did not hold incentive compatibility





cqθ(q, t) dq dt < 0 from cqqθ < 0.





cqθ(q, t) dq dt < 0 as Φ(θ, θ̂
−) = 0 by assumption.
Hence, incentive compatibility is violated from θ to types slightly above θ̂. This is the
desired contradiction.









cqθ(q, t) dq dt >
0 from cqqθ < 0. Consequently, Φ(θ, θ̂





cqθ(q, t) dq dt < 0 and
therefore incentive compatibility is violated from θ to types slightly below θ̂.
In case (iii) the same arguments as in case (i) apply if
∫ θ
θ̂
cqθ(q(θ̂), t) dt ≤ 0 while the
same arguments as in case (ii) apply if
∫ θ
θ̂
cqθ(q(θ̂), t) dt > 0.
Second, it is shown that θ < θ̄ cannot be bunched with some type θ′ if q(·) is
continuous at θ. Suppose θ and θ′ were bunched on qb (and by monotonicity all types in
between them are as well) and suppose for now θ < θ′. But then Φ(θ′, θ̂) < 0 and ic is
violated as





















cqθ(s, t) ds dt < 0
where the last inequality follows from (C1) and cqθθ > 0.
Now suppose θ > θ′ and both types are bunched. From condition (C1) for θ < θ̄
and cqθθ > 0 it follows that
∫ q(t)
q(θ̂)
cqθ(q, t) dq < 0 for every t ∈ (θ − ε, θ). But then





cqθ(q, t) dq dt < 0, so incentive compatibility would be
violated. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4.2: Suppose q(θ) < qr(θ) for some types. Since local
incentive compatibility does not allow downward jumps, q(θ) has to be strictly below
qr(θ) for a mass of types. Consider changing this ‘optimal’ decision to q∗(θ) where
q∗(θ) = max{q(θ), qr(θ)}. Transfers t∗(θ) are determined such that π(θ) = 0 and πθ(θ) =
−cθ(q
∗(θ), θ).




It remains to check incentive compatibility, i.e





cqθ(q, t) dq dt ≥ 0
for arbitrary types θ and θ̂ < θ. If q∗(θ̂) = q(θ̂), incentive compatibility follows from
q∗(t) ≥ q(t) and as q(t) ≥ s(t) the corresponding ‘additional’ c(q, t) are negative.
If q∗(θ̂) > q(θ̂) (and therefore q∗(θ̂) = qr(θ̂)), there are three possibilities: (i) There
exists a type θ′ ∈ (θ̂, θ) with q(θ′) = q∗(θ̂), (ii) all types θ′ ∈ (θ̂, θ) have q(θ′) < q∗(θ̂)
and (iii) there are types θ′ ∈ (θ̂, θ) with q(θ′) > q∗(θ̂) but no type θ′ with q(θ′) = q∗(θ̂),
hence q(·) is discontinuous92.
If (i), then Φ(θ, θ′) ≥ 0 implies incentive compatibility as Φ∗(θ, θ̂) > Φ(θ, θ′). In case
(ii) q∗(θ̂) has to be above q(θ′) for all θ′ ∈ (θ̂, θ). But since q(θ′) > s(θ′) for all these types
it follows that q∗(θ̂) > s(θ) and therefore incentive compatibility is trivially satisfied.
In case (iii) define θ′ = sup{t ∈ (θ̂, θ) : q(t) < q∗(θ̂)} that is θ′ is the jump point.










cqθ(q, t) dq dt ≤ 0 where q
−(θ′) denotes the limit of q(t) as t → θ′ from below.
From cqqθ < 0 and q





cqθ(q, t) dq dt ≤ 0. But





cqθ(q, t) dq dt ≥ 0 incentive compatibility is satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of theorem 4.1: Note that even if the theorem was not true one could still
define a function η(θ) by rearranging (4.5). What one has to show are the properties of
this function. η(θ) ≥ 0 follows immediately from proposition 4.2 and the fact that the
left hand side of (4.5) is decreasing in q.
Next turn the property that η(θ) is constant on an interval of types on which non
local incentive constraints are lax. Suppose to the contrary that η(θ) is not constant.
In particular, suppose η(θ) was increasing on some interval [θ1, θ3] where non-local ic
is lax for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ3]. Denote by θ2 some interior type of the interval. For each
θ ∈ [θ2, θ2 + ε] define a corresponding type θ
′ ∈ [θ2 − ε, θ2] by θ
′ = θ2 − (θ− θ2) for some
small ε > 0. I will show that one can change such a decision on [θ2 − ε, θ2 + ε] in a
way which increases the principal’s payoff (while keeping incentive compatibility). This
contradicts the optimality of q(θ).
Consider a changed decision qc(·) such that (i) qc(θ) > q(θ) on [θ2−ε, θ2), (ii) q
c(θ) ≤
92Given that solutions in Araujo and Moreira (2010) display sometimes discontinuities, one cannot
totally exclude this possibility.
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q(θ) on [θ2, θ2+ε], (iii) for corresponding types θ and θ








cqθ(q, θ) dq and (iv) q
c
θ(θ) ≥ 0 on [θ2−ε, θ2+ε]. The changed decision will therefore
display upwards jumps at θ2 − ε and θ2 + ε. For small changes in q, (iii) can be written
as δ(θ′)cqθ(q(θ
′), θ′) = −δ(θ)cqθ(q(θ), θ) where δ(θ) = q
c(θ) − q(θ). This in turn can be




Before proceeding, let me show that a function qc(θ) satisfying (i)-(iv) exists. Note
that k(θ2) = 1 and that–due to the differentiability and continuity assumptions on c(·)
and the monotonicity of q(θ)–the function k(θ) is continuously differentiable almost
everywhere.93 First, consider the case where k+θ (θ2) < 0. Then it is feasible to set
qc(θ) = q(θ2) for types θ ∈ [θ2, θ2 + ε] if ε > 0 is chosen small enough. Feasibility
means that determining q(θ′) by δ(θ′) = −δ(θ)k(θ) will satisfy all conditions especially
(iv). Feasibility of qc(θ) = q(θ2) for θ ∈ [θ2, θ2 + ε] and monotonicity of q(θ) imply that
qc∗ = αqc(θ) + (1 − α)q(θ) is also feasible. The effect of a marginal change of q is the
effect changing q(·) to qc∗(·) as α → 0.
Second, consider kθ(θ2)
+ > 0. By the same argument, it is feasible to bunch types
θ ∈ [θ2−ε, θ2] on q(θ2) and the remaining argument goes through analogously. Obviously,
the third case k+θ (θ2) = 0 is analogous to either the first or the second case (depending
on the second derivative).
The effect of a marginal change on the principal’s objective is
∫ θ2+ε
θ2−ε









where the last inequality follows from δ(θ) ≤ 0 for θ ∈ [θ2, θ2 + ε] and ηθ(θ) > 0. Hence,
the principal’s objective increases. Due to (iii) incentive compatibility is still satisfied.
This contradicts the optimality of q(θ).
A similar argument can be made when η(θ) is decreasing almost everywhere on some
interval [θ1, θ3] where non-local ic is lax. The only difference is that (i) and (ii) are
substituted by (i) qc(θ) < q(θ) on [θ2 − ε, θ2), (ii) q
c(θ) ≥ q(θ) on [θ2, θ2 + ε]. The
argument for existence is then that for kθ(θ2) < 0 one can choose a θ2 + ε such that
93Note that a feasible qc(θ) exists even around types θ2 where q(θ) is discontinuous: Whether bunching
types [θ2 − ε, θ2) on q
−(θ2) or bunching types (θ2, θ2 + ε] on q
+(θ2) is feasible is then decided by k
+
θ (θ2)
just as in the text.
114
Appendix
setting qc(θ) = q(θ2 + ε) for all θ ∈ [θ2, θ2 + ε] is feasible. Everything else goes through
accordingly.
Hence, η(θ) is constant on all intervals on which non-local incentive constraints do
not bind.94
To see that η(θ) is non-decreasing at types θ̂ to which a non-local incentive constraint
is binding one can use the same steps as above for types where non-local incentive
constraints were lax. The key insight is that such a change is feasible due to the structure
given by lemma 4.1 and lemma 4.2 (see also figure 4.5): Increasing q for slightly higher
types than θ̂ (and reducing for slightly lower types than θ̂) will relax (or not affect)
binding non-local incentive constraints because these constraints are downward binding
and not overlapping.
The argument why η(θ) is non-increasing at types θ from which non-local incentive
constraints bind is also equivalent to the one above. The key with respect to feasibility
is now that reducing q for types slightly below θ (and increasing for types slightly above
θ) will again relax (or not affect) binding non-local incentive constraints because these
constraints are downward binding.
Now turn to η(θ̄) = 0 (and therefore q(θ̄) = qfb(θ̄)) whenever no non-local incentive
constraint is binding from θ̄. Clearly, q(θ̄) does not affect non-local incentive constraints
of other types, see figure 4.2b for an illustration. Consequently, the principal’s payoff
is maximized by setting q(θ̄) = qr(θ̄). The only thing to show is that the monotonicity
constraint is not binding at θ̄. Suppose to the contrary that types [θ′, θ̄] were bunched on
qb > qfb(θ̄). By lemma 4.3, non-local incentive constraints cannot be binding for types in
(θ′, θ̄]. First, note that q(θ) has to be continuous at θ′ as otherwise the principal’s payoff
could be increased by reducing qb. Therefore–by the same argument as in the proof of
lemma 4.3–non-local incentive constraints cannot bind from types [θ′ − ε, θ′] for some
small ε > 0. Given that q(θ) > qfb(θ̄) > qr(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ′ − ε, θ̄), the principal’s payoff
could be increased by changing q(θ) to q(θ′ − ε) for all θ ∈ [θ′ − ε, θ̄]. This contradicts
the optimality of q(θ).
The part that η(θ) = 0 if no non-local incentive constraint is binding to θ is even
94Note that η(θ) cannot be different for isolated types in such an interval: This would, by (4.5) and
the continuity of the derivatives of c(·), lead to q(θ) being discontinuous at isolated points. Such a
discontinuity, however, violates local incentive compatibility.
115
Chapter 4: Adverse selection without single crossing
simpler: Reducing q(θ) to qr(θ) cannot violate the monotonicity constraint as q(θ) ≥
qr(θ) ≥ qr(θ) by proposition 4.2. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 4.4: I proof the stronger statement, i.e. non-local incentive con-
straints do not only bind at isolated interior types. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose, non-local incentive constraints bound only from isolated interior types. De-
note by θ′ the supremum of all types with η(θ) > 0, i.e. θ′ = sup{θ : η(θ) > 0}. By
theorem 4.1, a non-local incentive constraint is binding from θ′ and η(θ) = 0 for all
θ > θ′.95 As the set of types from which non-local incentive constraints bind consists
only of isolated types, there exists an ε > 0 such that non-local incentive constraints are
lax for all θ ∈ (θ′ − ε, θ′). By theorem 4.1, η(θ) is constant on (θ′ − ε, θ′) and by the
definition of θ′ there has to be a discontinuity in η(θ) at θ′, i.e. η−(θ′) > η+(θ′) = 0.
The definition of η(θ) in (4.5) implies then that q−(θ′) > q+(θ′). But this violates the
monotonicity constraint. Hence, θ′ cannot be isolated in the set of types from which
non-local incentive constraints bind.
Similarly, take θ̂′ = inf(θ̂ : η(θ̂) > 0). It holds that η(θ) = 0 for all θ < θ̂′.
Therefore, by proposition 4.2, θ̂′ cannot be bunched. Consequently, a non-local incentive
constraint has to bind to θ̂′. If θ̂′ is isolated in the set of types to which non-local incentive
constraints are binding, η(θ) has to be discontinuous at θ̂′ by the definition of θ̂′. Then
also q(θ) is discontinuous at θ̂′. But this is impossible by lemma 4.3. Hence, θ̂′ cannot
be isolated in the set of types to which non-local incentive constraints bind.
It remains to show the closedness part of the lemma. Note first that a monotone
solution is continuous almost everywhere. Consequently, the principal’s payoff is not
changed if q(·) is changed at its discontinuity points. I want to resolve this ambiguity
using the following convention: Say q(θ) is discontinuous at θ′. Then q(θ′) = q−(θ′) if
there exists an increasing sequence of types θi i = 1, 2, . . . such that (i) limi→∞ θi = θ
′
and (ii) a non-local incentive constraint is binding from or to each θi. If such a sequence
does not exist, q(θ′) = q+(θ′).
With this convention in mind, consider a sequence of types θn with n = 1, 2, . . . such
that a non-local incentive constraint is binding from each θn to some θ̂n. Assume that
limn→∞ θn = θ
′. Then it has to be shown that Φ(θ′, θ̂′) = 0 for some θ̂′. Since all θ̂n
belong to the closed and bounded interval [θ, θ̄], there is a convergent subsequence of θ̂n.
95Note that θ′ cannot be bunched because of proposition 4.4 and q−(θ′) = qr(θ′).
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I will denote the elements of this subsequence by θ̂k with k = 1, 2, . . . . The corresponding
type from which a non-local incentive constraint is binding to θ̂k is denoted by θk. Now,
take θ̂′ = limk→∞ θ̂k. Note that there always exists a monotone subsequence of θk. It
is therefore without loss of generality to assume θk to be monotone. For concreteness,
assume θk+1 ≥ θk for all k = 1, 2, . . . . As Φ(θk, θ̂k) = 0 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , continuity
of Φ(·) at (θ′, θ̂′) is sufficient for Φ(θ′, θ̂′) = 0. As π(·) is continuous by local incentive
compatibility and c(·) is continuous by assumption, continuity of Φ(·) at (θ′, θ̂′) follows
if q(·) is continuous at θ̂′. Since θk is monotonically increasing, continuity from below is
actually sufficient. But this is ensured by the convention above.
If θk+1 ≤ θk for all k = 1, 2, . . . , the convention establishes q(θ̂
′) = q+(θ̂′) which is
needed in this case.
The proof for the closedness of the set of types to which non-local incentive constraints
bind works in the same way. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 4.5: From lemma 4.3, non-local incentive constraints cannot bind
from any θ ∈ [θbs, θ
b
e). To satisfy similar properties as in theorem 4.1, η(θ) has therefore
to be non-decreasing on (θbs, θ
b
e).
Let η(θ) be defined by (4.5) for all types that are not bunched. Define η(θ) on the
bunching interval using the following two step procedure: First, all θ̂ ∈ (θbs, θ
b
e) such that
Φ(θ, θ̂) = 0 and (C1’) as well as (C2’) are satisfied are assigned η(θ̂) = η(θ). Second,
types in θ ∈ (θbs, θ
b
e) who are not assigned a value for η(θ) in step 1 are assigned the same
η as the highest type θ′ < θ that was already assigned a value η(θ′).
Now it is shown that the constructed η(θ) is non-decreasing on (θbs, θ
b
e): Say, there




e) with θ̂2 > θ̂1 which are assigned an η in the first step.
Then (C2’) implies that θ1 > θ2. From theorem 4.1 and the structure of the solution as
depicted in figure 4.5, it follows that η(θ2) ≥ η(θ1). Therefore, η(θ̂2) ≥ η(θ̂1). The second




If non-local incentive constraints are not binding for the bunched types, no type is
assigned a value for η(θ) in step 1. Consequently, η(θ) is constant on (θbs, θ
b
e).
Next, it is shown that η(θ) is also non-decreasing at the types θbs and θ
b
e. First, note
that the proof of theorem 4.1 can be easily extended to show that η(θbs) ≤ η(θ
b
e): If this
inequality did not hold, reduce q(θ) on (θbs−ε, θ
b












cqθ(q, t) dq dt remains the same before and after the change. As
in the proof of theorem 4.1, this change would increase the principal’s payoff without
impeding incentive compatibility (note that non-local incentive constraints cannot bind
from the bunched types because of lemma 4.3). Consequently, η(θbs) ≤ η(θ
b
e).
Second, it is necessary to show that–with the above constructed η(θ) on (θbs, θ
b
e)–there
is no upward jump of η(θ) at θbe (no downward jump of η(θ) at θ
b
s). If no type is assigned
an η in the first step of the procedure above, this is obvious. Therefore, take the case
where some type in the bunching interval is assigned a value η(θ) in the first step of
the procedure. Then the claim follows from theorem 4.1: Say, η−(θbe) = η(θ1) for some
type θ1 from which a non-local incentive constraint binds. The structure of the solution
(as depicted in figure 4.5) and theorem 4.1 imply that η+(θbe) = η
−(θ1).
96 Since η(θ)
is non-increasing at θ1 according to theorem 4.1, it follows that η
−(θ1) ≥ η
+(θ1) and
therefore η−(θbe) ≥ η
+(θbe). A similar argument holds for θ
b
s.
It remains to show
∫ θbe
θbs






Proof of proposition 4.3: By lemma 4.3, q(θ) cannot be discontinuous at a type
to which a non-local incentive constraint binds (with the exception of boundary types
of bunching intervals). Therefore, theorem 4.1 implies that a solution could only be dis-
continuous at types where η(θ) is non-increasing or at the boundary types of a bunching
interval to which a non-local incentive constraint is binding.
First, it is shown that η(θ) is also non-increasing at such boundary types of a bunch-
ing interval. To see this take a bunching interval [θ̂1, θ̂2] to which non-local incentive
constraints bind and suppose the solution was discontinuous at θ̂, i.e. q−(θ̂2) < q
+(θ̂2).




−(θ̂2), t) dt > 0 for any θ such that
Φ(θ, θ̂2) = 0. But then an argument as in the proof of theorem 4.1 applies: There is
an incentive compatible way to increase q(θ̂) for θ̂ ∈ [θ̂2 − ε, θ̂2] and decrease the deci-
sion for types in [θ̂2, θ̂+ ε]. Incentive compatible means that binding non-local incentive
constraints are not violated and the decision remains monotone (details in the proof of
96If non-local incentive constraints bind from types θ′ ∈ (θbe, θ1) to types θ̂
′ ∈ (θbe, θ1), this holds still
true because of the necessary condition (C3). Also discontinuities at θ′′ ∈ (θbe, θ1) do not matter as by
lemma 4.3 and theorem 4.1 η(θ) is non-increasing at θ′′. If there are several bunching intervals, the
argument holds for the highest interval and given this, it holds for the second highest etc..
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theorem 4.1). If η(·) was strictly increasing at θ̂2, such a change would increase the
principal’s payoff. Therefore, η(·) has to be decreasing at θ̂2. A similar argument applies
at θ̂1. A discontinuity is only possible at θ̂1 if
∫ θ
θ̂1
cqθ(q(θ̂1), t) dt < 0 for all θ such that
Φ(θ, θ̂1) = 0. Therefore, decreasing the decision on [θ̂1, θ̂1+ε] and increasing the decision
on [θ̂1− ε, θ̂1) can be done in an incentive compatible way. If η(·) was strictly increasing,
such a change would increase the principal’s payoff.
Hence, q(θ) can only be discontinuous at types where η(θ) is non-increasing. Second,
it is shown that a discontinuity in q(θ) would lead to an upward jump of η(θ) at the
discontinuity type which implies that there cannot be a discontinuity in q(θ).
By local incentive compatibility, q(θ) can only jump upwards, i.e. q−(θ′) < q+(θ′)
at a hypothetical discontinuity type θ′. Using the definition of η(θ) in (4.5) one can










(uqq − cqq)fcqθ + (1− F )cqqθcqθ − (uq − cq)fcqqθ − (1− F )cqθcqqθ
c2qθ
dq
where all functions are evaluated at (q, θ′). Note that the integrand is positive whenever










which is also positive due to the condition of the proposition. Hence, η(θ) would jump
up at θ′ but this contradicts that q(θ) can only be discontinuous at types where η(θ) is
non-increasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4.4: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the optimal
decision q(θ) was above the first best decision for some types. Since there is no distortion
at the top by assumption and since the optimal decision cannot drop discontinuously
downward (local incentive compatibility), there has to be a type θ′ at which the optimal
decision intersects qfb(θ) from above. The proof works now in two steps. First, I show
that a non local incentive constraint must bind from θ′ and second that then non local
incentive compatibility is violated for some type close to θ′.
Note that q(θ) > qfb(θ) if and only if η(θ) > 1 − F (θ). Since 1 − F (θ) is decreasing
and q(θ) > (<)qfb(θ) slightly above (below) θ′, it follows that ηθ(θ
′) is negative. But
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then, by theorem 4.1, a non local incentive constraint has to be binding from θ′ to some




′) dq = 0 has to hold.














′′) dq < 0 as well. The same inequality holds for all θ ∈ (θ′′, θ′).





cqθ(q, t) dq dt < 0, i.e. incentive compatibility
from θ′′ to θ̂′ is violated. Hence, the optimal decision cannot be above the first best
decision.
Continuity of the optimal decision is now straightforward: q(θ) ≤ qfb(θ) implies
that 1 − F (θ) − η(θ) ≥ 0. Therefore, the left hand side of the first order condition
uq − cq + (1 − F − η)cqθ = 0 is strictly decreasing in q. The same arguments as in the
proof of proposition 4.3 show that q(θ) has to be continuous.
Last it has to be shown that the decision is strictly monotone when it is below first
best and uqθ ≥ 0. This will be done in two steps. The first step is to show that q(θ)
is strictly increasing if ηθ(θ) ≥ 0. The second step is to show that in a hypothetical
bunching interval there are types θ at which ηθ(θ) ≥ 0 which by the first step contradicts
that these types are bunched.
First, the decision q(θ) has to satisfy
[uq(q(θ), θ)− cq(q(θ), θ)] +
(1− F (θ)− η(θ))
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ), θ) = 0 (4.9)
by theorem 4.1. From the implicit function theorem, the sign of qθ(θ) can be determined.
Note that q(θ) ≤ qfb(θ) implies 1 − F (θ) − η(θ) ≥ 0. This in turn implies that the
derivative of the left hand side of (4.9) with respect to q is negative. Hence, the sign
of qθ(θ) is the sign of the partial derivative of the equation above with respect to θ.
Denoting (1− F (θ)− η(θ)) by λ(θ) this derivative is







Now take a bunching interval [θ1, θ2] (closed or open). The first three terms are clearly
positive as q(θ1) ≤ q














where the inequality comes from the monotone hazard rate assumption if fθ(θ) ≤ 0. If
fθ(θ) > 0, then q
fb(θ) ≥ q(θ) implies λ(θ) ≥ 0 which ensures the inequality above.
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Now turn to the second step. Suppose contrary to the proposition that an interval
(θ1, θ2) exists in which types are bunched and non-local incentive constraints are either
binding to these types or are lax.97 Using the same argument as in the proof of theorem
4.1, it becomes evident that η(θ) as defined by (4.5) cannot be decreasing on the whole
interval (θ1, θ2): If this was the case, increasing q(θ) for types ((θ2 + θ1)/2, θ2) and
decreasing q(θ) slightly for the other bunched types would increase the principal’s payoff
(and can be done in an incentive compatible way). From the definition of η(θ) and
the differentiability of q on the bunching interval, it follows that η(θ) is continuous and
differentiable on this interval. Consequently, there has to be some type in the interior
of the bunching interval where ηθ(θ) ≥ 0. But then the first step shows that this type
cannot be bunched. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4.5: Take two types θ′ and θ̂′ such that a non-local incentive
constraint is binding from θ to θ̂ under the optimal decision q(θ). By (C3), η(θ′) = η(θ̂′)
and for this proof η (in Φη()) simply denotes this common value η(θ′) = η(θ̂′).
First, suppose that (θ′, θ̂′) does not minimize Φη(θ, θ̂) on [θ̂′, θ] and call the minimizer
(θ′′, θ̂′′). Then incentive compatibility under the optimal decision requires Φ(θ′′, θ̂′′) ≥ 0.
If q(θ) was q̃(θ) for all types in [θ̂′, θ̂′′] ∪ [θ′′, θ′], then Φ(θ′, θ̂′) = Φη(θ′, θ̂′) + Φ(θ′′, θ̂′′) −
Φη(θ′′, θ̂′′) > 0 where the inequality stems from the definition of (θ′′, θ̂′′) as global mini-
mizer of Φη(θ, θ̂). Therefore ic would not be binding between θ′ and θ̂′.
If q(θ) 6= q̃(θ) for some types in [θ̂′, θ̂′′] ∪ [θ′′, θ′], then ic must be binding for some
of these types.98 But this will only relax ic, i.e. q(θ) > q̃(θ) in a monotone solution.
Therefore Φ(θ′, θ̂′) will be even higher than when q(θ) = q̃(θ) and therefore ic cannot
bind between θ′ and θ̂′. This is the desired contradiction. Consequently, (θ′, θ̂′) has to
minimize Φη(θ, θ̂) on [θ̂′, θ′].
Second, suppose that (θ′′, θ̂′′) with θ̂′′ < θ̂′ < θ′ < θ′′ has Φη(θ′, θ̂′) > Φ′(θ′′, θ̂′′). In
fact choose θ′′ and θ̂′′ such that it is the global minimizer of Φη(θ, θ̂) under the constraint
θ̂ < θ̂′ < θ′ < θ.
Now suppose for the moment that all types in [θ̂′′, θ̂′]∪ [θ′, θ′′] had q(θ) = q̃(θ). Then
since Φ(θ′, θ̂′) = 0 but (θ′′, θ̂′′) minimizes Φη(θ, θ̂), ic would be violated for θ′′ and θ̂′′.
97By lemma 4.3, types from which non-local incentive constraints bind cannot be bunched.
98Because of lemma 4.2 ic cannot bind from outside [θ̂′, θ] into the interval (neither the other way
round).
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If q(θ) 6= q̃(θ) for some types in [θ̂′′, θ̂′] ∪ [θ′, θ′′], then ic was binding for some types
in those intervals. In a monotone solution this implies that q(θ) < q̃(θ) for these types.
Put differently, ic is stricter under q(θ) than under q̃(θ).99 But then ic will be even more
violated for θ′′ and θ̂′′ under q(θ) than under q̃(θ). Therefore, there cannot be a global
minimizer (θ′′, θ̂′′) with θ̂′′ < θ̂′ < θ′ < θ′′. Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 4.1: Note first that the highest type θ from which a non-local
incentive constraint is binding must have q(θ) = qr(θ) if θ is interior. This follows
from the reasoning in the proof of lemma 4.4. The same holds for the lowest type θ̂ to
which a non-local incentive constraint binds. Therefore, there is a type pair such that
(i) q(θ′) = qr(θ′), (ii) q(θ̂′) = qr(θ̂′) and (iii) Φ(θ′, θ̂′) = 0.
Since (θ′, θ̂′) satisfy (C2) and (C1) with qr and given the results of proposition 4.5,
(θ′, θ̂′) locally minimize Φr(θ, θ̂). Proposition 4.5 rules out that θ̂r < θ̂′ < θ′ < θr and
also θ̂′ < θ̂r < θr < θ′. Hence, it still has to be shown that there cannot be an overlap
between the two type pairs, i.e. θ̂′ < θ̂r < θ′ < θr or θ̂r < θ̂′ < θr < θ′. To get a
contradiction suppose θ̂′ < θ̂r < θ′ < θr. In a similar way as in lemma 4.2, one can now
show that in this case Φr(θr, θ̂′) < Φr(θr, θ̂r) thereby contradicting that (θr, θ̂r) is the
global minimizer of Φr(θ, θ̂):










cqθ(q, t) dq dt





cqθ(q, t) dq dt
By proposition 4.5, Φr(θ′, θ̂′) − Φr(θ′, θ̂r) ≤ 0. Furthermore,
∫ qr(θ′)
qr(θ̂′)
cqθ dq = 0 since
(θ′, θ̂′) locally minimize Φr(θ, θ̂). Therefore,
∫ q(θ̂r)
qr(θ̂′)
cqθ dq > 0 as q
r(θ′) > qr(θ̂r) and





cqθ(q, t) dq dt > 0 which shows that
Φr(θr, θ̂′) < Φr(θr, θ̂r). This is the desired contradiction.
A similar argument can be made for the case θ̂r < θ̂′ < θr < θ′. Consequently, the
only possibility is that (θ′, θ̂′) = (θr, θ̂r) which had to be shown.
99Strictly speaking one also has to show that ic did not bind from outside [θ̂′′, θ′′] into this interval
(or the other way round), thereby increasing q(θ) for some types in say (θ′, θ′′). If however this was the
case and the increase in q(θ) was such that ic between θ′′ and θ̂′′ was relaxed by it, then there has to
exist a type θ̂′′′ ∈ (θ′, θ′′) and a type θ′′′ > θ′′ with Φ(θ′′′, θ̂′′′) = 0 and q(θ̂′′′) = q̃(θ̂′′′). But this would
contradict that (θ′′, θ̂′′) is a global minimum of Φη(θ, θ̂) (analogously to the proof of lemma 4.2), i.e.
Φ′(θ′′′, θ̂′′) < Φ′(θ′′, θ̂′′).
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If the highest/lowest type from/to which a non-local incentive constraint is binding
is a boundary type, this type’s decision is not necessarily the relaxed decision. However,
the minimization argument does not change which concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4.6: First, note that under the conditions of proposition
4.1 one can focus on decisions above s(θ): If some q(θ) < s(θ) was used in a stochastic
contract with positive probability, the principal could do better by assigning qs(q(θ), θ)
instead of q(θ). The proof is equivalent to the one of proposition 4.1.100
Second, suppose the optimal contract was stochastic and denote by G(q, θ) the dis-
tribution of q at type θ. Consider now an alternative deterministic contract q∗(θ) where




cθ(q, θ) dG(q, θ). In short, the slope
of the rent function π(θ) and therefore the rent of each type remains the same under
both contracts.101 It will be shown that under the assumptions of proposition 4.6 this
change increases the principal’s payoff and relaxes incentive compatibility.
Since only q(θ) ≥ s(θ) have to be considered, there is a one to one relationship
between q and −cθ(q, θ). Define h(z, θ) ≥ s(θ) as the decision corresponding to −cθ




[u(h(z, θ), θ)− c(h(z, θ), θ)]f(θ)− [1− F (θ)]z dθ. (4.11)
The next step is to show that W is concave in z. This implies that the deterministic
decision q∗ increases the principal’s payoff. The last step will then be to show that this
deterministic decision is also incentive compatible.
Using hz(z, θ) =
1
−cqθ(h,θ)










uqq(h, θ)− cqq(h, θ)
cqqθ
−




By condition (CVR), the integrand is negative and therefore W is concave in z.
100Admittedly, it is not obvious whether lemma 4.1 holds for stochastic contracts. Therefore, I
show here explicitly that upward incentive constraints are relaxed if all q(θ) < s(θ) are substituted





cθ(q, t) dG(q, t) −
∫
q
cθ(q, t) dG(q, θ̂) dt ≥ 0. Changing q(θ) < s(θ) to q
s(q(θ), θ) does not change the first term. But since
∫ qs(q(θ),θ)
q(θ)
cqθ(q, t) dq < 0 for all t < θ̂, the change relaxes the incentive constraint through the second
term.
101It is straightforward to check that local incentive compatibility requires the slope of the rent function
under the stochastic contract to be
∫
q
cθ(q̃, θ) dG(q, θ).
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∗(t), t) dt ≥ 0.






















−cθθ(q, θ) dG(q, θ̂) + cθθ(q
∗(θ̂), θ) ≥ 0.





−cθ(q, t) dG(q, θ̂)+cθ(q
∗(θ̂), t) dt is a convex function





















cθ(q, t) dG(q, θ̂) dt− cθ(q
∗(t), t) dt ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the incentive compatibility of the stochastic con-
tract G(q, θ) and the definition of q∗. Q.E.D.
4.8.3. Existence of an optimal contract
This appendix shows that an optimal contract exists and therefore the characterization
done in the paper is meaningful. It is assumed that qv(q, θ) ≥ qs(q, θ) for all q ∈ [0, qf(θ)]
and all θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] and therefore proposition 4.1 applies. Before showing existence, two
useful lemmata are derived.
Define q̃ such that
∫ q̃
0
cqθ(q, θ̄) dq = 0. Since cqqθ < 0, q̃ is unique and therefore
properly defined.
Lemma 4.6. Any incentive compatible contract with a decision q(θ) above q̄ = max{qfb(θ̄), q̃}
for some type is dominated by a contract consisting of decision
qc(θ) = min{q(θ), q̄}






Proof. The concavity of the virtual valuation implies that the principal’s payoff
under qc(θ) is higher than under q(θ). Hence, the lemma holds if the changed contract
is incentive compatible.
Note that incentive compatibility of qc(θ) is obvious if q(θ) > q̄ for all θ. Now define
θm = inf{θ : q(θ) > q̄}. Note that incentive compatibility from θm to any lower type is
not affected by the change from q(·) to qc(·) since Φ(θm, θ̂) does not change.
The next step is to see that q(θ) > q̄ for all θ > θm. The reason is that local
incentive compatibility does not allow for any decision in [s(θ), q̄] as long as q(θ) stays




j) dq ≥ 0 at the jump type θj (for local incentive compatibility). But by
the definition of q̄ and from cqθθ > 0, this inequality cannot hold for any type below θ̄
(and a jump at the boundary type θ̄ would not hurt the following argument).
Therefore, all types above θm will have q̄ as their changed decision. From lemma
4.1 it follows that only incentive compatibility from types above θm to types below
θm has to be checked. Therefore take an arbitrary θ > θm and some θ̂ < θm. Then





cqθ(q, t) dq dt > 0 where the inequality follows from the
incentive compatibility between θm and θ̂ under q(θ), the definition of q̃ and cqθθ > 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.7. Take a sequence of incentive compatible decision functions102 qn(θ) ≤ q̄,
n = 1, 2 . . . , and let this sequence converge to q(θ). Then q(θ) is incentive compatible.
Proof. Define c̃qθ = maxq∈[0,q̄], θ∈[θ,θ̄] |cqθ(q, θ)|. Since [0, q̄] × [θ, θ̄] is compact and
cqθ(·) is continuous by assumption, c̃qθ exists.
Now suppose contrary to the lemma that Φ(θ, θ̂) = −ε for some θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ and ε > 0
and therefore incentive compatibility is violated under q(θ). From convergence of {qn(θ)},
for each δ > 0 there exists an Nδ such that |q
















for an arbitrary n > Nδ. But then choosing a δ <
ε
2c̃qθ(θ̄−θ)
shows that Φ(θ, θ̂) > −ε as
102An incentive compatible decision is a decision such that the menu consisting of this decision and
transfers defined by π(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
−cθ(q(t), t) dt is incentive compatible.
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Φn(θ, θ̂) ≥ 0 where Φn(·) denotes Φ(·) under qn(·). This contradicts the definition of ε
and therefore q(θ) is incentive compatible. Q.E.D.
Given proposition 4.1 and the previous two results, the existence proof in Jullien
(2000) applies. For completeness, I replicate the proof briefly. The problem of the





(u(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ), θ))f(θ) + (1− F (θ))cθ(q(θ), θ) dθ
subject to
Φ(θ, θ̂) ≥ 0 for all θ, θ̂ ∈ [θ, θ̄]
0 ≤ q(θ) ≤ q̄
Let W ∗ be the maximum value of the program. Take a sequence of decision functions
such that qn(θ) induce a value larger than W ∗− 1
n
and each qn(θ) is incentive compatible
. Because of proposition 4.1, the sequence can be chosen such that each qn(θ) is an
increasing function. Then Helly’s selection theorem, see Billingsley (1986) Thm. 25.9,
yields that there exists a non-decreasing function q(θ) which is the limit of a subsequence
qnk(θ) at every point of continuity of q(θ) and therefore almost everywhere on [θ, θ̄].
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, see Billingsley (1986) Thm. 16.4, yields
that the principal’s payoff under q(θ) is W ∗. By lemma 4.7, q(θ) is implementable and
therefore an optimal contract exists.
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Cost incentives for doctors:
A double-edged sword
5.1. Introduction
It is well known that insurance creates moral hazard: In the health sector, insured
people would like to have more expensive treatments than socially optimal. On the
other hand, treatments are normally prescribed by doctors. If doctors took the costs
of treatment into account in their treatment decision, the moral hazard problem should
disappear. The tradition in the medical profession, however, is to view oneself as advocate
of one’s patients. Consequently, the patient’s wellbeing is put first and costs are only
secondary. What is more, doctors are often explicitly hostile towards cost incentives
in doctor remuneration. The German chamber of doctors, for instance, writes in its
principles of health policy103
[. . . ] the role of the doctor as advocate for his patient must not be restricted
[. . . ] The state must not establish financial schemes (e.g. bonus-malus sys-
tem) which could suggest to the patient that materialistic, self-serving aspects
are also of importance for medical decisions.
It is important to understand whether the doctors’ concerns are mainly self-interested,
e.g. worries about reputation and pay, or whether financial incentives for doctors could
have a negative impact on social welfare. Put differently, can patient advocacy be inter-
preted as an efficient institutional response to the particular structure of the health care
market? Answering this question will also give some insight into the optimal design of
health care markets. In particular, in which parts of the health care system should cost
103Translation by the author. Original title and source: “Gesundheitspolitische Leitsätze der
Ärzteschaft–Ulmer Papier” Beschluss des deutschen Ärztetags 2008, Anlage 1, p. 6, http://www.
bundesaerztekammer.de/downloads/UlmerPapierDAET111.pdf
127
Chapter 5: Cost incentives for doctors
incentives for doctors be employed and where are cost incentives less likely to succeed?
This paper focuses on the communication between patient and doctor. The patient’s
input, e.g. describing his symptoms and their intensity, is vital to reach the right di-
agnosis.104 The main mechanism I explore in this paper is the following: Patients are
(fully) insured. If doctors take costs into account in their treatment decision, their objec-
tives and the objectives of their patients are no longer aligned.105 Such a misalignment
undermines the patient’s trust in his doctor which in turn affects communication nega-
tively.106 More technically, in a setting where the patient has private information, e.g.
about his symptoms and their intensity, he has the possibility to exaggerate his symp-
toms (or their intensity) in order to get a more expensive treatment. Of course, the
doctor will anticipate such strategic exaggerating. This anticipation gives the patient
further incentives to exaggerate and so on. The appropriate model to analyze such a
“rat race” is the cheap talk framework. This paper will therefore extend the canonical
cheap talk model to the imperfect information setting typical for the health sector. Al-
though a complete breakdown of communication can be prevented, communication will
be worse in equilibrium because of the misalignment of interests, i.e. less information
is transmitted from patient to doctor. It is shown that this communication effect can
make a system without cost incentives preferable from a social welfare point of view. If
the patient’s collaboration is hardly needed, a system with cost incentives is preferable.
For example, a doctor can easily establish that a patient has a broken leg by having an
X-ray. The symptoms reported by the patient are less important in this case. If, on the
other hand, an illness might have a psychological background, the patient’s collaboration
is essential and a system without cost incentives might be preferable.
104The importance of communication is also stressed in the aforementioned document of the German
chamber of doctors where it is stated that “health can neither be commanded nor produced since health
depends crucially on the patient’s collaboration.” Also there is a whole string of the medical literature
dealing with doctor-patient communication, see Stewart (1995) for a survey.
105Negative effects from cost incentives on the doctor-patient relationship are also established in the
medical literature, see for example Rodwin (1995), Kao et al. (1998) or Gallagher and Levinson (2004).
106There is no doubt that patients understand this nexus: According to Gallagher et al. (2001) 73%
of their respondents dislike the idea of a cost control bonus for their doctor and 91% favor disclosure to
the patient if such a bonus was in place. Furthermore, 95% of those who dislike the bonus stated that
the bonus would lower their trust in their physician.
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The main idea of the paper is a tradeoff between having the best information to base
the decision on and having the socially best decision rule. A related tradeoff is known
in organization theory. Alonso et al. (2008) ask how much autonomy division managers
should have. Giving division managers more autonomy results in better information use
in decision making but less coordination across divisions. In my paper, the only way
to get better information (from the patient) is a socially less desirable decision rule for
the doctor. In both papers, there is a tradeoff between the quality of information and
the quality of the decision rule (for a given information structure). The downside of an
informed decision in Alonso et al. (2008) is a lack of coordination while in my paper
it will be the neglect of costs. A major technical difference between the papers is that
division managers (headquarters manager) have full (no) information in Alonso et al.
(2008) while doctor and patient will both receive a noisy signal in my model. This setup
seems to be closer to reality in the health sector.
From a technical point of view, the paper contributes to the cheap talk literature
following the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Their model is extended in
de Barreda (2010) to a setup where the decision maker receives a noisy signal. My paper
generalizes further by substituting the perfect information on the sender/expert/patient
side by a noisy signal.
This paper complements existing literature on the design of health care systems.
Early contributions as Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968) already point out the moral haz-
ard caused by health insurance: Insured patients might overconsume treatment from a
social welfare perspective because they are insured. Ma and McGuire (1997) introduce
the physician as an additional player and analyze contractual difficulties in the health
market. In particular, health outcome and doctor’s effort are non-contractible and even
the quantity of care consumed can be subject to misreporting. Ma and McGuire (1997)
analyze how these contractual constraints influence optimal contracts between insurance
and patient as well as between insurance and physician. My paper focuses on a different
kind of constraint, i.e. a constraint in information transmission arising in the commu-
nication between doctor and patient. It will be shown that the necessity of information
transmission between patient and doctor might constrain the power of the incentive
scheme offered to the doctor.
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Obviously related is the literature on physician compensation and managed care.
In his survey of the managed care literature, Glied (2000) mentions two problems of
“supply-side cost sharing,” i.e. cost incentives for physicians: (i) underprovision of nec-
essary services and (ii) strong incentives to avoid costly cases. In this context, my paper
adds a third problem: Hampered information transmission between doctor and patient.
Furthermore, my paper provides one possible explanation for the ambiguous cost effect
of managed care mentioned in Glied (2000).
The medical literature contains statements like “payment arrangements could sig-
nificantly undermine patients’ beliefs that their physicians are acting as their agents”
(Mechanic and Schlesinger, 1996) and emphasizes that there should be no conflict of
interest between patient and doctor (Emanuel and Dubler, 1995). Kao et al. (1998)
find that patients trust their physician less if the physician is capitated than when he is
payed on a fee for service basis. Physicians are also less satisfied with their relationships
with capitated patients compared to their average patient (Kerr et al., 1997). My paper
contributes by formalizing why trust, interpreted as shared objectives, is vital for the
patient-physician relationship. Such a formalization is interesting for two reasons: First,
it allows for both costs (less trust) and benefits (less overtreatment) of cost incentives.
Second, one can obtain results concerning the optimal design of health care systems, i.e.
where in the health system are aligned interests especially important and where could
cost incentives improve welfare.
The next section introduces the model and is followed by a simple numerical example.
This example illustrates the main points. Section 5.4 analyzes a general model and
answers the question: When do cost incentives work? The final section concludes by
discussing certain assumptions and pointing out testable predictions as well as possible
applications in different areas.
5.2. Formal setting
Patient and doctor have a common prior F over the set of all possible health states of
the patient. The set of health states is denoted by Θ. A health state can be interpreted
either as the severity of a given disease or as a set containing different diseases. The
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patient receives a private signal σp ∈ Σp about his health state. In practice this signal
can be interpreted as the symptoms a patient can report to his doctor or as the intensity
of his symptoms. The doctor receives also a private signal σd ∈ Σd about the patient’s
health. This signal can be interpreted as the result of the doctor’s examination, e.g. his
interpretation of an X-ray photograph or listening to the patient’s heartbeat. Given the
health state, there is a distribution G(σp, σd|θ) of signals which is common knowledge.
Put differently, G(σp, σd|θ) gives the probabilities that a patient (doctor) receives signal
σp (σd) given a health state θ.
The timing is the following: First, the patient’s health state is determined by nature.
This health state is unknown to doctor and patient. Second, doctor and patient receive
their signals σ = (σp, σd) which correspond to the true health state through G. Third,
the patient can send a message, e.g. communicating his signal, to the doctor. Fourth,
the doctor determines a treatment τ from a set of available treatments. The costs of the
treatment c(τ) are paid for by the patient’s insurance.
Utility of the patient depends only on his true health state θ ∈ Θ and the treatment
τ . In particular, a patient’s well being does in the end not depend on the signals. For
the doctor, I look at two scenarios: Either the doctor has “no cost incentives” which
means that he makes his treatment decision to maximize the patient’s utility or he is
“cost sensitive” (or “has cost incentives”) with which I mean that he maximizes social
welfare. Social welfare is the patient’s utility minus costs. The perspective of the paper
is therefore eventually the perspective of a (benevolent) designer of the health system,
e.g. a government or an insurance plan, who has to determine which kind of incentives
he gives to the doctor.
5.3. A simple example
This section deals with a small numerical example which illustrates that cost incentives
can lead to lower welfare. Take Θ = {A,B,C} and Σp = Σd = {0, 1}. In words, there
are three diseases called A, B and C. One can interpret health states either as similar
diseases or as levels of severity of the same disease. Doctor and patient will each receive
one of two possible signals which are denoted by 0 and 1. For example, the patient’s
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signal could be whether he feels “no/little pain”or “strong pain”while the doctor’s signal
could be whether the patient’s heartbeat is unusual or not. The prior F is given by
disease A and B occurring with probability 2/5 each and disease C with probability 1/5.
The distribution G is given in the following table:
prior 2/5 2/5 1/5
σ A B C
(0,0) 4/5 0 0
(0,1) 0 0 1
(1,0) 0 4/5 0
(1,1) 1/5 1/5 0
The interpretation is that, given health state A, signal (σp, σd) = (0, 0) occurs with
probability 4/5 and signal (σp, σd) = (1, 1) occurs with probability 1/5. Assume that
there are three available treatments which are denoted by a, b and c. The patient’s
utility and the costs of each treatment are given in the following table:
A B C costs
a 8 5 8 5
b 10 10 9 8
c 1 1 10 0
To illustrate: A patient with disease A receiving treatment a has a utility of 8.
Treatment a costs 5. Therefore, welfare would be 8− 5 = 3 in this situation.
One interpretation is that “disease”C is being healthy and treatment c is the option
“no treatment”. Treatment b is a very effective but also very expensive treatment while a
is not so effective but substantially cheaper. A quick calculation shows that treatment a
is welfare maximizing in health state A where welfare is defined by patient utility minus
costs. The same is true for b in health state B and c in C.
5.3.1. No cost incentives
If the doctor has no cost incentives, the incentives of doctor and patient are aligned. The
patient will therefore communicate his true signal σp in equilibrium.107 The doctor can
107In principle, there is also a pooling equilibrium in which the doctor takes only his own signal into
account and the patient sends the same message regardless of his signal. However, this equilibrium is
Pareto dominated and does not seem very realistic.
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then base his decision on both signals and maximizes gross consumer surplus. Hence,
the doctor knows the disease whenever the signals are (0, 0), (0, 1) or (1, 0). If the signal
is (1, 1), the doctor assigns equal probabilities to disease A and B. This leads to the
following optimal decisions: (0, 0) → b, (0, 1) → c, (1, 0) → b and (1, 1) → b




















5.3.2. Cost sensitive doctor
If the doctor is cost sensitive, his preferred decisions (if he knew both signals) would be:
(0, 0) → a, (0, 1) → c, (1, 0) → b and (1, 1) → b. Hence, there is a conflict between
the patient and the doctor whenever the signal is (0, 0): The doctor prefers treatment a
while the patient prefers b. Next, I write down the optimal decision of the doctor if he
only knows his own signal σd. If σd = 0, he assigns equal probability to disease A and
B. Therefore, the optimal treatment is b. If σd = 1, he assigns probability 2/9 to disease
A, 2/9 to disease B and 5/9 to disease C. It is straightforward to calculate that in this
case the optimal treatment is c.
In principle, there could be two kinds of equilibrium: First, a separating equilibrium
in which the patient truthfully reports his signal to the doctor, i.e. the two signals are
separated. Second, a pooling equilibrium in which the patient sends the same message
regardless of his signal.
Suppose there is a separating equilibrium, i.e. the patient communicates his signal
σp truthfully to the doctor in equilibrium. The doctor will then implement the welfare
maximizing treatment knowing both signals. If σp = 0, the patient expects–given his
signal–to get a utility of utruth = 8/13 ∗ 8 + 5/13 ∗ 10 = 114/13.109 If however the
patient lied and communicated σp = 1, the doctor would implement treatment b and the
patient’s expected utility would be ulie = 8/13 ∗ 10 + 5/13 ∗ 9 = 125/13. Hence, lying
pays off for the agent and there cannot be a separating equilibrium.
108Just to illustrate: The first term is the probability of being in state A and receiving the signal (0, 0),
i.e. 2/5 ∗ 4/5, multiplied with the utility of the resulting treatment b in state A, i.e. 10, minus the costs
of this treatment, i.e. 8.
109Given σp = 0, the patient assigns probability 8/13 to health state A with signal σ = (0, 0) which
leads to treatment a. With the counter probability 5/13, he expects state C with signal σ = (0, 1) and
treatment c.
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Consequently, there is a pooling equilibrium in which the doctor uses only his own




















Since W c < W nci, cost incentives reduce welfare in this example. Nevertheless,
costs are lower if the doctor is cost sensitive since the signal (1, 1) leads to the low cost
treatment c while b is prescribed without cost incentives. The driving force behind this
result are the conflicting objectives of patient and doctor which result in a break down
of communication.
5.3.3. Variation I: Restricting the choice set
Interestingly, there is an easy fix in this example: Suppose, the health authority does
not clear treatment a. Hence, treatment a is not available. But then there is no conflict
between doctor and patient as even a cost sensitive doctor will now prescribe b if the signal
(0, 0) occurs. Unfortunately, this means that cost incentives simply do not matter/work:
Every signal leads to the same treatment with and without cost incentives. Furthermore,
this trick will not always work: Amend the example above with a disease D which can
be identified with certainty (so there would be a signal (2, 2) which occurs if and only
if the health state is D). If in this state D treatment a is by far superior to all other
treatments, a health authority banning treatment a would reduce welfare.
5.3.4. Variation II: Increasing costs
The negative information effect of cost incentives can be so strong that costs can be
higher under cost incentives. To see this, change the example above by changing the ex
ante probability of disease C from 1/5 to pc < 1/5 and assign the ex ante probability
(1 − pc)/2 to sickness A and B. Note that this does not change decisions without cost
incentives as it is always perfectly known whether one is in state C or not.
If, however, pc is small enough and the doctor knows only his own signal, he will
prescribe treatment b instead of treatment c when he receives signal σd = 1. This
inevitably leads to higher costs than without cost incentives: Now b is always prescribed
while c was prescribed without cost incentives for signal σ = (0, 1). Note that a lower pc
will make the incentive constraint of a separating equilibrium even tougher, i.e. reducing
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pc does not lead to a separating equilibrium. It turns out that in the example expected
costs are higher with cost incentives if pc < 2/41.
This result is slightly reminiscent of the empirical results concerning the cost effects of
managed care. One feature of many managed care plans are cost incentives for doctors,
e.g. cost control boni or capitation payment. As Glied (2000) reports in his survey,
results on the cost effect of managed care are however inconclusive: Some studies report
higher costs, some report lower costs or no cost difference between managed care and
traditional care plans.
5.4. Model and results
This section uses a more general model to analyze the setting and effect described before.
There are two reasons why this is desirable: First, one has to verify that the effects
described above are not due to the discrete nature of the example. Second, this will
allow to determine under which circumstances cost incentives are welfare maximizing
and therefore have implications for the optimal design of a health care system.
The patient’s message in the example above is “cheap talk”: The message itself does
not have direct payoff implications. Only the treatment decision is relevant for the
patient’s utility and welfare. The canonical model for cheap talk games is Crawford and
Sobel (1982). To fit the health sector, the information structure of Crawford and Sobel
(1982) has to be amended as described below.
I assume that health state θ is a real number from some bounded interval and also
σp, σd and τ are assumed to be real numbers.110 Without loss of generality take Θ = [0, 1].
Again one can interpret the health state either as the severity of a given disease or one
views Θ as a continuum of diseases. Higher signals are assumed to imply higher expected
states. To make this formal define by H(θ|σp, σd) the cumulative distribution function
which gives the probability that the state is below θ given signals σp and σd. This
distribution is derived from F (θ) and G(σp, σd|θ) using Bayes’ rule. The assumption is
that H(θ|σp, σd) first order stochastically dominates H(θ|σp′, σd
′
) whenever σd ≥ σd
′
and
σp ≥ σp′. In words, a higher signal implies that higher health states are more likely to
110Restricting τ to some interval, e.g. R+ is possible as explained in footnote 114. Drawing the signals
from some closed subset of R simplifies matters, see assumption 5.1.
135
Chapter 5: Cost incentives for doctors
occur.
Patient utility u(θ−τ) is a function of “distance”between health state and treatment.
It is assumed that the patient is fully insured, i.e. costs of treatment do not enter his
utility function. Assume that u(θ − τ) is two times continuously differentiable, strictly
concave and attains its maximum at 0. Put differently, patient utility is maximized if
τ = θ and is lower the further away treatment τ is from this ideal treatment. A treatment
above (below) θ corresponds to overtreatment (undertreatment) from the patient’s point
of view. It is not assumed that u(·) is symmetric and therefore over- and undertreatment
might affect utility in different ways. The cost function c(τ) is strictly increasing and
marginal costs are bounded away from 0, i.e. c′(τ) ≥ δ ∀τ for some δ > 0. This last
assumption implies that the patient’s utility is never aligned with the social objective
or, put differently, the patient always prefers a more expensive treatment than socially
optimal because he is insured. If there was no such conflict, cost incentives would simply
not matter for the outcome. Consequently, introducing cost incentives could not even
help to reduce costs.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. After observing his
signal σp a patient updates his beliefs about his health state θ and about the doctor’s
signal. Given σp, a strategy for the patient is a probability distribution over Σp denoted
by q(m|σp).111 This distribution gives the probability of reporting m ∈ Σp when the
true signal is σp. For illustration purposes, think of a partition equilibrium in which
patients with signals in, say, [0.3, 0.4] are bunched, i.e. send the same message. In
this case q(m|σp) could be a uniform distribution over [0.3, 0.4] for all σp ∈ [0.3, 0.4].
Given his signal σd and the message he receives from the patient, the doctor updates his
beliefs about the health state of the patient θ and chooses his preferred treatment. For
simplicity, I assume that u(θ− τ)− c(τ) is strictly concave in τ which implies that there
is a unique socially efficient treatment τw. This assumption is, for example, satisfied if
c(τ) is linear or convex. Hence, the doctor will always have a unique preferred treatment
which I denote by τd(m, σd). The strategies (q(m|σp), τd(m, σd)) form an equilibrium if:
1. For each σp, q(m|σp) is a distribution, i.e.
∫ 1
0
q(m|σp) dm = 1, and if q(m∗|σp) > 0





u(|θ− τd(m, σd)|) dP (θ, σd|σp) where P (θ, σd|σp) is the




distribution of (θ, σd) derived from G(σp, σd|θ) and F (θ) conditional on observing
σp and using Bayes’ rule.112
2. For each m and σd, treatment maximizes the doctor’s objective. For the cost sensi-
tive doctor, this means that τd(m, σd) = argmaxτ
∫ 1
0
[u(θ − τ)− c(τ)] dH(θ|m, σd)
where with a slight abuse of notation H(θ|m, σd) is the distribution of the health
state conditional on observing σd and m using by Bayes’ rule (given G(σp, σd|θ),





In words, the first condition says that the patient reports with positive probability only
signals maximizing his utility given the strategy of the doctor. The second condition
establishes that the doctor uses an optimal strategy given the patient’s equilibrium be-
havior.
For the analysis of this model the following technical assumption proves to be useful.
Note that the boundedness part is automatically satisfied if Hσp is continuous and the
signal σ is drawn from a closed set, i.e. if Σp and Σd are closed intervals.
Assumption 5.1. H(θ|σp, σd) is differentiable in σp and |Hσp(θ|σ
p, σd)| is bounded from
above by some M > 0. At all states where H(θ|σp, σd) has a density h(θ|σp, σd), this
density is also differentiable in σp and hσp is bounded.
Put differently, beliefs about the true health state do not change too sharply if the
patient’s signal changes marginally. Note that slightly irregular distribution, e.g. with
mass points at a “healthy state” θ = 0, can be allowed. Assumption 5.1 simplifies the
analysis by ensuring that the doctor’s treatment decision is differentiable in the patient’s
signal. In fact, it implies that there is an upper bound on how strongly the doctor’s
treatment decision reacts to a marginal change in σp (in a hypothetical situation in
which the doctor knows the patient’s signal). Loosely speaking, this means that a patient
who exaggerates his signal a little bit will–as a consequence–only get a slightly higher
treatment. See the proof of proposition 5.1 for details.
The game is then similar to the information transmission model of Crawford and
Sobel (1982) with three additional twists: First, the doctor (receiver in the language of
112Note that the patient takes expectations not only over the health state but also over the doctor’s
signal because σd will influence the doctor’s treatment decision.
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Crawford and Sobel) receives a signal while he is completely ignorant in Crawford and
Sobel (1982). Second, the patient (sender) does not know the state of the world. Instead,
he has a noisy signal. Third, the divergence of interests between doctor (receiver) and
patient (sender) is not fixed but depends on the treatment (decision). The following
proposition extends results from Crawford and Sobel (1982) to this more general setting.
Proposition 5.1. With cost incentives, there exists no separating equilibrium. There
exist partitioning equilibria on the range of σp. Each part of this partition has a minimum
length κ which is bounded away from zero. If Σp is bounded, the number of parts in the
partition is bounded from above.
Proof. see appendix
The intuition is the following: In equilibrium, a patient cannot tell his true signal to
the doctor. If he did, the doctor would prescribe a treatment that is “too cheap” from
the patient’s point of view (as the patient does not care about costs). Hence, the patient
would have an incentive to overstate his signal. In practice, this would mean to claim
additional symptoms or to overstate the intensity of existing symptoms. What happens
in equilibrium is that the patient’s signal range is partitioned and the patient reports in
which part of the partition his signal lies. The doctor does not know the precise signal
of the patient but gets a rough idea which he takes into consideration when choosing the
treatment. Because of the partitioning, a patient can no longer overstate his signal “a
little bit”. If the patient deviated by reporting a higher part of the partition, he would get
a substantially higher treatment. In equilibrium he will not deviate because he expects
this treatment to be too high. One could interpret this in the following two ways: First,
a patient does not want to report symptoms that are too much different from the real
ones as this could mislead the doctor, i.e. result in treating the wrong illness. Second,
extreme overstatement of symptoms could result in too strong medication with severe
side effects. Hence, the patient does not want to overstate his existing symptoms too
much.
It is also clear that the partition cannot be arbitrarily fine: If the parts are too small,
then overstating one’s signal “a little bit” is again possible. This explains the minimum
length statement in the proposition. The minimum part length immediately implies that




The mechanism through which cost incentives can harm welfare is the same as in the
example of section 5.3: If the objectives of doctor and patient are different, the patient has
an incentive to use his information strategically to get the more expensive treatment he
wants. In equilibrium, the doctor will have less information (partitioning of signal range)
compared to the situation without cost incentives. Consequently, he is more prone to
make inappropriate treatment decisions. In short, there are two effects when introducing
cost incentives: First, costs are taken into account which, ceteris paribus, decreases costs
and increases welfare. Put differently, the doctor stops prescribing excessively expensive
treatments. Second, communication and therefore the information of the doctor is worse.
Hence, treatment decisions are less accurate which reduces welfare. Whether the cost
or the information effect dominates is ex ante unclear. The following propositions show
that in two extreme cases the cost effect dominates and therefore cost incentives lead to
higher welfare than no cost incentives.
Proposition 5.2. Welfare is higher with cost incentives if the doctor’s signal is suffi-
ciently informative. That is, given G(σp, σd|θ), there exists an ε > 0 such that cost in-
centives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if the doctor’s signal is drawn from
εG(σp, σd|θ)+ (1− ε)1θ where 1θ is a distribution putting all probability mass on θ. Cost
incentives lead also to higher welfare if the patient’s signal is sufficiently uninformative,
i.e. for ε > 0 small enough if the patient’s signal is drawn from εG(σp, σd|θ) + (1− ε)Uθ
where Uθ is the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
Proof. see appendix
This result is intuitive: If the doctor is able to determine the patient’s health state
almost on his own, i.e. without knowing the patient’s signal, then the patient’s signal
is useless. Therefore, the information effect of introducing cost incentives is small while
the cost effect is still there.
One interpretation of proposition 5.2 is that cost incentives become eventually more
attractive with medical progress. This holds at least true if medical progress implies
better diagnosis possibilities for doctors. Consequently, one might then expect to see
more cost incentive elements in health care systems over time.
A second interpretation is that some specialists optimally should have cost incentives
while others should not. A radiologist or a trauma surgeon will normally base his deci-
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sions on his own examination and less on the patient’s report. This might be less true
for an internist or a general practitioner.
A related third interpretation is that an optimal health care system should incorpo-
rate selective cost incentives. More precisely, cost incentives should be applied for the
treatment of diseases where the doctor’s information is relatively more important than
the patient’s information.
Proposition 5.3. Cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if social
and private objectives differ sufficiently. That is, for any given information structure and
cost function c(τ) there exists an α > 0 such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare
than no cost incentives under the cost function αc(τ).
Proof. see appendix
The intuition is that the cost effect will become dominant if (marginal) costs are high
enough. Consequently, the information loss due to cost incentives is negligible compared
to the cost effect.
In line with previous interpretations cost incentives are especially useful for specialists
dealing with high cost treatments on a regular basis. Also diseases involving high cost
treatment on a regular basis are especially well suited for cost incentives.
The previous propositions illustrate when cost incentives are superior to no cost
incentives. Now, I want to give an example where no cost incentives are superior to cost
incentives. In fact, I can use the same example as Crawford and Sobel (1982) which is
attractive for two reasons: First, it is very simple and allows therefore for an analytical
solution. Second, it has been used repeatedly in the cheap talk literature and has become
a benchmark example there.
Example 5.1. Health states are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The patient has per-
fect knowledge of the health state while the doctor’s signal is completely uninformative.
Assume that the patient’s utility function is a quadratic loss function, i.e. u(θ, τ) =
−(θ − τ)2, and that the cost function is linear in treatment, i.e. c(τ) = ατ . Given the
information that σp (which is now the true health state) is in the interval (s1, s2), the op-
timal treatment decision for a doctor with cost incentives is τ = s1+s2−α
2
. With α = 1/10
the model is mathematically equivalent to the example in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
It is shown there that the finest possible equilibrium partition is (0, 2/15, 7/15, 1), i.e.
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a patient will report whether his signal is in [0, 2/15) or in [2/15, 7/15) or in [7/15, 1].
Utility of a patient with state θ in [0, 2/15) is given by −(1/60−θ)2, with θ ∈ (2/15, 7/15)
utility is −(1/4− θ)2 and with θ ∈ (7/15, 1) utility is −(41/60− θ)2. Expected consumer


















































Hence expected welfare is −0.01058 − 0.045 = −0.05558. Note that this is an upper
bound on welfare: Of course, there are also equilibria with partitions consisting of only
two parts or one part. It is easy to check that these equilibria result in lower welfare.
Without cost incentives the patient will truthfully reveal his signal and therefore com-
municate the true health state to the doctor. Consequently, τ = θ and consumer welfare is
0. Expected costs are 1
10
0.5 = 0.05 which results in expected welfare of −0.05. Therefore,
no cost incentives lead to higher welfare than cost incentives.
To conclude this section, think of a generalization: Say, the planner could set to which
extent the doctor takes costs into account, i.e. the doctor maximizes the expected value
of u(θ − τ)− βc(τ) with his treatment decision where β ∈ [0, 1] is set by the planner. I
want to argue that β = 1 is normally not optimal. Hence, a welfare maximizing planner
does not want a welfare maximizing doctor. The idea is the following: Say β = 1
induces the partition [s0, s1, . . . , sN ]. Now suppose β is decreased marginally (starting
from β = 1) and assume for now that the partition remained the same: The doctor
will prescribe higher treatments in response. As he was welfare maximizer before this
change, this will only have a second order effect on welfare (if the partition did not
change). However, there will be a first order information effect: Because the doctor
prescribes higher treatments, a patient with signal σp = s1 is no longer indifferent but
strictly prefers to report in the (s0, s1) part of the partition. Consequently, a patient
with σp = s1 will only be indifferent if s2 is reduced. Hence, the partition can become
finer.
Of course, there are some caveats to this intuition: For example, it might be hard
in practice to fine tune doctor’s incentives in such a precise way. In particular, doctors
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will be heterogenous in how much they respond to incentives. Nevertheless, the intuition
above suggests that a welfare maximizing planner does not want doctors to naively
maximize welfare also in more general settings than the one discussed in this paper.
5.5. Discussion and conclusion
Introducing cost incentives for doctors turns out to be a double-edged sword: On the
one hand, taking costs into consideration should avoid the prescription of too expensive
treatments. On the other hand, misalignment of patient’s and doctor’s incentives will
hamper communication between the two: The patient has an incentive to exaggerate
and in equilibrium this leads to signal bunching. Consequently, the doctor has worse
information and is less likely to assess the patient’s health state correctly. Knowing
about the uncertainty he might even choose more expensive treatments to be on the safe
side. In a numerical example, this can lead to higher costs than under no cost incentives
(see section 5.3).
If costs are very high or if the doctor is able to assess the health state very accu-
rately given only his signal, cost incentives are the welfare maximizing policy. This shows
that an optimal health care system will use different degrees of cost incentives in dif-
ferent circumstances. In practice, cost incentives could differ across diseases and across
specialists.
One could interpret trust as congruence in decision making, e.g. shared objectives.
In this interpretation, the model in this paper allows to formalize the idea that trust
is important in the patient-doctor relationship. A lack of trust reduces the quality of
communication and eventually the quality of the doctor’s diagnosis. This effect could
constrain contracting between insurances and doctors.
Note that some seemingly strong assumptions are actually not very restrictive: The
concentration on two extreme cases where the doctor either maximizes patient utility or
total welfare is obviously not realistic. The main effect, that diverging objectives lead to
worse communication, however, holds true whenever the doctor cares more about costs
than the patient. By the same argument, it is not restrictive to assume full indemnity
insurance: The main point is that the patient does not bear the full social costs which
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is a feature of any form of insurance. The results do therefore not depend on a specific
form of insurance. One can interpret the costs c(τ) simply as the part of treatment costs
paid by the patient’s health insurance.
In some sense, the model is a best case scenario for the benevolent designer: He can
freely set the doctor’s incentives without incurring any costs. In practice setting up an
incentive scheme for doctors might actually be costly. Doctors might also not respond
immediately because of previously formed habits. It is therefore even more remarkable
that the designer might not want to give cost incentives to the doctor in the model of
this paper.
The model gives several testable predictions. Quality of diagnosis should decrease
after an introduction of cost incentives for doctors. Such a quality decrease could be
reflected in the data in different ways: First, therapies could be changed more often (if
the doctor realizes the error at a later stage). Second, patients with a given diagnosis-
treatment pair will be treated less successfully (e.g. take longer to recover) because some
receive the wrong treatment due to a wrong diagnosis. These effects should be more
pronounced for specialists and diseases where patient input is vital for the diagnosis. If
trust reflects the willingness to communicate, one should expect patient’s trust in their
doctor to be lower when their doctor has cost incentives. This last result is indeed
confirmed by the health literature, see for example Kao et al. (1998).
More abstract, a welfare maximizing sponsor (say a benevolent government) might
prefer a decision maker (doctor) who shares his preferences not with the sponsor but with
the patient. In a broader context an agent might benefit from surrendering his interests
when information provision by another party is important. This could have applications
in other contexts like mediation: A mediator with decision power who shares the interests
of another party might be preferable to making the decision oneself.
In general, shared objectives prove to be vital for information provision. Patient
advocacy can therefore be seen as an institutional response to the importance of infor-
mation provision by patients. Consequently, one might expect similar institutions to
emerge whenever information provision by affected parties is vital. In this context, the
relationship between a lawyer and his client could serve as an additional example.
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5.6. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 5.1: The proof proceeds in a number of steps. The first three
steps establish that there cannot be a separating equilibrium, i.e. there is no equilibrium
in which a patient always reports his true signal. Consequently, patients with some
signals are bunched together. Patients in one “bunch” (one part of a partition of the
signal range) send the same report to the doctor. Steps four and five establish that each
part of a partition must have a minimum length, i.e. the partition cannot be arbitrarily
fine.




τ) − c(τ)] dH(θ|m, σd) + b ≤ argmaxτ
∫ 1
0
u(θ − τ) dH(θ|m, σd) for a given equilibrium
strategy q(m|σp); i.e. the patient would opt for an at least b higher treatment than a
cost sensitive doctor if he chose (and had the same information). This follows from the
first order conditions corresponding to the two argmax expressions
∫ 1
0







The left hand side of (5.3) is continuous in τ and also strictly decreasing in τ . Since
c′(τ) ≥ δ > 0 and u′(·) is continuous, the claim follows. This argument is for a given
(m, σd) but the infimum of all these b over (m, σd) will also be strictly positive. To
establish this, it is sufficient to show that the derivative of the left hand side of (5.3)
with respect to τ is bounded:113 Since u′(θ − x) > 0 for x ≥ 1 and any θ ∈ [0, 1], the
optimal treatment is bounded from above by 1. Furthermore, the optimal treatment
is bounded from below by τ solving u′(−τ ) = c′(τ ), i.e. the optimal treatment if the
doctor knew that θ = 0. Therefore −1 ≤ θ − τ ≤ 1 − τ . By the continuity of u′′(·)
and the compactness of [−1, 1− τ ], u′′(·) is bounded on this interval. Consequently, the
derivative of the left hand side of (5.3) is a weighted (by the distribution H(·)) average
of a bounded function and therefore bounded. Denote by B > 0 such a bound on the
derivative of the left hand side of (5.3). Then we can choose b = δ/B.114
113Just to illustrate why boundedness is sufficient: Say the derivative of the left hand side of (5.3) is
between 0 and −B. Since this left hand side is differentiable, the two τ solving (5.3) with the right hand
side equal to zero and equal to c′(τ) have to differ by at least δ/B.
114If the treatment is restricted to be larger than, say, 0, the argument still holds true as long as
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Second, the patient’s expected utility is under separating higher under a slightly
higher decision than the cost sensitive doctor takes. From the first step and the strict
concavity of u(·) it follows that any treatment in (τd, τd + b) yields a higher expected
utility for the patient than τd.
Third, in a hypothetical separating equilibrium the patient attains a higher utility
by misrepresenting slightly upwards as the doctor will increase his decision uniformly













[u′′(θ − τ)− c′′(τ)] dH(θ|σp, σd)
. (5.4)
The denominator is obviously positive as it is (−1) times the second order condition
of the doctor’s maximization problem. The numerator is positive as well because of
stochastic dominance: As −u′(θ − τ) is a strictly increasing function of θ, we have
∫ 1
0
−u′(θ − τ) dH1(θ) >
∫ 1
0
−u′(θ − τ) dH2(θ) whenever H1(θ) first order stochastically
dominates H2(θ). Since H(θ|σ
p′, σd) first order stochastically dominates H(θ|σp, σd)
whenever σp′ > σp, the numerator has to be positive. The uniform continuity follows
from the boundedness of 5.4: The numerator is bounded by assumption 5.1 and the
fact that u′(θ− τ) is bounded on the relevant range. The strict concavity of the doctor’s
program implies that the denominator is strictly bounded away from zero.115 By uniform
continuity, misrepresentation can be chosen small enough to prevent an “overreaction”
by the doctor.
Consequently, there cannot be a separating equilibrium. The same argument shows
that also locally, i.e. on some subinterval of the patient’s signal range, there cannot be
a perfect separation of types, i.e. patient signals have to be bunched in equilibrium.
Fourth, in a partition equilibrium communicating a higher partition will result in
a higher treatment decision. This follows from the fact that higher signals σp indicate
higher health states θ and the doctor’s optimal treatment decision is increasing in θ.
Formally speaking, H(θ|(s1, s2), σ




H(0|0, 0) < 1. A patient will then always desire a treatment that is strictly bounded away from 0.
Therefore, interests of patient and doctor are not aligned even if the constraint τ ≥ 0 is binding.
115To be precise, this follows as the treatment range is bounded by τ and 1. On this closed and
bounded treatment range the maximum of the second derivative exists and constitutes the bound away
from 0.
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whenever s′1 < s
′
2 ≤ s1 < s2.
Fifth, in a partition equilibrium there exists a minimum partition length κ > 0. It
was shown earlier that the optimal treatment decision of a doctor is uniform continuous
in σp (in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Therefore, there exists a κ > 0 such
that optimal treatment decisions differ by less than b for all σp and σp′ with |σp−σp′| < κ
(in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Now suppose by way of contradiction that
there was a partition (s0, s1) with s1−s0 < κ. By the definition of κ and b, a patient with
signal σp = s0 will (in expectation) strictly prefer the cost sensitive doctor’s separating
treatment decision for type σp = s1 to the separating treatment decision for type σ
p = s0.
By concavity of u(·), he will also prefer a cost sensitive doctor’s separating treatment
decision for all types σp ∈ (s0, s1) to his own. By continuity, the same holds for patients
with a signal s0−ε for some ε > 0 small enough. Clearly, a cost sensitive doctor receiving
the message (s0, s1) will assign a treatment between the optimal separating treatment for
σp = s0 and for σ
p = s1. Therefore, a patient with signal s0 − ε will prefer the message
(s0, s1) to any message m ⊂ [0, s0].
Step five and boundedness of the patient’s signal range imply that the number of
partitions in any partition equilibrium is bounded.
A one-part-partition equilibrium (“babbling equilibrium”) in which all σp are pooled
exists always. This proves existence of partition equilibria. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 5.2: Denote the doctor’s beliefs over states θ (derived by
Bayes’ rule) given a signal drawn from εG(σp, σd|θ) + (1 − ε)1θ by k(θ, ε|σ
d). Note
that these beliefs are continuous in ε. For ε = 0, the doctor has full information and
therefore the welfare maximum is attained with cost incentives. As c′(τ) > 0, decisions
under no cost incentives differ from decisions with cost incentives. Consequently, welfare
with cost incentives is strictly higher than without cost incentives if ε = 0. As beliefs
(and therefore treatment decisions and welfare) are continuous in ε, the first part of the
proposition follows.
For the second part, note that H(θ|σp, σd) does not depend on σp if ε = 0. Con-
sequently, no information is lost when switching to cost incentives. Taking costs into
account makes cost incentives strictly superior as c′(τ) > 0. By continuity of H(θ|σp, σd)
in ε, the same conclusion holds for ε > 0 small enough. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 5.3: Since c′(τ) ≥ δ > 0, there exists an α such that
−u′(1)− αc′(0) ≤ 0.
This implies that the welfare maximizing treatment decision τ is non-positive for any
signal/message under the cost function αc(τ). Without cost incentives τ ≥ 0 and
τ(σp, σd) > 0 with strictly positive probability as
∫ 1
0
−u′(θ) dH(θ|σp, σd) > 0
whenever H(0|σp, σd) < 1. Consequently, welfare is lower without cost incentives com-
pared to the simple policy τ = 0 (regardless of the signal) under cost function αc(τ).
A cost sensitive doctor will improve on this simple policy by using the information he
has, i.e. σd. Consequently, cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives
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